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Abstract 
 
 
International roaming is a hot topic in the telecommunications industry. Many countries have 
witnessed a downward trend in mobile domestic prices. On the contrary, international 
roaming prices remained reluctant to follow the domestic trend. In Europe, the service has 
been regulated with price cap since 2007, and regulation is maintained for years to come.   
 
The existing literature on the economics of international roaming has focused on theoretical 
modelling, which assumes a uniform retail price (i.e. common across visited networks). The 
main finding is that wholesale and retail prices rise with the number of visited networks. 
Additionally, vertical merger is found unprofitable; and home network steering does not 
cause downward pressure on wholesale prices. 
 
We found that the assumption of uniform retail pricing leads to results that are inconsistent 
with wholesale competition because visited networks appear in the demand as complements 
rather than substitutes. We present theoretical models that match the existing literature’s 
findings, and compare results to the case whereby the retail price is discriminatory (i.e. 
differs by visited networks). With discriminatory retail, substitutability of networks reduces 
prices, and the incentive for vertical merger exists. In a steering game, steering is found able 
to reduce wholesale prices; and networks alliances are formed in equilibrium. 
 
The empirical literature on international roaming is limited to few industry studies. We use an 
aggregated dataset on prices and quantities for networks visited by roamers from one major 
mobile provider whose subscribers travel a lot across the world, Etisalat. The study period 
witnessed a retail price shift from discriminatory to uniform. The main findings are: (1) 
competition, as measured by the number of visited networks, reduces wholesale price; (2) 
traffic steering is effective, especially towards preferred networks (alliance and cross-
owned); (3) only alliance networks offer wholesale discounts; and (4) demand is more elastic 
than crude industry studies.  
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Chapter (1). Introduction 
 
 
 
When two mobile networks licensed in two different countries sign a bilateral Inter-Operator 
Tariff (IOT) agreement, their subscribers are allowed to roam across the networks with their 
phone handsets to make or receive phone calls and text messages (SMS), and to access 
mobile wireless internet.  
 
Many countries have witnessed a declining trend in most mobile domestic prices due to 
different reasons such as competitive pressures, price regulation and technological 
improvements that increased networks efficiency. On the contrary, international roaming 
prices had increased and remained reluctant to follow the domestic trend. Inspired by this 
phenomenon, we are interested in understanding how networks would set their wholesale 
prices under their bilateral IOT agreements, which also affect their retail prices.  
 
The existing literature assumes the roamer only cares about the average retail price, and 
hence the retail price used in the demand is uniform. The home network marks up the 
average wholesale price. We introduce in the modelling the assumption of retail prices that 
differ by visited networks (i.e. discriminatory). The assumptions made on retail pricing 
(uniform versus discriminatory) give opposite predictions with regards to competition and the 
incentives for networks to vertically merge. 
 
The empirical literature on wholesale competition is limited to few industry studies. We make 
use of an aggregated dataset on prices and quantities for networks visited by roamers from 
one major mobile provider whose subscribers travel a lot across the world, Etisalat. The 
study period records a shift in Etisalat retail pricing policy (from discriminatory to uniform), 
which provides an empirical experiment to measure wholesale competition. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section (1.1) explains international roaming in the 
context of mobile services. Section (1.2) provides thesis motivations, and Section (1.3) 
outlines the next chapters. 
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1.1 The Service Of Mobile International Roaming 
 
If a mobile network is closed, its subscribers can only communicate within the network’s 
subscribers. If the network interconnects with other networks (i.e. signs 
interconnection/wholesale agreements), it enables its subscribers to communicate with 
subscribers to those networks. Interconnection agreements therefore make networks 
compatible. 
 
Interconnection agreements can be classified into two types: one-way access, whereby only 
one network needs to access the facility of another network; and two-way access whereby 
the two networks need access to one another’s facilities. The agreeing networks can be 
competing within the same geographic market, or operating in different geographic markets.  
 
Mobile-to-mobile (MTM) call termination access for off-net calls and national roaming tariffs 
are examples of wholesale prices of interconnection agreements within a geographic market. 
In parallel, international settlement rate agreements for terminating international calls and 
international roaming tariffs (IOT) are examples of wholesale prices of cross-border 
interconnection agreements. If interconnection charges are per unit of use, they act as 
“perceived marginal cost” to the network that incurs them.  
 
This thesis concentrates on international roaming services governed by IOT agreements that 
allow a home network subscriber to use his same phone number while using (roaming on) a 
foreign network1. IOT agreements are typically a bilateral (two-way access) agreement. 
 
Despite international roaming similarities with other telecommunications services that involve 
interconnection agreements, international roaming has some features that make it unique, 
as explained below.  
 
The consumer of international roaming has to be in a different geographic market. He 
effectively borrows the facilities of a foreign network to originate or terminate traffics (e.g. 
making an outgoing call while roaming). The IOT agreement is between non-rivals, which is 
similar to the international settlement rate agreement for international calling. 
 
                                               
1 For a technical definition, see GSMA (2013). 
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With national roaming, the consumer usually does not pay a premium for any mobile service 
when roaming on a different network than his home network within the same market. In other 
words, retail prices are the same whether the consumer uses his home network or any other 
domestic network. In addition, in areas where the home network provides coverage, the 
consumer cannot select manually (on his handset) between networks other than his home 
network. Given no price differentials, consumers typically leave handsets on automatic mode 
to be picked up by the home network or by its national roaming partners in areas the home 
network has a lack of coverage. 
 
On the contrary, with international roaming, the consumer is usually aware that the traffic he 
uses costs a premium2 when roaming in a foreign land, and he will be charged for incoming 
calls3. Paying for incoming calls (rather than free) is supposed to eliminate consumer’s 
substitutability in call making-receiving4. In addition, the consumer can select manually (on 
his handset) between visited networks that are IOT partners of his home network. In other 
words, the consumer can choose a wholesale supplier to his home network. We will later 
assume the consumer leaves his handset on automatic mode if there are no price 
differentials.  
 
The home network collects retail roaming revenues from its travelling subscribers, and pays 
IOTs (i.e. wholesale prices) to visited networks5 for the use of their facilities. The retail price 
is typically the IOT plus a markup6.  
 
Retail prices for international roaming are generally classified into four categories which also 
represent the wholesale services in a typical IOT agreement: (i) making an outgoing call 
(destined to local phone number within the visited country or to the home country or a third 
country); (ii) receiving a call from any destination; (iii) sending a SMS to any destination7; 
and (iv) using megabytes (MB) of data roaming.  
 
In order to enjoy international roaming, the consumer has to be a subscriber to a home 
network, and this home network has an IOT agreement with visited networks. In order for his 
demand to be satisfied, the roamer has to be in an area where a visited network provides 
coverage. In populated areas, where roamers would typically visit, visited networks would 
                                               
2 Of course, the consumer can quit roaming and use outside options instead, such as using a visitor SIM-card or public 
payphones. 
3 This is true even in countries that follow the Calling Party Pay (CPP) regime. 
4 Hakim and Lu (1993) modelled international calling (under international settlement rate agreement) assuming making the call 
and receiving it as near-perfect substitutes.  
5 Mobile operators use TAP as the billing standard, by which a visited network sends billing records of roaming subscribers to 
their respective home network (GSMA, 2013). 
6 Some countries impose value-added tax (VAT) on wholesale or/and retail prices.  
7 Incoming SMS is free. 
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tend to have coverage overlaps that should enable roamers to substitute between visited 
networks. 
 
Roamers have two options at their handsets to select a visited network: automatic or manual 
network selection. The automatic mode is usually the default setting in mobile handsets, 
which would be typically picked up by the network with the strongest coverage signal. 
Leaving a handset on the default selection could be due to a number of reasons: (1) the 
roamer’s unawareness of manual selection; (2) unawareness of retail price differential 
between visited networks (discriminatory); or (3) the roamer has no preference over the 
visited networks. The automatic mode of handsets is a necessity for home network’s traffic 
direction technologies (i.e. steering) to take effect. 
 
The rational roamer is supposed to manually select between visited networks if this selection 
raises his utility, such as reducing his expenditure. The roamer’s manual selection is a 
demand-side substitution, which obstructs steering made by his home network (supply-side 
substitution). One way to make the roamer indifferent in the selection between visited 
networks is by charging him a uniform retail price. 
 
The roamer with prepaid subscription can enjoy international roaming if both his home 
network and the visited network installed Customised Applications for Mobile Enhanced 
Logic (CAMEL) technology to allow the home network to instantly deduct the credits 
according to usage. At the wholesale level, a visited network charges an IOT price to a home 
network with no price discrimination between the home network’s (prepaid/postpaid) 
subscribers or their place of visit within the visited market8 . At the retail level, prepaid 
subscribers tend to be charged more for roaming compared to postpaid. 
Mobile networks may involve in preferential IOT agreements in the form of cross-ownership 
or roaming alliance membership, which result in preferential wholesale prices, and lower 
retail prices when roaming on a member’s network. Vodafone and ten of its affiliates in 
Europe notified the European Commission (EC) in 2001 to set preferential wholesale prices 
and to offer a pan-Europe retail price (Eurocall) for roaming on Vodafone networks (O.J. 
2001).  
                                               
8 Networks located near borders may unintentionally cause accidental roaming. This happens if two networks are IOT partners 
and the subscriber to any of them is at his home country but near the border. If the foreign network has a stronger signal with 
coverage stretching over the subscriber whose handset is on automatic mode, the subscriber unintentionally consumes 
international roaming units and the foreign network charges IOT bills to the home network. Accidental roaming is usually solved 
through consumer complaints.  
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At the retail level, Vodafone’ Eurocall is lower for roaming on its’ cross-owned networks, but 
differs by visited networks. The practise of the home network setting retail prices that are 
discriminatory (by visited networks) used to be the common practise in this industry. Many 
mobile networks shifted from this discriminatory policy to a uniform policy9 (i.e. identical retail 
price across visited networks in the same market), despite being charged different wholesale 
prices by the visited networks, as noted by Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011).  
The practise of uniform retail policy and the formation of roaming alliances are also observed 
outside Europe. In the UAE, the mobile operators Etisalat and Du used to charge 
discriminatory retail prices. Du started offering uniform retail prices in 2008 (EITC, 2008); 
while Etisalat in 2010 started uniform prices based on geographic zones (Gulfnews.com,  
2010).  
In an IOT agreement, each mobile operator serves two distinct demands: (1) own 
subscribers at the retail level (or outbound) and (2) visitors at the wholesale level (or 
inbound). Any cross-subsidisation between the two groups (outbound and inbound roamers) 
can be a response to competition on one side, but there is no linkage between the two 
groups. That is, there is no pricing structure for the two groups that can lead to an inter-
group network externality. Hence, international roaming is not a two-sided market (Shortall, 
2010). We shall see in the next chapters that the wholesale and retail demands for a network 
are independent. 
 
Despite competition for subscribers within a market, a mobile network holds monopoly power 
in providing access to its subscriber because any communication with him has to come 
through it. This competitive bottleneck, as in Armstrong and Wright (2009), is reinforced after 
crossing borders, where different interconnection agreements may intersect to serve the 
travelling bottleneck.  
 
For example, consider a voice call by A1’s subscriber to A2’s subscriber, where A1 and A2 
are mobile networks in country A. Let us suppose that A2’s subscriber happens to be 
roaming on foreign network B. In this case, A1’s subscriber pays local (off-net) retail price to 
A1; A1 pays mobile-to-mobile (MTM) domestic access (wholesale) to A2 for terminating the 
call; A2 charges its travelling subscriber a retail price for incoming call while roaming; and A2 
pays B an international settlement rate (wholesale) for the international leg of the call plus an 
                                               
9 In Appendix (A), we show discriminatory pricing is superior to uniform pricing for a monopolist selling two substitutable goods 
with different (actual) marginal costs, ignoring upstream strategic behaviours for simplicity. This conclusion is more appealing 
as the two goods become more asymmetric in marginal costs or/and more substitutable. 
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IOT (wholesale) price for the incoming call. In this example, three interconnection 
agreements are involved: MTM access, international settlement rate and IOT.  
 
Nonetheless, interconnection agreements are complementary. An IOT agreement does not 
replace non-IOT interconnection agreements since they are typically signed independently 
and billed to end users in different transactions (Shortall, 2010). Moreover, IOT agreements 
are voluntary agreements, similar to international settlement rates 10 , and are widely 
unregulated compared to other interconnection agreements. 
 
1.2 Motivation  
 
Despite the rise in the number of mobile networks overtime, technological improvement, and 
decrease in domestic prices, prices of international mobile roaming services are exceptional 
to the observed price trend in the mobile industry. In Europe, the EC regulated international 
roaming by imposing price caps for roaming within the European Economic Area (EEA) 
countries. This phenomenon inspired the theoretical modelling of Salsas and Koboldt (2004), 
Lupi and Manenti (2009), Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011), and some others as shall be surveyed 
in Chapter (2). 
 
The gap in the theoretical modelling of wholesale competition lies in the assumption of a 
uniform retail price. By assuming a uniform price, the demand reflects visited networks as 
perfect complements rather than substitutes. This will be elaborated in the next chapters, 
and will become clear as we compare price equilibria to the case of discriminatory retail 
prices. 
 
Contrary to the existing literature, we provide a game for home network steering investment 
and roaming alliance formation, assuming uniform retail price that takes into account 
substitutability of visited networks.  
 
In addition, IOT agreements are rarely regulated as opposed to most wholesale agreements, 
making it interesting to undertake empirical research on market outcomes. We are not aware 
of any empirical paper that examines competition in international roaming.  
 
                                               
10  Cave and Donnelly (1996) describe international settlement agreements as voluntary, which satisfies Edgeworth’s 
requirement: any agreement must make both parties at least as well off as no agreement (individual rationality) and any 
agreement must be Pareto optimal. 
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We are provided with access to data on Etisalat’s outbound roaming at the visited network 
level, observed over four years. Etisalat retail prices were discriminatory in the first two 
years, then uniform in the rest of years. Such data will help in testing the theoretical 
predictions regarding the impact of the retail policy and preferential IOT partners on 
wholesale competition and on market share to explore for steering. Furthermore, the data 
will help in the estimation of the demands for visited networks.  
 
The thesis focuses on the economics of mobile international roaming because of the 
aforementioned gaps in both the theoretical and empirical literatures. We draw attentions to 
the implications of home network retail policy (discriminatory versus uniform) on consumers’ 
choice between automatic and manual network selection, and on visited networks’ wholesale 
prices and steering by the home network.  
 
1.3 Outline Of Thesis  
 
The next chapters are organized as follows. Chapter (2) reviews the literature. It starts with 
the EU experience with international roaming as a competition case. The chapter 
summarizes: the main findings of the EC’s sector inquiry, competition analyses by European 
NRAs, and the EC’s intervention in the industry. Then the chapter reviews the literature on 
vertically related industries, and reviews the existing papers on international roaming. 
Finally, the chapter places our next chapters in the context of the existing literature. 
 
Chapter (3) lays down the base model. The chapter explains the underlying assumptions 
used in modelling the behaviours of networks at the retail and wholesale levels. Then 
different wholesale pricing strategies are explored under discriminatory and uniform retail 
pricing policies. Finally, results are discussed.  
 
Chapter (4) extends the base model to address preferential IOT agreements. The chapter 
examines the incentive for networks to engage in vertical mergers, and compares results 
under discriminatory and uniform retail pricing policies. Finally, a steering game is presented 
to understand the incentive for steering investment and the formation of roaming alliances. 
 
Chapters (5) describes the dataset of Etisalat outbound roaming. The chapter explains the 
relevance of the dataset with regards to understanding wholesale competition, and explains 
the data gathering process. Finally, the dataset variables are explained and summarized.     
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Chapter (6), (7) and (8) contain the empirical estimations, using the dataset on Etisalat 
outbound roaming. Chapter (6) estimates the demands by Etisalat roamers for visited 
networks. Chapter (7) estimates the visited networks’ wholesale prices to Etisalat. The 
chapter takes into consideration the visited networks characteristics which may reflect 
preferential IOT agreements, and market structure that may reflect competition effects. 
Chapter (8) estimates visited networks’ market shares to explore for the effectiveness of 
steering by Etisalat. 
 
The Appendices at the end contain: (A) a model for a monopolist choosing between 
discriminatory and retail policies; (B) the derivations of the base model’s solutions; (C) a 
game for networks choosing between discriminatory and uniform retail policies; (D) the 
evaluations of instrumental variables used in demand estimations; (E) the estimated own 
price elasticities of demands for EEA networks; and (F) the list of all foreign networks visited 
by Etisalat roamers during the study period.  
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Chapter (2). Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the literature related to Inter-Operator Tariff (IOT) agreements between 
mobile network operators, which govern international roaming. 
 
We start with a brief history on international roaming under the EC legal framework (Section 
2.1). In Section (2.2), we provide a short survey on vertically related industries that 
encompasses interconnection agreements. Specifically, we review three papers on 
international settlement rates due to its similarity to IOT agreements; and a paper on fixed-
to-mobile network access as it is referred to in some papers that model IOT agreements. In 
Section (2.3), we extensively review the available papers on IOT agreements, including the 
ones with empirical estimations. Section (2.4) discusses the gap in the literature and how 
this thesis can contribute to the literature.   
 
2.1 International Roaming In EU 
 
2.1.1 Sector Inquiry 
 
In 1999, the EC opened a sector inquiry into mobile international roaming after receiving 
numerous complaints. This section summarizes the information contained in the EC (2000) 
document regarding the history of the IOT agreements and the initial findings.   
 
Since 1992, members of the GSM Association (GSMA) applied the Normal Network Tariff 
(NNT) regime for setting international roaming wholesale prices, which used the local retail 
price for the equivalent service as a reference price plus a 15% markup. Because the 
wholesale price was linked to the retail price in the visited market, it was subject to local 
price competition. Visited networks kept changing the reference price to the more expensive 
one in their range of retail prices (e.g. outside-the-package price for a minute of call).  
 
In 1996, the GSMA notified its Standard International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) to the 
EC for clearance from the cartel prohibition. STIRA clauses state that (i) wholesale service is 
offered exclusively by licensed mobile networks (i.e., excluding virtual networks); (ii) 
wholesale prices are non-discriminatory (i.e., applying same terms and conditions to all 
members); and (iii) wholesale prices are uploaded to the GSMA Infocentre to be accessible 
by a member network, where the member network cannot access the wholesale price set by 
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its competitor. The EC issued comfort letter conditional on the limited accessibility in item 
(iii)11.  
 
In 1998, the GSMA notified its IOT regime to the EC as the new regime for bilateral 
wholesale price setting, replacing the NNT regime. The GSMA also received the EC’s 
comfort letter. Since 1998, STIRA and IOT regime became the common framework for the 
international roaming agreements.  
 
The EC predicted that agreements based on the IOT regime would bring competition in the 
wholesale market because domestic retail prices would not be used as reference prices. 
Paradoxically, the referenced retail prices declined over time in response to domestic 
competition, while international roaming wholesale prices increased dramatically.  
 
For the sake of the sector inquiry, the EC defined the relevant national markets as: “The 
market for retail roaming services, and the market for the provision of wholesale roaming to 
foreign mobile network operators.” The initial findings in the EC (2000) are summarized as 
follows. 
 
 Revenues from international roaming amount to 10-25% of the total revenue for a 
mobile network.   
 The market has high barriers to entry with few network (oligopolists) that have similar 
cost structures.  
 Wholesale roaming is offered exclusively by licensed public mobile networks, and 
few, if any, are found to be dominant in the market. 
 Retail roaming is part of a bundle of mobile retail services, with almost complete 
absence of retail competition. Other (outside) options, such as hotel phones or 
international calling cards, are poor substitutes. 
 International roaming is a homogeneous product.  
 Due to lack of price transparency, consumers’ impact on pricing is trivial if they 
override manually what their handsets had automatically selected. 
 Wholesale prices are set for each roaming service, which are usually based on 
regional zones. Few networks offer wholesale discount, which is limited to the invoice 
level (i.e., at the IOT bill level, rather than the listed wholesale price).  
 The retail price equals the wholesale price plus a handling charge (markup) of about 
10-35%, which usually differs by visited networks. 
                                               
11 See Valletti (2004) for possible remedies on STIRA clauses. 
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 During the years 1997-2000, wholesale prices between EEA networks witnessed 
absolute increases (126% for calling internationally and 166% for calling nationally), 
with relative increases converging towards a higher overall price. All these price 
changes bear no relation to the underlying costs. Consequently, retail prices 
increased as well. These trends are in contrast to domestic prices. 
 Excessive pricing and tacit collusion (via identical pricing) are likely to be taking place 
in the pricing behaviours of networks.   
 
2.1.2 Aftermath Of Sector Inquiry 
 
In this section, we summarize what happened after the EC’s 2000 sector inquiry till its 
closure in 2007, relying on reports by Cullen International (2013).  
 
The EC raided nine mobile operators in July 2001 in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
to gather evidence on alleged price fixing. Later on, the focus of the investigation shifted 
from collusion to abuse of dominant position, where the EC compared wholesale prices of 
international roaming to domestic mobile termination rates since both share considerable 
similarities in their actual costs, but have huge price differentials. 
 
In July 2004, the EC sent statements of objection to O2 and Vodafone in the UK on abuse of 
their dominant positions under Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Each network constituted a 
separate market in the period 1997/1998 until the end of September 2003, during which, 
each network enjoyed a dominant position in the provision of wholesale international 
roaming on its own network. The abuse consists of unfair and excessive wholesale prices 
charged to other European mobile networks. 
 
In February 2005, the EC sent similar statements of objections to T-Mobile and Vodafone in 
Germany. T-Mobile (since 1997) and Vodafone (since 2000) each enjoyed a dominant 
position in the provision of wholesale international roaming on own network till the end of 
2003. 
 
In these statements of objections, the EC applied a market definition whereby each visited 
network is considered a monopolist12. This definition is different to the one set out in the EC 
2003 recommendation on relevant markets, which defines the market for international 
roaming (known as Market 17) as: “Wholesale national market for international roaming on 
                                               
12 Martino (2007) supports such market definition. Martino views if demand is randomly assigned between visited networks, 
then each network is a monopolist over its share of traffic. This randomness makes steering by the home network ineffective.  
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public mobile networks” (O.J., 2003). This definition includes all mobile networks in a given 
country.  
 
Under the EU 2003 regulatory framework13, international roaming was among 18 markets 
that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) must review as part of market analysis procedure. 
During the years 2005-2006, six NRAs finished their market analysis exercise for Market 
(17). Their definitions of the geographic market corresponded to the EC’s definition of Market 
(17). For analysis purposes, the NRAs considered outgoing calls as a product market, where 
half of the NRAs calculated market shares in revenues and the other half market shares in 
minutes of use (i.e. quantity).  
 
The EC stated that the analysis of dominant position should be based on comparing market 
shares with/out intra-groups (or cross-owned networks, e.g. Vodafone in the UK and in 
Germany). NRAs which compared market shares with/out intra-group are Slovenia and Italy. 
Table (2.1) summarizes their findings.  
 
The six NRAs took into account expected competitive pressures on wholesale prices caused 
by traffic steering as a countervailing buying power by home networks. All NRAs did not find 
either single or joint significant market power. Their conclusions were based on the reduced 
risk of coordinated behaviours due to market structure, growth of the market and its 
seasonality nature. In addition, the existence of roaming alliance discounts were found to 
reduce wholesale price transparency, and hence credible retaliation mechanism to 
discourage deviation was assumed absent. In summary, all NRAs concluded that the market 
was effectively competitive despite high roaming prices.  
 
Although all NRAs found the market competitive at the wholesale level, the EC was 
concerned that reductions in wholesale prices were not passed on to consumers. It was also 
concerned that prices (retail and wholesale) remained unjustifiably high and showed no 
signs of decline. 
 
In June 2007, the EC issued roaming regulation to address the concerns of its sector inquiry 
and law proceedings. The EC closed the sector inquiry, and closed the competition law 
proceedings against the UK mobile networks (O2 and Vodafone) and against Germany 
mobile networks (T-Mobile and Vodafone). In addition, the EC removed Market 17 from its 
recommendation on relevant markets. 
  
                                               
13 See Buigues and Rey (2004) for market definitions in the telecommunications industry. 
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1Table (2.1) NRAs’ responses to the EC market analysis notification exercise for Market (17). 
Source: Adapted from Cullen International (2013). 
 
  
Country 
 
(Date of report) 
Notes 
Finland  
(15 December 2005) 
 Market shares were calculated in quantities for 2005: 
 
                   Sonera (45%) 
                   Elisa (39%)  
                   Finnet (14%)  
                   Alands (2%) 
 
 Rise in traffics, steering and wholesale prices 
Italy  
(7 June 2006) 
 
 Market shares were calculated in revenues for 2005: 
 
                  TIM (38.8%; or 51.2% without intra-group) 
                  Vodafone (42.6%; or 23.9% without intra-group) 
                  Wind (18.3%; or 24.8% without intra-group)  
                  H3G (0.3%, or 0.1% without intra-group) 
 
 TIM’s share exceeded 50% when intra-group was excluded, but since its share by 
volume was higher than share by revenue, TIM was conceived unable to charge 
higher wholesale price than its competitors 
Denmark  
(28 July 2006) 
 
 Market shares were calculated in quantities for 2004: 
 
                 A (37%) 
                 B (25%)  
                 C (38%) 
 
 High level of wholesale prices that did not change since 2001 
 Mobile operators belonged to different roaming alliances in Europe, making it 
difficult to coordinate nationally 
Slovenia  
(7 August 2006) 
 Market shares were calculated in quantities for 2005: 
 
                 Mobitel (47%; or 55% without intra-group) 
                 Simobil (50%; or 42% without intra-group) 
                 WWI (3%; or 3% without intra-group) 
 
 High level of wholesale prices 
Austria  
(25 August 2006) 
 Market shares were calculated in revenues for 2005: 
 
                 Mobilkom (<40%) 
                 T-Mobile & Telering (merged) (>40%) 
                 The rest for One & Hutchison 
 
 70% of overall demand was from 5 countries, while 56% was from subsidiaries of 
T-Mobile and Vodafone 
 No network could charge higher wholesale price than its competitors, and all tried 
to grant discounts to large buyers.  
 Significant reductions in wholesale prices since 2001, particularly for alliance 
networks 
Spain  
(25 August 2006)  
 
 Market shares were calculated in revenues for 2005: 
 
                 Vodafone (44%)  
                 Telefonica (39.6%)  
                 Amena (16.4%) 
 
 Home networks were able to steer 75-80% of traffics 
 Difficulty in determining the actual wholesale price due to existence of discounts 
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2.1.3 EC Roaming Regulation 
 
In June 2007, the EC roaming regulation applied price-caps on both wholesale and retail 
prices, known as the Eurotariffs. The regulation also mandated home networks to send free 
SMS to their travelling subscribers informing them about the retail prices14. 
 
According to Falch et al. (2009), before the EU roaming regulation, retail prices for 
international roaming calls were approximately four times higher than for national mobile 
calls, indicating prices were exceeding underlying costs. Such excessive pricing provided 
justification for the EU regulation, after a lengthy review from 1999 to 2007. In September 
2007, the new regulation was fully implemented; as a result, retail prices were reduced by 
57% for outgoing calls and 60% for incoming calls. After 2007, the EC amended the 
regulation to lower the Eurotariffs and to include other services such as SMS and data 
roaming. 
 
2.2 Vertically Related Industries 
 
The literature on vertically related industries addresses the vertical relationship of firms. It 
investigates incentives for maximizing the individual profit versus joint profit and the choice 
of contract (i.e. vertical restraints such as retail price maintenance or franchise fee compared 
to linear pricing)15.  
 
The main incentive for an upstream monopolist and downstream monopolist to vertically 
integrate is to overcome the double marginalisation problem (Spengler, 1950). This problem 
exists when the wholesaler marks up the input sold to the retailer, with the retailer itself also 
adding another markup. Vertical integration internalizes this vertical externality by charging 
the monopoly retail price, which increases producer surplus; and since this monopoly price is 
lower than the double-markup price, consumer surplus is also increased. Therefore, total 
welfare is enhanced. The incentive to vertically integrate may not hold under competition 
and/or the use of vertical restraints. 
 
Bonanno and Vickers (1988) develop a price game model for the case whereby a wholesaler 
and a retailer compete with another pairing in the provision of final goods. The game is 
                                               
14 This transparency measure was implemented in the Arab World. For a chronology of regional regulatory actions in this 
regard, see Sutherland (2008) for the EU case and Sutherland (2011) for the Arab World.  
15 See Vickers and Waterson (1991) for an introduction on the economics of vertical integration and vertical restraints.   
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played in two stages, where the wholesaler sets a linear wholesale price (with/out a 
franchise fee), and the retailer sets the retail price. If the goods are independent (monopoly), 
the wholesaler’s profit from vertical integration is greater than the profit from vertical 
separation due to elimination of double markups; but equal if franchise fee is used. On the 
other hand, if goods are substitutes, the wholesaler can use the franchise fee to extract the 
retailers’ surplus and subsequently charges a wholesale price above marginal cost. This 
results in greater total profit under vertical separation than under vertical integration16. 
 
The model in Economides (1994) is similar to the one in Bonanno and Vickers (1988), 
except that Economides restricts the model to linear pricing and assumes that each good 
consists of two complements in fixed proportions. These complement goods are produced 
by two separate producers17. With linear demands for the final goods, the game is played in 
two stages: producers decide whether or not to merge; then they set their input prices. The 
game makes provision for four ownership structures: independent ownership; partial vertical 
integration; parallel vertical integration; and joint ownership. The equilibria are then 
compared at different degrees of substitutability. Playing the game out, Economides 
concludes that when final goods are poor substitutes, producers have an incentive to 
integrate; but this incentive diminishes as goods become perfect substitutes.  
 
Telecommunications networks are similar to vertically related industries as they involve 
wholesale pricing for handling interconnection services, such as terminating a call that is 
originated on a different network. Networks would typically sign bilateral interconnection 
agreements, commonly taking the form of two-way access agreements with linear wholesale 
pricing. Examples include international settlement rates for international calling, domestic 
access agreements for terminating local calls (e.g. mobile-to-mobile (MTM), mobile-to-fixed 
(MTF) and fixed-to-mobile (FTM)), and IOT agreements for international roaming. In the 
context of vertically related industries, the proceeding sections will review some papers on 
international settlement rates18 that share similarity with IOT agreements, and following this 
we review a paper on FTM that is referred to in the existing literature on international 
roaming.  
 
  
                                               
16 See Cyrenne (1994) for a closed form model in this line which only involves linear pricing.  
17 That is, given fixed proportionality, the sum of the input prices equals the final price of the good. An example of this case is 
given in Section (2.2.2). 
18 See Armstrong (2002) for a comprehensive summary on the theory on access, including international settlement rates, and 
see Einhorn (2002) for a literature survey on international settlement rates. 
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2.2.1 Access Theory  
 
The similarity between IOT agreements and international settlement rates lies in the nature 
of two-way access agreement between non-rivals that involves wholesale linear prices. The 
literatures for both agreements share similarity in strategies and payoffs.  
 
Consider the following simple example. If two non-rivals are monopolists within their 
respective countries, assuming zero marginal costs for simplicity, the profit function to 
partner   is 
  (     )  (     )  (  )
⏞          
             
        (  )
⏞      
                
 (   )  
(2.1) 
where  , , and   are retail price, wholesale price and demand respectively. Notice Eq. (2.1) 
is separately additive: there exists profits derived from retail and wholesale. Each partner of 
an agreement is a wholesaler and a retailer and therefore the wholesale demand for one 
partner is the retail for the other. This typically represents the profit maximization problem for 
international settlement rates, and IOT agreements as well. 
 
Carter and Wright (1994) provide a model for two countries, each is served by a monopolist 
offering international calling services and terminating international calls from the other 
country (i.e. symbiotic producers). Their main finding is that, unilateral wholesale pricing 
results in profits that are Pareto inefficient (due to double markups), and both networks can 
be made better off by an appropriate choice of wholesale prices. Therefore, as the incentive 
to remove the double marginalisation problem works both ways, both networks can 
maximize their joint profits by accepting the division of profits with the sole use of wholesale 
linear pricing, (while the retail price is set independently). This removes the need for other 
mechanisms such as franchise fees.  
 
The authors found that removing the double marginalization problem has a second order 
loss in own profit but first order increase in the other’s profit. This is clear with firms having 
equal demands19 , and would hold if the asymmetry is not excessive. If excessive, the 
network with the larger wholesale demand will do better by not cooperating. 
 
Cave and Donnelly (1996) focus on understanding the circumstances that may lead to 
nonreciprocal bargained prices. Networks use the unilateral wholesale price as a threat point 
                                               
19 If demands are identical, networks can agree on a reciprocal wholesale price equals marginal cost; hence the net payment 
is zero, retail prices are lower and monopoly profit is achieved as demonstrated in a closed-form model in (Box 5.1) in Laffont et 
al (2000).  
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for the Nash bargaining solution. Each network maximizes its own profit with respect to the 
pair of wholesale prices, then both networks bargain over their solutions. The authors found 
nonreciprocal wholesale prices as the outcome if profits are unequal when evaluated at 
wholesale prices that equal marginal costs. 
 
Wright (1999) provides a model to test the USA’s NRA claim that artificially high international 
settlement rates led to high retail prices for American consumers, and that the deficit in net 
payments subsidized foreign networks in low-income countries. He assumes a 
representative consumer’s utility for international calling, with two countries where each is 
served by a monopolist. The author then allows for retail competition. He assumes here a 
common wholesale price equal to the weighted average cost of incoming calls, with weights 
determined by income levels. Income disparity in this setting increases the common 
wholesale price, and this wholesale price is reached by Nash bargaining solution.  
 
In Wright (1999), starting with the threat of no agreement (zero profit), the network with the 
high profit from any agreement (due to high demand or low actual costs) will gain more; thus 
it is willing to share some of its profit with its partner, resulting in wholesale prices above 
marginal cost.  
 
With comparative statics, Wright concludes that competition has strong pressures on both 
retail and wholesale prices. However, with reciprocal wholesale pricing and asymmetry 
between networks, wholesale competition may not be effective. This is because networks 
can inflate the wholesale price to keep retail prices artificially high.  
 
Shy (2001) agrees with Wright. Shy assumes asymmetric unit demands for international 
calling in two countries. The game is played in two stages: wholesale pricing followed by 
retail. For simplicity, he assumes the networks agree on a mutual wholesale price equivalent 
to the average of both unilaterally-set wholesale prices. Due to asymmetry in demands, the 
network with high (retail) demand has a negative net payment with the low-demand network, 
but still makes a positive profit. Shy then assumes perfect retail competition, where the retail 
price equals the wholesale price (i.e. the perceived marginal cost). He concludes that, in 
equilibrium, if each network has zero net payment and its profit equals its retail revenue, 
networks can use the wholesale price as a means of collusion by artificially inflating it in 
order to raise the retail price to the monopoly level. 
 
Nonetheless, Shy views the supply-side alternatives, which can bypass high international 
settlement rates, challenges such collusion. For example, the home network can rout the call 
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through international resellers, internet telephony, or through the cheapest terminating 
network in the destined country20. 
 
On local access, we review a paper by Gans and King (2000) who model FTM calling 
originated from a single fixed network and terminated on a mobile network, where there are 
more than one mobile network. They assume uniform retail prices for FTM calls because 
either the consumer is unaware to which mobile network the mobile number belongs (due 
probably to mobile number portability), or because the fixed network is unable to price 
discriminate by mobile network (i.e. unable to set discriminatory retail prices by destined 
mobile networks). Therefore, the fixed network’s consumer is likely to base his calling 
patterns on the average retail price.  
 
The model is built on a two-stage game: each mobile network sets a wholesale price, and 
then the fixed network marks up the average wholesale price weighted by the market shares 
of the mobile networks. The solution method is backward induction. 
 
The authors found that wholesale price increases in the number of mobile networks, and is 
negatively related to own market share. A wholesale price rise by one mobile network raises 
the final price, which reduces total demand. Such price rise can represent a profit gain to the 
undertaking network, while any loss in sales is shared with the rest of the mobile networks. 
This effect is larger with smaller networks as the smaller network sets a higher wholesale 
price. However, with linear demands, changes in wholesale prices (due to changes in market 
shares) exactly offset each other and hence the retail price is independent from market 
shares.  
 
Gans and King (2000) concluded that competition between wholesalers does not exist 
because any undercutting by a wholesaler does not raise its market share. As the number of 
networks rises, the effect of horizontal separation increases, pushing up the wholesale price. 
 
The authors’ model assumes a uniform retail price. The literature on retail on-net/off-net 
pricing by domestic networks is abundant, where networks take into account the strategic 
choice on access (or termination rates)21. In this case, a uniform retail price entails that the 
network does not set any price differential between on-net and off-net calling. On the other 
                                               
20 This requires liberalisation of international gateway. 
21 See Peitz et al. (2004) for a literature survey on the theory of national access; and Hoernig and Valletti (2012) for a recent 
survey. 
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hand, a discriminatory retail price entails that the network sets price differential between on-
net and off-net calling22.   
 
In international roaming, there is a noticeable trend in shifting from discriminatory retail 
pricing to uniform, as noted by Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011). In fact, the EC (2000) found a few 
mobile networks that offer uniform retail price; while the EC (2006) noted that often mobile 
networks offer uniform retail prices. 
 
As shall be demonstrated below, the existing models on international roaming are based on 
assuming uniform retail price. Therefore, the conclusions of Gans and King (2000) are 
similar to Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti (2009) and Ambjørnsen, et al. 
(2011). All these papers assume the subscriber of a home network is unaware of the retail 
prices per the interconnecting networks (wholesalers); and the consumer only cares about 
the average retail price. This average price is uniform since it does not discriminate between 
wholesalers. 
 
We draw attention to the perfect complementarity feature in the aforementioned papers. We 
argue that by assuming uniform retail price, wholesalers appear in the demand functions as 
perfect complements, rather than substitutes. An explanation is provided below on the effect 
of perfect complementarity on equilibria, which leads to results similar to the ones found by 
Gans and King (2000) and by the published papers on international roaming. 
 
2.2.2 Perfect Complementarity 
 
Sonnenschein (1968) points out to the duality between the two Cournot’s theories of duopoly 
(where two firms sell identical products) and complementary monopoly (where two products 
are used in fixed proportions), where the difference lies in the interpretation placed on the 
symbols 23 . Singh and Vives (1984) found that with differentiated products 24 : “Cournot 
(Bertrand) competition with substitutes is the dual of Bertrand (Cournot) competition with 
complements.”  
 
                                               
22 In this case, the price for off-net calling is viewed as a departure of termination rate from the true marginal cost of call-
termination (Hoernig and Valletti, 2012). 
23 That is, for two firms A and B, the Cournot indirect demand is given by    (     ); while the complementary monopoly 
direct demand is given by    (     ). 
24 Singh and Vives use a parameter in the demand that can be positive for substitutes or negative for complements. 
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In this section, we illustrate perfect complementarity in order to show how the number of 
perfect complementary firms impacts upon equilibria. Assume firms sell products in fixed 
proportions to one buyer, where the buyer in this case is the complementary monopoly.  
 
Let the buyer’s demand for the products be given by 
    ∑  
 
   
   
(2.2) 
where    is the product price by firm  , and   is the number of complementary firms. 
Assuming symmetric marginal costs (normalized to zero), each firm unilaterally maximizes 
the profit 
   
(  )
       (  ∑  
 
   
+  
 
The first order condition for firm 1, for example, is 
   
   
    
and its response function is given by 
   
  ∑   
 
   
 
  
(2.3) 
Eq. (2.3) is downward sloping with respect to price charged by the rest of firms (i.e. response 
functions are strategic substitutes). If the rest of firms respond symmetrically, Eq. (2.3) can 
be expressed as 
   
  (   )  
 
          (        )  
If firm   responds symmetrically to firm 1, the (unilateral) price equilibrium is given by 
   
 
   
  
(2.4) 
Thus, the final price the buyer pays is 
∑  
 
   
     
 
   
  
(2.5) 
and the equilibrium demand is 
     
 
   
  
 
   
  
(2.6) 
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In the duopoly case, therefore,       , which also equals   . In this case,    equals the 
quantity equilibrium under Cournot duopoly competition, reflecting Sonnenschein’s duality. 
This is due to the downward sloping in the respective response functions. 
 
Table (2.2) shows equilibria for different values of  . As   rises: (1) own unilateral price 
decreases, (2) total price to the buyer increases while its demand reduces, and (3) unilateral 
profit to each firm declines. If all firms merge, the buyer will be charged the monopoly price 
(½) and firms can share the monopoly profit (¼). 
 
2Table (2.2) Illustration of perfect complementarity at different values of  . 
Number  
of 
(complementary) 
firms 
  
Unilateral price 
by  
each firm 
 
   
Final price 
charged to  
the buyer 
 
    
Quantity 
demanded 
by the buyer 
 
   
Unilateral 
profit to  
each firm 
 
        
Merger profit  
to each firm 
 
 
          
1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/4 1/4 
2 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/9 1/8 
3 1/4 3/4 1/4 1/16 1/12 
4 1/5 4/5 1/5 1/25 1/16 
 
Figure (2.1) below demonstrates the prices at different values of  . Clearly, as the number of 
firms increases, the buyer pays less to each firm (  , the dotted-line), but pays more in total 
(   , the dashed-line). These prices equally depart from the monopoly price (½).  
 
 
1Figure (2.1) Prices of perfect complementary firms at different values of n. 
 
Each firm unilaterally charges a markup; thus double marginalisation takes place horizontally 
between complementary firms. This horizontal separation externality can be internalised 
through a merger. Nonetheless, competition does not exist because firms are complements. 
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This section demonstrated the effect of perfect complementarity on equilibria. Perfect 
complementarity is a feature in the demands used in Gans and King (2000), Salsas and 
Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti (2009) and in Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011).  
 
2.3 Literature On International Roaming 
 
In this section, we review the available published and working papers that theoretically 
modelled international roaming. We also review the available empirical papers. 
 
2.3.1 Published Papers 
 
The first published paper is Salsas and Koboldt (2004). They assume consumers put mobile 
handsets on automatic selection mode because consumers only care about the average 
retail price. The home network marks up the average wholesale price weighted by the 
market shares of visited networks. The base model does not assume any supply-side 
substitution (i.e. no steering), and thus the choice of visited networks is assumed to be 
random.  
 
The demand facing a home network is assumed to be linear (i.e. representative consumer, 
with a substitutability parameter referring to downstream competition). Home networks set 
linear retail prices and the consumer decides on a home network to subscribe to, based 
merely on retail price for international roaming (ignoring switching costs). The retail price in 
this case is non-differentiated by visited networks (i.e. uniform retail). Assuming two 
countries, each country has two networks with symmetric coverage and costs. The price 
game is played in two stages: wholesale price setting then retail price setting, solved by 
backward induction.  
 
Due to perfect complementarity of visited networks, the unilateral wholesale price in Salsas 
and Koboldt (2004) is above the monopoly price. Under collusion, the equilibrium price 
equals the monopoly level. These wholesale price equilibria do not change with retail 
competition25, as retail competition only reduces retail markup.  
 
Salsas and Koboldt conclude that wholesalers cannot enlarge their market shares via 
lowering wholesale prices because any undercutting has less than a proportionate impact on 
                                               
25 The wholesale profit changes in the retail markup, but the effect cancels out in the first order condition of the wholesale 
objective function.   
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the average wholesale price and consequently on the average retail price. They also found 
the equilibrium wholesale price increases by the number of visited networks. Visited 
networks on the other side benefit from retail competition because retail competition lowers 
the retail markup and enhances demand. 
  
The authors extend the base model by allowing default market shares to be asymmetric. 
This leads to wholesale prices being negatively related to market shares. The authors found 
that the visited network with low market share has an incentive to increase its wholesale 
price. This is due to its smaller impact on the weighted average wholesale price. The base 
model’s retail price does not change with the exception that it marks up the weighted 
average wholesale price, instead of the simple average. As in Gans and King (2000), the 
retail price is independent from wholesalers’ market shares.  
 
Salsas and Koboldt also evaluate the model where only one pair of networks engages in a 
vertical merger. They found the independent networks would set higher wholesale prices 
compared to the merged entity. These differences lead to asymmetric retail prices (lower 
with the merged entity). This difference shrinks with intense retail competition. They judged 
that merger is unprofitable in this case because the consumer is unaware of prices. Then 
they allowed the merged entity to improve price transparency. The fully informed consumer 
will subscribe to the merged entity at home and will choose it (manually) in the visited 
country. In this case, they judged that merger is profitable to the merged parties, which of 
course comes at the expense of the independent parties (that did not merge). The degree of 
profitability is stronger under more intense retail competition. 
 
Finally, the authors explore the case when all home networks can steer to the cheapest 
visited network, using complex expressions for market shares. Depending on the 
effectiveness of steering, wholesale prices will approach marginal costs; and as a 
consequence, retail prices will decline. 
 
Lupi and Manenti (2009) study the impact of traffic steering on wholesale prices, building on 
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), but ignoring retail competition. Similar to Salsas and Koboldt, 
Lupi and Manenti conclude that wholesale and retail prices rise with the number of visited 
networks. They relate this result to random traffics, which means each visited network acts 
as a monopolist over its share of traffic; in other words, the home network deals with many 
monopolists.  
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Lupi and Manenti then use a parameter to denote the success of steering, where networks 
fully overlap in their respective coverages. The authors argue that wholesale prices can 
reach marginal cost only if steering is perfect (i.e. fully successful). If steering is imperfect, 
there will be no equilibrium in pure strategies, as explained below.  
 
With imperfect steering, each visited network has a share of random traffic (not successfully 
steered) as a source of monopoly power, and a share of the steered traffic that induces 
wholesale competition. The home network will assign a higher market share to the visited 
network that offers the lowest wholesale price. Asymmetry in market shares (due to steering) 
causes asymmetry in wholesale prices; hence no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
 
Lupi and Manenti conclude that, under steering, visited networks will offer menu wholesale 
prices to home networks. They will offer a low price if the home network steers, a high price 
if the home network steers away and a middle price if the home network does not steer to 
any. This middle price equals the unilateral wholesale price, which is equivalent to the 
weighted average of the low and the high prices, since market shares under steering act like 
weights. However, the retail price is unaffected, similar to Salsas and Koboldt (2004). 
 
Lupi and Manenti also assume a game for steering investment decision. They found 
investment is the equilibrium in pure strategies. Because of no impact on retail prices, the 
authors concluded that steering investment is a waste of resources.  
 
Finally, the authors explore vertical merger, where traffic is assumed random (i.e. steering is 
absent). The cooperative wholesale price between members is equal to marginal cost. A 
matching game is then played out where each network simultaneously has to choose 
whether to vertically merge with one IOT-agreement partner. They found non-cooperation is 
the unique equilibrium of the game, because the non-cooperating pair can charge a higher 
price without loosing market share. 
 
A recent paper is provided by Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011), who develop a model based on 
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), and Lupi and Manenti (2009). Ambjørnsen, et al. assume perfect 
retail competition between two home networks and oligopoly visited networks. The game has 
three stages: visited networks decide to invest in coverage improvement, and then 
wholesale prices are set followed by retail prices. The game is solved by backward 
induction. They assume uniform retail prices because the consumer considers only the 
average retail price. They also assume steering by home network is absent, and that a 
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visited network can increase its probability of being selected by roamers if it improves its 
coverage. 
 
The model by Ambjørnsen, et al. uses linear demands, where a retailer faces weighted 
average wholesale prices. Because of perfect retail competition, the retail price equals the 
weighted average wholesale price. The model predicts wholesale price increases in the 
number of firms (beyond the monopoly level). This is interpreted as each visited network 
raises its wholesale price because it knows that its price does not affect the probability of it 
being chosen. 
 
The model states that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes if traffic is random, but if 
manual network selection is assumed (hence no random traffic), wholesale prices can be 
strategic complements.  
 
Ambjørnsen, et al. highlight the noticeable price policy shift from discriminatory retail prices 
(by visited networks) to uniform, which took the form of zone (or regional) pricing with some 
mobile network operators. They also predict that when home networks set a uniform zonal 
retail price, the weighted average wholesale price can rise further.  
 
Ambjørnsen, et al. concluded that fierce upstream competition would increase both 
wholesale and retail prices26. They also found the wholesale price is decreasing in own 
market share, and concluded that investment to increase market share, such as coverage 
improvement, is not profitable because a viable alternative is to reduce the wholesale price.  
 
The authors extend the model to allow for traffic steering, using a parameter for success of 
steering. Steering causes downward pressure on wholesale prices, and consequently, on 
retail prices.  
 
2.3.2 Working Papers 
 
Roaming is also studied by Tsyganok (2008), who extends Salsas and Koboldt (2004) model 
on pricing behaviours by considering non-linear and asymmetric demands, and varying the 
number of networks. Her results are in line with Salsas and Koboldt’s. 
 
                                               
26 Retail price equals wholesale price because of assuming perfect retail competition. 
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Bühler (2010) assumes two countries; each is served by two networks that compete for 
subscribers downstream and for hosting visitors upstream. Home networks are differentiated 
on a Hotelling line, and offer only international roaming service. They charge a two-part tariff 
(i.e. a rental/fixed fee, and a uniform price per call) for their post-paid subscribers. 
Subscribers can register with one network only. Assuming symmetric costs and demand 
parameters, and reciprocal wholesale price setting, the game is as follows: networks set 
wholesale prices, followed by the retail prices, with subscribers deciding on which home 
network to join. The model also assumes wholesale roaming is sold non-cooperatively 
through IOT agreements, or through alliances, where each member of an alliance commits 
to buy exclusively from the alliance member (based on the agreed upon mutual wholesale 
price); but each member can however sell to outsiders. This implicitly assumes perfect 
control over network selection (i.e. perfect steering).  
 
Bühler found that each home network sets the retail price of the call equal to the wholesale 
price because of perfect retail competition, while the fixed fee is set to extract consumer 
surplus. In equilibrium, wholesale price equals the marginal cost for non-alliance members. 
 
However, if one alliance is formed, the wholesale price between the members will exceed 
marginal cost. If two competing alliances are formed, due to strategic complementarity of 
wholesale response functions, both alliances charge symmetric wholesale prices that 
exceed prices under a single alliance. The author also found that networks endogenously 
form alliances in a stage prior to setting wholesale prices, as each network benefits from the 
higher wholesale price. Therefore, two competing alliances are formed in equilibrium. 
 
The intuition behind excessive wholesale pricing (under alliance) in Bühler (2010) is the 
following. Due to full steering commitment, alliance members have zero net payments since 
they have symmetric demands and profits. Each network gets retail profit only from rental 
(while the price of calling equals wholesale price). It can be determined therefore that a 
wholesale price increase has two effects on the retail profit, which are: (1) a direct negative 
effect on profit, and (2) a strategic effect on softening competition for subscribers by inducing 
the downstream competitor (through strategic complementarity) to offer less attractive 
contracts to its own subscribers. If the retailer does not join an alliance, the first effect 
dominates the second; but by joining an alliance, the first effect is offset by gains at the 
wholesale level (since raising the mutual wholesale price raises wholesale profits). 
 
Bühler extends his base model to cases of imperfect steering. If steering is absent, the 
selection between networks is random and the equilibrium wholesale price exceeds the one 
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in the base model. This result holds with or without alliances; thus, alliance formation has an 
impact on wholesale prices only if steering is effective. In the continuous case (imperfect 
steering), Bühler found that without alliances, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. With 
two competing alliances, the effectiveness of steering (i.e. its ability to manipulate market 
shares) reduces the equilibrium wholesale price, but it is still above marginal cost. In 
summary, subscribers are worse off under alliances, since retail price of calling increases 
while the rental fee is unchanged. 
 
Hualong and Shoulian (2009) develop a model similar to Salsas and Koboldt (2004). Under 
different scenarios, they analyse the case whereby two networks form an alliance first and 
then charge a lower wholesale price to each other. They concluded that lowered wholesale 
prices do not improve payoffs, while lower retail prices reduce profits. Therefore, the alliance 
members can improve their market shares either by steering, or choosing retail prices 
(discriminated by visited networks) in order to let the consumer manually select an alliance 
partner. The additional payoff alliance members make is a loss to the independent networks. 
 
Furthermore, Shortall (2010) and Lacasa (2011) address the choice of alliance member 
when demands are asymmetric. Both papers concluded that, using different scenarios and 
numerical examples, networks with large retail demands will form an alliance, while small 
networks will form another alliance.  
 
2.3.3 Empirical Literature 
 
This section surveys the available relevant empirical papers. In Section (2.1.2), we 
summarized the analyses done by the European NRAs regarding steering and wholesale 
pricing between European mobile network operators. The focus in the NRAs analyses was 
about traffic steering as a countervailing buying power by home networks.  
 
Most of the analyses compared a visited network’s market shares and wholesale prices over 
two periods. The NRAs considered aggregate volumes (either traffics or sales), but only two 
NRAs looked at these volumes with/out intra-group (e.g. networks that are cross-owned). 
Using outgoing minutes as the product market, half of the analyses calculated market shares 
based on revenues and the other half on minutes. 
  
The NRAs reached a consensus that steering exists, which should enhance wholesale 
competition. In Italy, for example, Vodafone has a market share of 42.6% in wholesale 
revenues. By excluding intra-groups (revenues related to home networks that might have 
37 
 
preferential IOT agreements in Italy), Vodafone’s market share reduces to 23.9% (see Table 
2.1). Therefore, steering by some of the intra-group home networks to Vodafone might be 
behind the differences in market shares. For example, Vodafone in another country might be 
steering its roamers in Italy towards Vodafone-Italy. However, this can be due to demand-
side substitution because of the existence of Vodafone’s Eurocall that offered lower retail 
price when roaming on Vodafone networks. 
  
Another data analysis topic in the EU is own price elasticity of demand, which has been 
crucial in the debates regarding the impact assessment of the EC roaming regulation on 
welfare. The EC (2006) used three scenarios for own price elasticities in its assessment. The 
scenarios are (-0.55), (-1.0), and (-1.2). The GSMA (2008) disagrees with the EC, and 
proposes that the elasticity should be (-0.25).  
 
We found two industry studies that derive own price elasticity of demand. The first is a study 
conducted by Europe Economics (2008) for the European Parliament. The second is a study 
conducted by the NRA of Spain (CMT, 2009). The focus of both studies is estimating 
demand elasticity for outgoing calls while roaming within the EU. The studies use roaming 
total minutes of outgoing calls and average retail prices, all at the country-level, where the 
study period is the second quarter of 2007 (i.e. a quarter before the EC roaming regulation) 
to the first quarter of 2008, while CMT also covers up to the third quarter of 2008. 
 
In Europe Economics (2008), the following model is estimated with panel fixed and random 
effect regressions. 
  (   )         (     )              
(2.7) 
where   (   ) is the natural log of total minutes consumed in country   in time  ;   (     ) is 
the natural log of the average retail price per minute in country   and time    27;    is a 
vector of time dummy variables to capture seasonality effects; and     is the error term.  
 
The coefficient    in Eq. (2.7) represents the own price elasticity, which is estimated as (-
0.35) in the random–effect model, and (-0.44) in the fixed–effect model, where the 
significance level is 5% in both estimations. 
 
In CMT (2009), the following model is estimated with panel fixed-effect regression. 
 
                                               
27 The use of lagged-time is due to assuming consumers require some time to adjust their behaviors in response to the price 
change. 
38 
 
  (   )         (   )               
(2.8) 
where   (   ) is the natural log of total minutes consumed in country   in time  ;   (   ) is the 
natural log of the average retail price per minute in country   and time  ;     is a vector of 
control variables (price of SMS, number of tourists and summer-season dummy); and     is 
the error term.  
 
CMT (2009) uses instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem of price and the 
error term. The instruments are: the lagged price, a dummy variable if the country’s currency 
is not Euro, and a variable to capture exchange rate variations for non-Euro countries.   
 
The coefficient    in Eq. (2.8) represents the own price elasticity, which is estimated as (-
0.37) in the model without instrument, and (-0.36) in the model with instrument, where the 
significance level is 5% in both estimations. 
 
Obviously, the aforementioned industry studies show that international roaming demand is 
inelastic. This finding serves the argument against the EU regulation. The GSMA (2008) 
argues that demand inelasticity implies that consumption would not increase largely by 
capping retail prices and therefore the impact on producer surplus would raise questions 
about the expected enhancement of total welfare28.  
 
In surveying the literature, we found one empirical working paper on roaming alliances by 
Rieck et al (2005). We also review an empirical paper by Wright (1999) on international 
calling, since it shares some similarities with international roaming. In addition, we 
summarize a working paper by Martino (2007) who provides guidance on how future 
research should test for steering. 
 
Rieck, et al. (2005) analyze empirically the implications of roaming alliance formations on 
roaming retail prices. They observe the retail prices for outgoing calls (while roaming abroad) 
to home countries, as listed on the websites of 88 mobile network operators in the OECD 
countries and five in Asian countries29 , from September to mid-November of 2004. To 
overcome the complexity in retail prices, the highest retail price for roaming on a given 
visited network is considered. Network A1 in country A is considered to be favoring network 
B1 among the other networks in visited country B if the lowest retail price A1 charges is for 
                                               
28 The GSMA (2008) argues that the price cap creates a focal point for pricing, which harms competition. The GSMA proposes 
that transparency measures can enhance competition instead of price regulation. 
29 Namely, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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roaming on B1’s network, assuming the rational consumer would manually select the visited 
network with the cheapest retail price. A dummy variable was created for the network 
membership in an existing roaming alliance (e.g. Vodafone group, Freemove, etc…).  
 
Based on literature on social network analysis, the authors compute two indices: a network’s 
centrality (how many favoring relations a network has), and networks’ clique (a subset of 
networks forming a group). The control variables used in estimations are a network’s total 
revenues and market shares in local subscribers, and other country-level variables such as 
population and GDP. 
 
The centrality index is regressed on the dummy for alliance membership and the control 
variables. The roaming alliance dummy is found insignificant. The results from the control 
variables suggest that networks in countries with high export-to-import ratio would tend to 
have a high degree of centrality. In addition, a high degree of centrality is associated with 
intermediate sized networks (in terms of revenues).  
 
The dummy for alliance membership is regressed on the clique index to see whether an 
existing alliance behaves like a strategic alliance (where members are expected to be 
involved in favoring relations). The authors found that only Vodafone group members 
constitute a strategic alliance (i.e. involving themselves in reciprocal favoring in terms of 
retail prices) compared to the rest of alliances30.  
 
Wright (1999) empirically tests his theoretical predictions on international settlement rates. 
The author uses data on wholesale and retail prices, and volumes (quantities) of 
international calls between the USA and 167 countries over 17 years. He found that retail 
and wholesale prices have a strong positive correlation.  
 
Wright investigates the determinants of wholesale prices. He found wholesale prices 
increase with income disparity between the USA and the foreign countries, but the 
magnitude decreases after controlling for competition, where competition generally reduces 
wholesale prices. Marginal cost proxies fall over time, which influence wholesale prices as 
follows: (1) wholesale price increases with distance between the USA and the country, (2) 
increases with the country’s area, and (3) decreases with the country’s population (indicating 
the existence of economies of scale). 
                                               
30 We think this result is caused by Vodafone’s cross-ownership of mobile networks in multiple markets. Vodafone, as an 
example, offered a Eurocall plan, which was a common retail price for roaming on any Vodafone network in Europe (O.J., 
2001). Vodafone is able to offer such retail plans relying on its presence in many markets. In contrast, another alliance, say 
Freemove, consists of different networks that may not be able to maintain preferential wholesale prices in each market. 
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Martino (2007) defines steering in international roaming. He argues that market definition 
should be based on the success of traffic steering. If traffic steering is not possible, each 
visited network should constitute a separate market.  
 
Martino tries to answer the question of how to assess the existence of steering. He 
recommends comparing the market share of a visited network in serving a home network to 
the visited network’s market shares in serving other home networks.  
 
Martino proposes that the calculation of market shares should be done for each service (e.g. 
outgoing calls) in traffic (i.e. quantities) over a year to smooth out the seasonality effect. To 
explore for steering, he recommends studying the movements in market shares over years. 
Information on networks coverage, quality of services, technological developments, lifetime 
of handsets, preferential agreements, roaming alliance relations, and merger/acquisition 
events of visited networks should be included within an appropriate dataset. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
In this section, we identify how the next chapters complement the existing literature surveyed 
in this chapter. 
 
We develop a base model on pricing behaviours under IOT agreements. The base model 
assumes linear (wholesale and retail) prices, and compares equilibria under different 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies (with different states of substitutability). It relies 
on the literature on international settlement rates, in terms of using similar profit functions 
and game setting. Such profit functions and game settings are also used by Salsas and 
Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti (2009) and Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011).  
 
Moreover, our base model assumes international roaming is an additional service offered by 
mobile networks. This, however, is contrary to Salsas and Koboldt (2004) and Bühler (2010) 
who assume networks only offer international roaming and compete for subscribers. 
 
In line with the existing published papers on roaming, our base model assumes a world of 
two countries, each served by two networks that compete at the wholesale level but hold 
monopoly positions at the retail level. The base model compares equilibria under 
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discriminatory retail policy (i.e. retail prices discriminated by visited networks) and uniform 
policy. In other words, it explores different wholesale pricing strategies with and without the 
uniform retail pricing constraint. With this uniform constraint, the results in the published 
papers surveyed in Section (2.3.1) are reproduced. We demonstrate that uniform retail price 
assumption makes wholesalers appear in the demand as complements rather than 
substitutes, such that the price maximisation problems provide results that are inconsistent 
with wholesale competition.  
 
We also model two preferential IOT agreements under cross-ownership and roaming 
alliance strategies, where the former results in asymmetric retail prices (assuming manual 
network selection by the consumer), while the later is built on uniform retail price (assuming 
automatic selection by consumer). We also compare the cross-ownership model’s results to 
the case where retail price is uniform, as in Salsas and Koboldt (2004), and Lupi and 
Manenti (2009). 
 
We found that cooperating to form a cross-ownership pair is a dominant strategy to each 
partner under discriminatory retail prices, since retail prices reflect preferential wholesale 
prices. However, the opposite is true under uniform retail price: non-cooperation is the 
dominant strategy to each partner; which is also found in Salsas and Koboldt (2004), and 
Lupi and Manenti (2009). 
 
We model roaming alliance based on assuming all home networks set uniform retail prices, 
which equal the monopoly price given home networks hold monopoly positions downstream, 
taken into consideration implications of net payments, as in Shy (2001). Steering requires 
handsets to be on automatic mode, which is the assumed case under uniform retail price.  
 
We found that investment in steering affects wholesale competition and alliance formations. 
That is, with investment in steering, the home network can cause downward pressures on 
wholesale prices. The equilibrium is such that all networks invest in steering, and in this 
case, it is a waste of resources because profits are reduced by sunk costs. This intuition is 
also found in Lupi and Manenti (2009), and in Ambjørnsen, et al (2011). 
 
The success of steering is assumed to be dependent on the substitutability of demand, 
which is different to the success rate used in Lupi and Manenti (2009). If steering is absent, 
wholesale price equals the monopoly price. This reduces as substitutability increases. The 
result is different from menu pricing found in Lupi and Manenti (2009), and from above-cost 
pricing found in Bühler (2010). 
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We found IOT agreement partners have incentive to form alliances only if mutual steering is 
insured. Thus, steering is a necessity for alliance formation, as predicted by Bühler (2010) 
and Hualong and Shoulian (2009).  
 
Investment in network coverage is addressed in Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011), but our model 
takes coverage as given because visited networks typically set their respective coverages to 
compete for home subscribers, rather than for visitors. 
 
We also show that with non-zero net payments due to asymmetry in market sizes, each 
network has an incentive to form an alliance with the largest network. This contradicts with 
the conclusions of Shortall (2010) and Lacasa (2011) who argue that small networks prefer 
to form an alliance.  
 
With regards to empirical papers, as far as we know, there is no existing paper about 
competition in wholesale roaming, structural demand estimation for visited networks, or 
about the impact of preferred networks on wholesale prices.  
 
We use a dataset on traffics (quantities) demanded by Etisalat outbound roamers and 
wholesale charges per roaming service for each visited network. We make a distinction 
between visited networks that are cross-owned by Etisalat and the ones that are considered 
by Etisalat as alliance networks. This is to emphasize that a home network can steer to an 
alliance network without necessarily having an ownership stake in it, a fact that is ignored in 
the European NRAs analyses which mainly consider cross-ownership (intra-groups).  
 
More importantly, the dataset has observations before and after Etisalat retail policy shift 
from discriminatory pricing (i.e. per visited network) to uniform (i.e. common across visited 
networks). Before the policy, retail prices were discriminatory and hence the choice between 
visited networks is assumed to be manually selected by roamers (i.e. demand-side 
substitution). After the policy, retail prices become uniform, so the choice is assumed to be 
made by Etisalat through steering (i.e. supply-side substitution), controlling for visited 
networks non-price characteristics and assuming handsets on automatic mode. 
 
We draw attentions to the retail price policy importance in steering, which is ignored in the 
European NRAs analyses and in Rieck et al (2005). A roamer can override his home 
network’s steering by manually selecting a visited network with the cheaper retail price. Such 
obstruction has to be removed for steering to exist. In order to steer, the home network 
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should make the roamer indifferent between visited networks price-wise, which is assumed 
possible through setting identical retail prices (uniform). In our dataset, we make use of 
Etisalat retail policy shift, which should act as a shock in the data through which we explore 
for steering.  
 
In our dataset, we only observe one side of the IOT agreements; that is, what Etisalat pays 
out to visited networks (its wholesale costs), which is also the visited networks revenues. 
Therefore, the reciprocity in prices that may exist in IOT agreements cannot be inferred from 
the dataset, neither on the retail level as in Rieck et al (2005) nor on the wholesale level as 
in Wright (1999) who studied international calling.  
 
Nonetheless, the dataset is used to improve our understanding about wholesale competition 
between visited networks. Therefore, we estimate demands for visited networks, estimate 
the relationship of market structure and preferential IOT partners with wholesale prices. In 
addition, we explore the effectiveness of steering by the home network, Etisalat. 
 
We study outgoing calls while roaming abroad, similar to the European NRAs analyses, but 
calculate market shares in quantities (as opposed to shares in sales) since steering is 
related to market shares in quantities; thus we separate out the impact of wholesale pricing 
behaviors. 
 
Unlike Rieck et al (2005) who use retail prices to study alliance formation, we have data on 
wholesale prices which are very relevant to preferential IOT (wholesale) agreements. 
Wholesale prices charged to Etisalat can be compared between its IOT partners, controlling 
for its alliance networks and cross-owned networks.  
 
We found that, after the uniform policy, steering by Etisalat is effective. Wholesale discounts 
are offered by Etisalat alliance networks, but not by its cross-owned networks. Etisalat 
roamers are found to have higher marginal valuations for visited networks that allow prepaid 
roaming and networks that are alliance to Etisalat, but less for networks cross-owned by 
Etisalat.  
 
In addition, the number of networks is found to significantly reduce wholesale prices, 
reflecting substitutability of visited networks. Moreover, demand is found more elastic than 
the industry figures in EC (2006), GSMA (2008), Europe Economics (2008) and CMT (2009).   
  
44 
 
Chapter (3). The Base Model 
 
The exisiting theoritical models on mobile international roaming are based on networks 
choosing wholesale prices with uniform retail pricing constraint; that is, the retail price is 
common or non-discriminatory by visited networks, as in Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Lupi 
and Manenti (2009), and Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011), which are surveyed in Section (2.3.1).  
 
The rationale for assuming home networks applying a uniform retail is the fact that the 
subscriber in many situations only cares about the average retail price even if prices differ 
due to probably different wholesale prices. Such assumptions are used in Gans and King 
(2000) who model the case a fixed network subscriber calling a mobile number without 
knowing the terminating mobile network. Models on mobile international roaming also follow 
these assumptions for the roamer who either originates a traffic (e.g. making an outgoing call) 
or terminates a traffic (e.g. receiving an incoming call) when roaming on a foreign visited 
network without knowing the applicable retail price for using it. Nonetheless, all these models 
assume the subscriber knows the average retail price he eventually pays to his home 
network.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter (2), this uniform retail price in the demand equation 
makes networks complements rather than substitues, removing the wholesale competition 
the existing papers aim at modelling. As a consequence, these papers share similar results: 
the final wholesale price charged to the home network by non-cooperative upstream 
networks is higher than the collusive price, which increases with the number of upstream 
networks. Perfect complementairty explains how these results can exist, as demonestrated 
in Section (2.2.2). 
 
The assumption on retail pricing policy for mobile international roaming, whether uniform or 
discriminatory, has implications on the roamer’s handset network selection and on wholesale 
competition as we shall demonestrate in this chapter. The discriminatory retail pricing policy 
is overlooked in the lietraure, so we aim in this chapter to compare equilibria under this 
policy to the uniform policy used in the literature. 
 
This chapter lays down the base model for mobile international roaming for the 
discriminatory and the uniform retail pricing policies. Section (3.1) explains the model 
background. Section (3.2) outlines the game. Section (3.3) shows game results and welfare 
implications. Section (3.4) discusses game intuitions and its connection to next chapter. 
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3.1 Model Background 
 
3.1.1 Demand Side 
 
We base most of our assumptions on the findings in the EC sector inquiry (2000). We make 
three key assumptions with regards to switching behaviours of the consumer of mobile 
international roaming.  
 
The first relates to the decision of registering at a home mobile network operator (hereafter 
home network). The consumer has to be registered at a home network in order to be eligible 
to roam abroad with his home mobile number. Given roaming is only a component of a 
mobile bundle that is not offered on its own, it is plausible to assume that subscribers do not 
decide to subscribe to a home network based on roaming reasons31.  
 
In addition to the assumed negligible weight for international roaming in consumer’s decision 
to choose a home network, we further assume high switching costs between home networks 
that outweigh any domestic competitive offering for international roaming. The absence of 
mobile number portability in some countries is an example, which makes the subscriber who 
plans to switch away from the current home network unable to use his current mobile 
number. If international roaming is mainly about using the same mobile number, such 
convenience will not be enjoyed abroad in this case had the subscriber domestically 
switched to another home network. Another similar example is a subscription contract with a 
locked handset, under which the subscriber will not enjoy the convenience of using the same 
handset abroad with a SIM card from a different home network. Based on all the above, we 
assume a home network is a monopolist at the retail level.  
 
The second switching assumption is that the outside options in the visited country are 
inconvenient. Examples of such options include the use of a visitor-SIM, a VOIP 
communications via WIFI, a satellite handset, a hotel telephone and a public payphone. Due 
to the temporary nature of visits, we assume those outside options are highly inconvenient 
as they require technical know-how to use for communication.  
 
The third switching assumption relates to the roamer’s selection between different mobile 
network operators in the visited country (hereafter visited networks). Visited networks are 
                                               
31 Europe Economics (2008) claim most consumers place little weight on roaming prices in deciding which home network they 
subscribe to. 
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assumed to be differentiated in their geographical coverages. Other product differentiation 
dimensions such as brand are ignored in the base model for simplicity32. The roamer is 
assumed to manually select the visited network (through his handset) with the cheapest 
retail price as long as its coverage allows. If the retail price is uniform, we assume the 
roamer would consider leaving his handset on automatic mode. 
 
We assume complete information33 and rational economic agents. Since visited networks 
lack information on the heterogeneity of foreign visitors 34 , we use the representative 
consumer approach to model the demands for visited networks.  
 
3.1.2 Supply Side 
 
The travelling subscriber is assumed to choose manually the visited network for his home 
network based on the visited network’s coverage and on the retail price he eventually pays 
to his home network. With uniform retail, he is assumed to leave his handset on default 
automatic mode because he has no price reason to manually select between visited 
networks; and thus the handset would be picked up any visited network (more likely the one 
with the strongest network signal).  
 
In the case of uniform retail price, in order for the home network to ensure the selected 
visited network is a preferred visited network (which may offer a lower wholesale price), the 
home network needs to acquire steering technology, such as SIM application toolkit or over 
the air programming, to steer to the preferred network. Investment in such technology is 
supposed to bring efficiency gains to the home network. Steering, as a supply-side 
substitution, requires overlapping coverages of visited networks in order to be effective, 
where its success is based on minimizing random traffics. We defer the choice on acquiring 
steering technology to Chapter (4). 
 
For the demand to be satisfied, visited networks must provide geographic coverages. Both 
demand-side and supply-side substitutions (through steering) need overlapping coverages of 
                                               
32 The estimated demand in Chapter (6) addresses visited networks’ characteristics, which are: (i) home network’s cross-
owned networks that may bear the brand of home network, (ii) home network’s roaming alliance networks; and (iii) home 
network’s partners that allow prepaid roaming. Chapter (6) tests the significance of these characteristics in explaining the mean 
utility of Etisalat roamers, where the unobserved characteristics (by the econometrician), such as coverage of visited networks, 
enter the error term.  
33 Mobile international roaming had been blamed for lack of price transparency. Regulators in the EU and Arab states 
overcame such problem by requesting home networks to send SMS to their travelling subscribers detailing the applicable 
roaming prices. 
34 Visited networks recognise the home network of the visitors, and are not expected to know the details of the foreign visitors. 
This is why, as observed in the market place (e.g. Etisalat), visited networks do not price discriminate (in their wholesale 
pricing) between the visitors from the same home network (e.g. business/consumer; postpaid/prepaid, etc.).  
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visited networks; otherwise each network is an isolated monopolist in its own coverage area. 
Thus the higher the overlap, the higher will be the substitutability.  
 
Typically, the home network signs IOT agreement with all networks in a given country so that 
its travelling subscriber can have the most possible network coverage in order to be able to 
use the service continuously35. Therefore, visited networks are assumed to be imperfect 
substitutes regarding coverage; hence preferential IOT agreements are not assumed to 
result in exclusive IOT agreements. 
 
Usually, a NRA obliges its licensed mobile network operators to meet the minimum network 
coverage requirement. In the literature on choice of network coverage 36 , the networks 
choose their coverages strategically to compete for domestic subscribers, where coverage is 
considered a product quality parameter. As coverage increases product differentiation for 
domestic subscribers, at the same time, it increases product substitutability for foreign 
visitors. We do not assume the choice on coverage is made for the sake of hosting visitors; 
hence it is exogenous to the agents in our model. This also means coverage fixed costs are 
irrelevant too37.  
 
In the base model, we use a substitutability parameter as an index to show that visited 
networks’ coverages are overlapping where substitution between visited networks can be 
made. The nature of mobile networks’ coverages does not make them perfect substitutes, so 
the substitutability parameter is bounded.  
 
Furthermore, we assume networks provide equal coverages; and have unconstrained 
capacities, symmetric constant actual marginal costs (normalized to zero without loss of 
generality) on both the retail and wholesale service provisioning, and no fixed costs as 
networks use existing facilities to serve roamers38. 
 
The focus of the model is on the pricing behaviour of networks, not their market structures, 
so we assume a fixed number of players (i.e., mature market). More specifically, we assume 
                                               
35 This is also noted by the French NRA (ARCEP, 2006). 
36 See Valletti (1999) for coverage as a quality parameter, and see Valletti (2003) and Fabrizi and Wertlen (2008) for the 
choice on coverage and its impact on national roaming agreements. 
37 Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011) assume a stage in the game, before the pricing stages, where visited networks choose to invest in 
coverage improvement, especially in airports, to compete in hosting visitors.   
38 CAMEL technology allows roaming by prepaid subscribers, which must be installed by both the home and visited network. 
The home network instantly deducts from the balance of the prepaid roamer according to his usage. The technology is 
expensive to acquire, but typically, the home network charges higher retail for prepaid (European Parliament, 2006). According 
to Etisalat, visited networks do not price discriminate in wholesale prices for prepaid versus postpaid. CAMEL technology is 
assumed to affect the market size only; but is not assumed to affect the pricing behaviours of visited networks, which is the 
focus of all theoretical models. Therefore, costs of CAMEL technology are ignored in all the theoretical models.  
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a duopoly game. Networks are independent of one another (no cross-ownership39), and 
maximize their roaming profits 40  independent from other existing interconnection 
agreements, such as the international settlement rate agreement for international calls.  
 
3.1.3 Pricing  
 
Wholesale prices under IOT agreements are known to be set on a linear basis (i.e. per unit 
of use)41 . For simpification and in line with the EC (2000), the model assumes linear 
wholesale and retail prices. We start with discriminatory retail prices. Then we assume 
uniform retail pricing in line with the existing literature. Home networks are assumed not to 
coordinate their retail pricing strategy as the retail price is irrelevant in a typical IOT-
agreement42. 
 
In line with the literature, a two-stage pricing game is played: wholesale price followed by 
retail price. In different specification of the model, wholesale price setting may stem from 
maximizing individual wholesale profit. If networks in the vertical line set the wholesale price 
to maximize their joint profits, they may avoid the double marginalization problem43. Two 
collusive pricing strategies are also explored44: domestic networks fixing the wholesale price 
to maximize their national cartel profit45; and an international cartel aimed at maximizing the 
market profit46. We compare the four wholesale strategies equilibria under discriminatory and 
uniform retail price setting that aim at maximizing the retail profits of a home network across 
its IOT agreements.  
 
3.2 The Game 
3.2.1 Players 
 
Similar to Salsas and Koboldt (2004) and Lupi and Manenti (2009), we assume there are two 
countries each is served by two networks. Each network is assumed to be a monopolist in 
                                               
39 In Chapter (4), we model cross-ownership, which is a wholesale pricing strategy that results in preferential wholesale prices 
between the agreeing networks.    
40 We assume a home network offers international roaming as an additional service to existing mobile package of services, 
and therefore will continue to offer it as long as it gains non-negative profit. 
41 That is, wholesale prices do not involve two-part tariff at the retail level or franchise fee at the wholesale level. This may be 
due to demand uncertainty of roaming.  
42 See Section (1.1) on IOT agreements.  
43 Since each player is a wholesaler and a retailer (i.e. symbiotic producers), the incentive to maximize the vertical profit 
comes from both sides (Carter and Wright, 1994). 
44 Collusive agreements are thought to be unofficial but coexist with the official wholesale (IOT) agreement. 
45 This practice is a domestic price fixing against a foreign firm, which is illegal in some countries such as the EU member 
states. 
46 The GSM Association is an example of a global umbrella that has a history in issuing roaming price guidelines (STIRA) and 
lobbying against price regulation (see Section 2.3.3).  
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providing the retail service to its travelling subscriber; and at the same time, since it can be 
used by foreign visiting subscribers, it competes domestically for the wholesale service.  
 
Denote countries by   and  . A pair of networks from the two countries sign a bilateral IOT 
agreement denoted by (     ), where     *   +. Hence, there are four IOT agreements: 
(     ); (     ) ; (     ); and (     ) . Each agreement defines the wholesale prices 
charged between the agreeing partners. Figure (3.1) depicts the relationship. 
 
 
Country A 
A1 A2 
B1 B2 
Country B 
 
2Figure (3.1) International roaming in two countries each with two networks. 
-The double arrow represents a pair of two networks in an IOT agreement. 
 
3.2.2 Demand Specification 
 
We use linear demands as in Shubik and Levitan (1980). The main feature of this linear 
demand is the independence of the substitutability parameter from the market size, which we 
let vary to compare payoffs without affecting market size47.  
 
Let us use the subscript as the network in question and the superscript as the foreign 
network it deals with. The following equations are for network    which applies similarly to 
any network. The representative consumer who subscribes to home network    has 
preferences to roam on networks    and    given by the following quadratic utility  
    
 
 
     
   
 
  
 
(   
      
  ) 
  (   )
    
     
       
     
     
(3.1) 
where        
      
    is the aggregate quantity demanded by   ’s subscriber for roaming 
in country  ;    
   and    
   are the applicable retail prices; and   (the market size) and   
                                               
47 In contrast, the market size of the demand in Dixit (1979) is given by   (   ), which is reduced by the substitutability 
parameter  . 
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(slope of demand curve) are positive constants. The substitutability parameter is    , 
which is also the inverse of product differentiation. 
 
The roamer maximizes his utility for roaming in country   by choosing    
   and    
   
    
    
   
    
    
      
(3.2)  
The direct demands for roaming on networks    and    respectively are given by 
   
   
 
 
 [   .  
 
 
/    
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and 
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/    
   
  
 
   
  ]  
(3.3) 
The demands are downward sloping, showing the own price effect is greater than the cross 
price effect (i.e.           ).  If the prices are uniform (i.e.    
      
      ), the effect of 
  is removed from the demands, resulting in identical demands 
   
      
       
 
 
 ,      -  
(3.4) 
Figure (3.2) shows the direct demands as in Shubik and Levitan (1980). In this Figure, 
consider firm 1 as visited network    and firm 2 as   ; while home network    faces their 
aggregated demands. The      line is the analogy to Eq. (3.3); the      line is the 
analogy to Eq. (3.4); the     line shows the aggregate demand (e.g.   ); and the       
line shows the demand for firm 1 when it drives out firm 2 from the market (i.e., firm 2 sells 
nothing)48.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 The kink in the demand curve insures non-negative demands. That is, there exists   
  at point    such that      because 
firm 2 is priced out of the market (Shubik and Levitan, 1980).     
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3Figure (3.2) The demand facing firm 1.  
Source: Figure (6.1) in Shubik and Levitan (1980).  
 
In our case, for example, products are differentiated in their geographic coverages, not as a 
response to host roamers, but as a response to local licensing obligations and to local 
competition for subscribers (i.e. exogenous reasons). Visited networks use their existing 
coverages to host roamers. Given our assumption on symmetric coverages, the roamer may 
have equal quantities demanded. In the coverage overlapping areas, the roamer can 
substitute between visited networks. 
 
We let the substitutability parameter   represent the overlapping coverage. If    , the 
roamer views visited networks as non-substitutes. This is equivalent to non-overlapping 
coverage. As   rises, the roamer views visited networks as more substitutable. This 
corresponds to the increase in overlapping coverage. In the limit of  , visited networks are 
perfect substitutes, which means coverage overlap is perfect.  
 
Define     (   ) as the index for the degree of substitutability49, where    ,   ).   is 
equivalent to the cross price elasticity divided by the absolute value of own price elasticity 
when prices are symmetric. For example, take the following demand 
      
 
 
 0   .  
 
 
/    
  
 
  1              
The own price elasticity is given by 
                                               
49 This index is also used in Economides (1994), and is similar to (     ) typically used with Dixit’s demand as in Singh and 
Vives (1984). 
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and the cross elasticity is given by 
     
   
   
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
   
When prices are symmetric in equilibrium for example,   can be expressed as follows   
  
    
|    |
 
   
.  
 
 /   
 
  
   
  
If    , the services provided by visited networks are independent (isolated monopolists); 
and if    , the services are becoming perfect substitutes. In our model,   corresponds to 
the overlapping of coverages of visited networks, under which the roamer50 can substitute.  
 
3.2.3 Payoffs 
 
The IOT agreement (     ) results in (   
      
  ) profits to each partner consisting of a retail 
part and a wholesale part, where     *   +. The following is a separately additive profit 
function for network    based on the (     ) IOT agreement 
   
   (   
      
  )     
  
(   
      
  )
⏞         
             
    
       
  (   
      
  )
⏞      
                
          (       )  
The retail profit to    comes from the situation   ’s subscriber roams on   ’s network.    
charges its subscriber    
  
 and pays    
   to   . (In country  , network    is constrained by its 
rival    (    *   +    ) as long as the roamer can substitute and the wholesale prices 
are reflected in   ’s retail prices).  
 
The wholesale profit to    comes from the situation   ’s travelling subscriber roams on   ’s 
network. (   is also constrained by its rival    (    *   +    ) through the retail prices    
sets for roaming in country   as long as the roamer can substitute and the wholesale prices 
are reflected in   ’s retail prices). Notice that a network’s wholesale demand is also its IOT 
agreement partner’s retail demand.  
 
Let  (  ) denote the market profit (i.e., the sum of all profits for all networks). The market 
profit can be expressed horizontally, where    and    are the sum of profits in country   
and   respectively,  
                                               
50 In Chapter (4),   is used in modelling the steering game to represent home network’s supply-side substitution. 
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Observe above that the summations for    
  
 and    
   have identical dimensions. Hence, 
 (  ) can also be expressed vertically as follows, where  (    ) is the sum of profits to the 
vertically related partners in the (     ) IOT agreement.  
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Along with the base model’s assumptions, all the above payoffs result in symmetric price 
solutions. In other words, these profit functions do not reflect preferential wholesale 
agreements, which are deferred to Chapter (4).  
 
3.2.4 Timing Of The Game  
 
The game is played in two stages. In Stage I, networks set their wholesale prices 
simultaneously. In Stage II, networks set their retail prices simultaneously. The subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is solved by backward induction. The retail price solution of 
the second stage is a function of the wholesale price(s), which is substituted for to solve for 
first stage wholesale price equilibria. We call such a function the retail price mapping 
function (RPMF) following Carter and Wright (1994). 
 
For the sake of simplifying notations, we solve for the situation   ’s subscriber roaming on 
  ’s network as governed by the (     ) IOT agreement. We show the retail price solution 
for network    and the wholesale price solution for   , where all derivations are provided in 
Appendix (B). With symbiotic production, solutions apply similarly to any network.  
 
3.2.5 Wholesale Pricing Strategies 
 
We explore the profit maximizing strategies for wholesale price setting in the following four 
types:  
 
i. International cartel strategy;  
ii. National cartel strategy;  
iii. Narrow vertical strategy; and  
iv. Unilateral strategy.  
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As we shall see next, the maximization problems for the above strategies lead to symmetric 
wholesale prices for all networks. The unilateral strategy is a non-cooperative strategy, 
whereby a network sets its wholesale price to maximize its own profit. The other strategies 
are cooperative.  
 
In the narrow vertical strategy, two vertically related networks set wholesale prices to 
maximize their (narrow) joint profit ignoring implications on other revenues from their other 
IOT agreements51.  
 
The national cartel strategy is whereby two domestic networks maximize their joint profit by 
fixing the wholesale price to a foreign network with which they have separate IOT 
agreements. The international cartel strategy is about all players joining a coalition to set the 
wholesale price between themselves in order to maximize the industry’s profit.  
 
3.2.6 Retail Pricing Policies 
 
Retail prices are not part of any IOT agreement, and thus networks are not supposed to 
coordinate retail prices52. We consider uniform and discriminatory retail pricing policies which 
produce different retail price mapping functions (RPMFs) to solve wholesale price equilibria. 
To simplify the model, we assume all networks apply the same retail policy in each 
wholesale pricing strategy.  
 
First, we assume the retail price is differentiated by visited networks (i.e. discriminatory 
policy). Then, we assume the retail price is uniform. Price equilibria are presented for each 
retail pricing policy. Equilibria and results of the uniform policy are similar to the ones found 
in Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti (2009), and Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011).  
 
The demands under the uniform policy is given by Eq. (3.4), without the substitutability 
parameter. The problem here is that the relevant RPMF, once substituted into the demand 
equation to solve for wholesale prices, shows visited networks as perfect complements 
instead of substitutes. As a consequence, response functions are downward sloping due to 
perfect complementarity of visited networks.  
 
                                               
51 Chapter (4) explores cross-ownership strategy, which is a wider wholesale strategy that maximizes the joint profit for the two 
vertically related networks and includes profit margins from their agreements with the other networks. Such strategy results in 
asymmetric wholesale price solutions.  
52 Networks in an IOT agreement are licensed in two different countries and both offer retail services to two distinct groups of 
subscribers.  
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3.2.7 Stage II 
 
Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
With discriminatory retail prices, each home network sets retail prices differentiated by 
visited networks. The demands are similar to Eq. (3.3). Consider the following home network 
  ’s retail maximization problem when its subscriber roams in country   
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   )    
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  )     
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 (   
      
   )    
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  )     
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(3.5.0) 
  ’s retail prices are inside its retail profits (the first and the third terms, where the demands 
are given by Eq. (3.3)). The RPMFs for roaming on both visited networks are derived by 
solving 
    
    
   
    
    
      
simultaneously, yielding the following response functions 
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(3.5.1) 
By substituting symmetrically for    
   and    
   in each equation of (3.5.1), we get the 
following RPMFs 
   
   
      
  
  
   
and 
   
   
      
  
  
  
(3.6) 
The RPMFs given in Eq. (3.6) are the monopoly markups53. The RPMF is a markup only on 
the relevant wholesale price due to the following two effects.  
 
Consider    
   in the last term of    
   response function in Eq. (3.5.1). Substitute    
   with its 
RPMF from Eq. (3.6). One can see the impact of    
   is removed by tightening the margin on 
                                               
53 The RPMFs are similar to Eq. (6.15) in Shubik and Levitan (1980) if    , which is    (     )   , where   is the actual 
marginal cost. 
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using   ’s network. This is the primary effect. The secondary effect is due to the positive 
sign of    
  . It means a higher price for using    allows    to charge a higher price for using 
  . With the common   (the market size), the effect of substitutability between   ’s IOT 
agreements is removed from each RPMF. 
 
Uniform Retail Policy  
 
In the absence of steering54 and with uniform retail, each home network is assumed to set 
identical retail prices for its subscriber when roaming in the visited country, resulting in 
identical demands. The demands are similar to Eq. (3.4). 
 
Consider home network   ’s retail maximization problem when its subscriber roams in 
country  . The average wholesale price facing    is  ̅ 
   (   
      
  )  . The following 
retail maximization problem is for    when its subscriber roams in country   
   
(   )
     (     ̅ 
   )    (   )     
     (   )     
     (   )  
(3.7) 
  ’s retail price is inside its retail profit (the first term, where the demands are given by Eq. 
(3.4)). The first order condition (FOC) must satisfy 
    
    
     
By solving for    , the RPMF is given by  
     
     ̅ 
  
  
   
(3.8) 
Note importantly that, as compared to Eq. (3.6),     depends on both    
   and    
  . It is also 
equivalent to Eq. (3.6) if wholesale prices are symmetric. By substituting the RPMF given by 
Eq. (3.8) to solve for wholesale prices, the demand for a visited network becomes 
     
 
 
 *   
(   
      
  ) 
 
+  
Clearly in      above, wholesale prices have the same negative sign; making the visited 
networks appear as perfect complements, where the nature of the relationship of visited 
networks should be substitution. For example, to consume one minute of outgoing call, you 
only need to be roaming on one visited network; put differently, you do not need to combine 
half the minute from one network and the other half from the other network. The 
                                               
54 Chapter (4) looks at a steering model with uniform retail price. 
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complementarity in this case is similar to the case of a monopoly’s demand for inputs from 
two (perfect) complementary producers (i.e. Cournot complementary monopoly theory). 
 
3.2.8 Stage I 
 
The four wholesale pricing strategies are listed below. In each wholesale strategy, networks 
are assumed to set their (monopoly) retail prices independently according to the relevant 
RPMF of the retail policy (discriminatory or uniform).  
 
In the following objective functions, the first order conditions (FOCs) are with respect to    
   
(i.e.   ’s wholesale price to   ), where   ’s retail price is given by the RPMFs of Eq. (3.6) 
for the discriminatory policy and by the RPMF of Eq. (3.8) for the uniform policy. 
 
3.2.8i International Cartel Wholesale Pricing Strategy 
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the international market profit given by 
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(3.9) 
Eq. (3.9) shows the market profit equals the retail revenues of all networks as wholesale 
profits/costs cancel out. Note the relevant wholesale prices will be embedded in the relevant 
RPMFs.  
 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.3), and substituting Eq. (3.6) in Eq. (3.9), we find    
   a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
  (  )
    
      
By solving for    
  , the international cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
       
     
(3.10) 
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where     (   ) . Since   ,   ) , the only symmetric wholesale equilibrium is when 
   . Thus the equilibrium wholesale solution is  
      
then from Eq. (3.6), 
   
 
  
  
(3.11) 
With a wholesale price equals zero (the marginal cost), the retail price is at the monopoly 
level. 
 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.4), and substituting Eq. (3.8) in Eq. (3.9), we find     a direct 
function of    
  , and the FOC is 
  (  )
    
      
By solving for    
  , the international cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
        
    
(3.12) 
The only symmetric wholesale price solution is zero. Thus the equilibrium wholesale solution 
is  
       
then from Eq. (3.8), 
    
 
  
  
(3.13) 
The wholesale price equals zero (the marginal cost), and the retail price is at the monopoly 
level. 
 
3.2.8ii National Cartel Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the national profit. The maximization 
problem for networks in country   is 
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(3.14) 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.3), and substituting Eq. (3.6) in Eq. (3.14), we find    
   a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
   
    
      
By solving for    
  , the national cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 (   )
     
    
(3.15) 
where     (   ). By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (3.15), then substituting for 
 , we get  
   
 
  
    
then from Eq. (3.6), 
   
  
  
   
(3.16) 
With a wholesale price at the monopoly level, the retail price reflects the double 
marginalization problem. 
 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.4), and substituting Eq. (3.8) in Eq. (3.14), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
   
    
       
By solving for    
  , the national cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
    
    
(3.17) 
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By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (3.17), the solution will be indeterminate. If we 
let    
      
     , the wholesale price solution will be the monopoly price, similar to the 
collusion case assumed in Salsas and Koboldt (2004) and Lupi and Manenti (2009). 
 
Hence, the equilibrium wholesale price solution that maximizes the national market profit is  
    
 
  
   
then from Eq. (3.8),  
    
  
  
   
(3.18) 
The wholesale price is fixed at the monopoly level resulting in a retail price with double 
marginalisation problem.  
 
3.2.8iii Narrow Vertical Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the vertical profits of the two IOT partners 
within each separate IOT agreement. The maximization problem for the networks in the 
(     ) IOT agreement is 
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(3.19) 
Eq. (3.19) is equivalent to the retail revenues of    and    as their wholesale profits/costs 
cancel out. It does not include their profits from their separate IOT agreements with    and 
  55. 
 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.3), and substituting Eq. (3.6) in Eq. (3.19), we find    
   a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
  (    )
    
       
By solving for    
  , the narrow vertical strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
(   
   
 
 
 *  
(3.20) 
where     (   ). By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (3.20), we get  
                                               
55 A wider vertical (cross-ownership) strategy that includes such cross profits is deferred to Chapter (4). 
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  (   ) 
   
then from Eq. (3.6), 
   
  
 (   )
    
(3.21) 
Since   ,   ),    is negative if    . The negative wholesale price reduces the retail price 
and effectively enhances the demand for the IOT partner. The retail price approaches zero 
(the marginal cost) as    . 
 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.4), and substituting Eq. (3.8) in Eq. (3.19), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
  (    )
    
      
By solving for    
  , the narrow vertical strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
        
    
(3.22) 
The only symmetric wholesale price solution is zero. Thus the equilibrium wholesale solution 
is  
      
then from Eq. (3.8),  
    
 
  
  
(3.23) 
The wholesale price equals zero (the marginal cost), and the retail price is at the monopoly 
level. 
 
3.2.8iv Unilateral Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the own profit for each network. The 
maximization problem for    is 
   
(   
     
  )
    (   
      
  )    
  (   
      
  )     
       
  (   
      
  ) 
 (   
      
  )    
  (   
      
  )     
       
  (   
      
  )  
(3.24) 
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Under Discriminatory Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.3), and substituting Eq. (3.6) in Eq. (3.24), we find    
   a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
    
    
      
By solving for    
  , the unilateral strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 (   )
 
 
 
   
     
(3.25) 
where     (   ). By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (3.25), then substituting for 
 , we get  
   
  
 (   )
   
then from Eq. (3.6), 
    
 (   )
  (   )
  
(3.26) 
The substitutability parameter   reduces both prices. As    , the wholesale price 
approaches zero (the marginal cost) and the retail price approaches the monopoly price. 
 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (3.4), and substituting Eq. (3.8) in Eq. (3.24), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
    
    
      
By solving for    
  , the unilateral strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
(3.27) 
By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (3.27), we get  
   
   
   
   
then from Eq. (3.8),  
   
   
   
   
(3.28) 
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The price equilibria in Eq. (3.28) match the equilibria found in Salsas and Koboldt (2004) and 
Lupi and Manenti (2009). With wholesale price already above the monopoly level, the double 
marginalisation problem is prominent in the retail price. 
 
3.3 Results  
 
This section discusses the game results regarding the response functions, payoffs and 
welfare implications. 
 
3.3.1 Response Functions 
 
Under a given retail pricing policy, the response functions have the same sign with all 
wholesale strategies of the game. However, the response functions in the two retail pricing 
policies (discriminatory and uniform) have opposite signs. This leads to the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition (3.1). In all wholesale pricing strategies of the game, wholesale prices are 
strategic complements under the discriminatory retail policy, and strategic substitutes under 
the uniform retail policy. 
 
Proof. The derivative with respect to the competitor’s wholesale price is positive in the 
response functions under the discriminatory retail pricing policy given by Eq. (3.10), (3.15), 
(3.20), and (3.25); hence strategic complements. The derivative with respect to the 
competitor’s wholesale price is negative in the response functions under the uniform retail 
pricing policy given by Eq. (3.12), (3.17), (3.22), and (3.27); hence strategic substitutes.   
 
Visited networks are substitutes in nature, such that in a price game, the response functions 
should be upward sloping (i.e., positively related or strategic complements). This is the case 
under the discriminatory retail policy. On the other hand, when the response functions are 
downward sloping (i.e., negatively related or strategic substitutes) in a price game, we 
conclude that networks are made perfect complements. This is the case under the uniform 
retail policy, as visited networks carry the same negative sign in the demand. 
 
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti (2009), and Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011) all 
assume the roamer only cares about the average retail price, which in this case is similar to 
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the uniform retail policy in our model. With uniform retail, the roamer is assumed to leave his 
handset on automatic mode; and given absence of steering, network selection becomes 
random. Random network selection is attributed by Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011) to be causing 
the wholesale pricing response functions to become strategic substitutes. Ambjørnsen, et al. 
(2011) argue that the response functions can be, instead, strategic complements if roamers 
manually select between networks, or if steering is effective by the home network. 
 
Nevertheless, none of the aforementioned papers recognize that with uniform retail price, the 
nature of visited networks turns to complements, instead of substitutes. Competition, 
therefore, cannot be modelled between complementary networks.  
 
Notice that with the national cartel wholesale strategy, Eq. (3.17) is downward sloping, but it 
would lead to indeterminate solution. Instead, we imposed a common wholesale price that 
led to a monopoly wholesale price, following the treatment made by Salsas and Koboldt 
(2004), and in Lupi and Manenti (2009).  
 
3.3.2 Payoffs Comparison  
 
All price equilibria of the game have a convenient expression in separating out      (the 
price when demand falls to zero) from a fraction of one (except for the wholesale solutions 
that equal zero). Let    and    represent standardised wholesale and retail prices 
respectively, as shown in the Table (3.1). Assume market parameters (     ) are symmetric 
for all networks. 
 
3Table (3.1) Standardised wholesale and retail prices under discriminatory and uniform retail policies. 
   
 
 
        
 
 
  . 
  ,   ). 
    (   )   ,   ).  
 
Strategy 
Discriminatory retail policy Uniform retail policy 
Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 
International 
cartel 
         
 
 
          
 
 
 
National 
cartel 
   
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
Narrow 
vertical 
   
 
   
    
 
   
         
 
 
 
Unilateral    
 
   
    
   
 (   )
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
65 
 
Based on Table (3.1), the relation (       ) holds for any value of   under any strategy: 
   is less than    indicating wholesale price is not greater than retail price; and    is less 
than one reflecting positive demand. The equilibrium profit to network   (  is any network) 
from an IOT agreement is given by 
     
  
  
  
 (     )(    )
⏞              
             
 
  
  
    (    )
⏞        
                
 
  
  
   (    )
⏞        
              
  
(3.29) 
where    and    are standardised wholesale and retail prices respectively. Obviously, the 
equilibrium profit equals the retail revenue because, in equilibrium, the wholesale cost and 
wholesale profit cancel out. Since each network has two IOT agreements, each network will 
get    
  in equilibrium. 
 
Notice that    (  ) in Eq. (3.29) equals the own market share,    , times     (the price 
when demand falls to zero). Both of these are the intercepts of the      line in Figure (3.2). 
With (      ),   
  is a strictly concave function and symmetric around its maximum (i.e. 
½, the monopoly price), as depicted in Figure (3.3). 
 
Notice also that the limit exists for any    solution that involves  , which means    is a 
rational function of  ; hence continuous at any value of   (with negative derivatives with 
respect to  ). In addition, since changes in   do not affect the market size  , the curve in 
Figure (3.3) is stable at any value of  . Therefore, this curve can take all the    solutions in 
Table (3.1); where any    that is invariant with   will be a fixed point on the curve, and any 
   that varies with   will move on the curve to the left.  
 
  
 (  ) 
 
1/4  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
0           1/4        1/2                3/4    5/6       1 
 
4Figure (3.3) Equilibrium profit to network   in each IOT agreement.  
- Networks are assumed symmetric, and the expression    (  ) is normalized to one, which is responsible for 
the curve’s height. 
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Therefore, payoffs can be easily compared under any strategy/policy in a comparative static 
analysis that varies the substitutability parameter   (or its index  ), which are highlighted in 
the following remarks.  
 
Remark (3.1). Assume symmetric demand parameters and the equilibrium profit to a network 
from an IOT agreement is given by Eq. (3.29), with price equilibria given by Table (3.1). 
Therefore 
 
i. Under the uniform retail policy, all profits are invariant with the substitutability index  . The 
international cartel and narrow vertical strategies yield the monopoly profit. The national cartel 
strategy yields a higher profit than the unilateral strategy, but is lower than the monopoly 
level. 
 
ii. Under the discriminatory retail policy, the international cartel strategy yields the monopoly 
profit that is invariant with the substitutability index  . The national cartel strategy yields a 
lower profit that is also invariant with  . When    , the narrow vertical strategy yields the 
monopoly profit, while the unilateral strategy yields a profit equivalent to the national cartel 
strategy. As   rises, the profit of the unilateral strategy approaches the monopoly level while 
the profit of the narrow vertical strategy approaches zero. 
 
Proof. By Eq. (3.29), the equilibrium profit to network   from an IOT agreement is   
  
   (    ), with    (  ) normalized to one since it is identical to all networks. From Table 
(3.1), and given (      ), the monopoly retail price is ½, and the monopoly profit is ¼, 
where all net payments are zero. If two    solutions under two different strategies add up to 
one, the payoffs from both strategies will be equal. With the uniform retail policy, there is no 
effect of    (or its index  ). The international cartel and narrow vertical strategies yield the 
monopoly profit since they charge the monopoly retail price. Retail price is higher with the 
unilateral strategy compared to the national strategy; hence the national cartel strategy 
yields a higher profit compared to the unilateral strategy (     compared to     ), where 
both profits are less than the monopoly profit. Under the discriminatory retail policy, the 
international cartel strategy yields the monopoly profit because it charges the monopoly retail 
price, and the national profit yields a lower profit (    ), where the payoffs from these two 
strategies are invariant to  . When     (or    ), the narrow vertical strategy yields the 
monopoly profit, while the national cartel strategy yields a profit equivalent to the unilateral 
strategy. As   rises (or    ),    approaches zero under the narrow vertical strategy 
leading to zero profit; while    approaches the monopoly price under the unilateral strategy 
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leading to the monopoly profit. The profits of the narrow vertical and the unilateral strategies 
are equal at        (or     ), since    in both strategies add up to one.     
 
3.3.3 Welfare Implications  
 
We calculate the unweighted total surplus for a country as a proxy for the social welfare 
under the strategies analysed in this chapter. Take as an example country   which has two 
networks    and    retailing the service for their subscribers who visit country  , and at the 
same time hosting roamers from country  . The consumer surplus in country   is given by 
                  
(3.30)  
where the utility is as given by Eq. (3.1). Denote equilibrium utility for each network’s 
subscriber in country   by    
  (     ). Let us use    as in Section (3.3.2) to represent the 
standardised price under any strategy.  The consumer surplus in country   is given by 
      
      
  
  
 
 (    )      
(3.31) 
Notice the derivative of Eq. (3.31) with respect to    is negative, which shows that price 
reduces consumer surplus. 
 
On the other hand, each network has two IOT agreements with the networks in country  . 
Thus the producer surplus in country   is given by 
          
      
      
      
    
(3.32) 
Let    
  be the equilibrium profit from an IOT agreement to any network in country   (     ), 
similar to Eq. (3.29). Therefore, we have  
      
      
    
  
 
    (    )  
(3.33) 
Adding Eq. (3.31) to (3.33), the total surplus for country   is given by 
      
     
     
  
  
 
 (     )         
(3.34) 
As with the consumer surplus in Eq. (3.31), the total surplus in Eq. (3.34) is unambiguously 
reduced by the standardised retail price,   , where (      ). Price therefore is a 
sufficient statistics to identify consumer and total surpluses. Any reduction in wholesale price 
enhances consumer and total surpluses as long as this would reduce the retail price.  
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World surplus can be the sum of both countries’ total surpluses. However, as Valletti (2004) 
puts it, national regulators may have distorted incentives towards regulation as each is 
concerned with the surplus of its own consumers and own networks.  
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The base model in this chapter aims at modelling pricing behaviours of mobile networks in 
IOT agreements, comparing equilibria of four different wholesale pricing strategies under two 
retail pricing policies (discriminatory and uniform). The model uses a demand system which 
makes the substitutability parameter independent of market size. This substitutability 
parameter is interpreted in terms of overlapping coverages, in which the roamer can 
substitute between visited networks. The substitutability parameter is allowed to vary for 
comparative static analyses. 
 
Under the discriminatory retail policy, all response functions are upward sloping; hence 
strategic complements. There are two effects on prices: double markups and Bertrand 
competition. The unilateral retail price lies between the retail prices of the two cartel 
strategies (national and international). When   is zero, the relevant wholesale prices for the 
unilateral and national cartel strategies are the same and thus their retail prices are 
equivalent. This is the double-markup effect on the retail price. As   rises, the unilateral 
wholesale price reduces, approaching the marginal cost, driving the retail price towards the 
monopoly price (which is also the retail price under the international cartel strategy). This 
effect is due to wholesale Bertrand competition.  
 
On the other side, the narrow vertical strategy has the Bertrand competition effect only. 
When   is zero, the wholesale price equals marginal cost; but as   rises, the wholesale price 
becomes negative, dragging down the retail price towards marginal cost to enhance the 
demand for the IOT partner. Intuitively, mutual wholesale price subsidy is necessary to bring 
down the retail price.  
 
On the contrary, under the uniform retail policy, the relevant response functions are 
downward sloping; hence strategic substitutes. The wholesale price equals the marginal cost 
under the international cartel and the narrow vertical strategies, and is above marginal cost 
under both the unilateral and the national cartel strategies. Notice the national cartel 
(cooperative) wholesale price is lower than the unilateral (non-cooperative) price. Because 
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visited networks appear in the demand as perfect complements rather than substitutes, the 
higher the number of visited networks, the higher is the wholesale price to the home 
network. Those perfect complementary visited networks can overcome the effect of their 
horizontal separation problem by charging the monopoly price and share the monopoly 
profit. 
 
Payoffs under a wholesale pricing strategy may differ depending on the retail pricing policy 
being used. The retail price does not go below the monopoly level, except for the narrow 
vertical strategy due to the negative wholesale price if     . While   impacts equilibria 
under the discriminatory retail policy, it has no impact on the uniform retail policy because it 
is removed from the demands. All equilibria can be compared on the same curve of Figure 
(3.3) for any value of  . When   is zero, the position of    is either on the right side of the 
monopoly price (i.e. the double markups area), or at the monopoly price. As   rises, only 
equilibrium prices of the narrow vertical and unilateral strategies under the discriminatory 
retail policy move on the curve towards the left. Changes in   allow us to compare the 
Pareto optimality of strategies. For instance, a shift in strategy from narrow vertical to 
unilateral strategy will involve an increase in both wholesale and retail prices. Price 
increases are noticed in Europe (EC, 2000).  
 
In addition to the comparative static implications, the model shows that a price reduction 
under any strategy will always enhance both domestic and global unweighted welfares. 
However, due to the cross-border nature of the service, price regulation requires the 
cooperation of relevant regulators to jointly control wholesale and retail prices (Hoernig and 
Valletti, 2012), as in the case of the EC roaming regulation in 2007.  
 
The base model can be extended to oligopoly markets by replacing the own market size 
(   ) in the profit function of Eq. (3.29) by (   ), where   is the number of visited networks 
in each country. This follows from the extension of the demands in Shubik and Levitan 
(1980). The equilibrium profit from each IOT agreement would reduce by  . Nonetheless, if 
the equilibrium profit equals the retail revenue and if each network holds monopoly position 
downstream, the total retail revenues to each network will be unchanged. 
 
The base model compared equilibria under the discriminatory and uniform retail pricing 
policies. The substitutability parameter is found to place a downward pressure on prices 
under the discriminatory retail policy. In contrast, it has no impact on equilibria under the 
uniform retail policy. Equilibria under the uniform retail policy without steering in this chapter 
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are similar to the ones found in the existing literature, which obviously produce equilibria that 
are inconsistent with wholesale price competition.   
 
The base model does not address asymmetric wholesale price solutions that may arise from 
preferential IOT agreements. Chapter (4) extends the base model by addressing preferential 
IOT agreements between cross-owned networks, and between roaming alliance networks. 
Prior to roaming alliance game, an investment decision in steering technology is played by 
home networks. Steering is assumed to be effective only if the roamer is in overlapping 
coverage areas and the retail price is uniform such that the roamer’s handset is put on 
automatic mode 56 . The home network that acquired steering technology can execute 
steering (i.e. as a supply-substitution) between visited networks, seeking efficiency gains. 
 
 
  
                                               
56 The existing literature assumes lack of retail price information about visited networks, but the roamer knows the average 
retail price he pays to his home network; and thus intuitively, the roamer needs not to manually select between visited networks 
(i.e. leave handset on automatic mode).   
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Chapter (4). Preferential Wholesale Agreements  
 
In the base model of Chapter (3), all wholesale price equilibria from the Inter-Operator Tariffs 
(IOT) agreements are symmetric. Symmetry of wholesale prices is a result of assuming 
symmetric actual marginal costs with all networks. It is also a result of assuming compliance 
in the cooperative strategies (international cartel, national cartel, and narrow vertical) that 
perused identical maximization problems in each strategy, without involvement in 
preferential agreements. 
 
This chapter explores preferential IOT agreements that lead to asymmetry in wholesale 
prices, in line with the theoretical papers surveyed in Section (2.3), which will be referred to 
accordingly in this chapter. Similar to this literature, the focus of this chapter is on two 
wholesale pricing strategies that involve preferential IOT agreements: cross-ownership in 
Section (4.1); and roaming alliance in Section (4.2). The intuitions from these preferential 
agreements are discussed in Section (4.3). 
 
4.1 Cross-Ownership Model 
 
Mobile network operators may involve in merger and acquisition across the borders of their 
NRAs’ jurisdictions. Some cross-owned networks may carry the name of the parent 
company (e.g. Etisalat-UAE and its subsidiary Etisalat-Egypt); or may operate under a 
different brand (e.g. Etisalat-UAE and its subsidiary Mobily in Saudi Arabia). The first case is 
typically a merger or a branch of the parent company; and the second is typically shares 
acquired by the company(s). There are many mobile network operators that engage in 
cross-border merger/acquisition with existing foreign networks or acquire a license to 
compete with the existing networks, for example, AT&T, Vodafone, Orange, Zain, and MTN. 
 
Cross-border merger/acquisition is a vertically related cross-ownership, since the engaged 
networks are licensed by different NRAs to operate in different markets, and terminate cross-
border traffics. Nonetheless, foreign merger/acquisition may need to be notified to the 
authority in charge of merger regulation, which approval decision is normally based on 
whether or not the merger/acquisition raises competition concerns in the local market. 
 
In this section, we assume a game whereby the engaged (foreign) networks choose the 
wholesale prices under preferential IOT agreements. Similar to the base model, retail prices 
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are being set independently. The game is a wider vertical strategy, which is an extension of 
the narrow vertical strategy presented in Section (3.2.8iii) of the base model, for it includes 
the partners’ profit margins from their separate IOT agreements with outsiders.  
 
Salsas and Koboldt (2004) address a vertical merger (or cross-ownership) by one pair of 
networks assuming uniform retail pricing constraint and retail competition without steering 
investment. They found merger is unprofitable in this case because the consumer is 
unaware of prices. If the consumer is fully informed, he will subscribe to the merged entity at 
home and will choose its subsidiary (manually) in the visited country; hence, merger is 
profitable in this case, especially with more intense retail competition. 
 
Lupi and Manenti (2009) also consider a similar model to Salsas and Koboldt (2004), but 
ignored retail competition. They found non-cooperation is the equilibrium (i.e., a prisoner’s 
dilemma case), because the non-cooperating pair can charge a higher price without loosing 
market share. 
 
In light of these two papers, we follow the uniform retail pricing constraint and compare its 
results to the case without such constraint. In other words, we compare equilibria under the 
uniform retail policy to equilibria under discriminatory retail policy. First, the backgrounds of 
the discriminatory and uniform retail policies are explained. Then, the game is detailed for 
each policy, where results are compared in the concluding remarks.  
 
4.1.1 Model Background 
 
Similar to the base model in Chapter (3), there are two networks in country   (   and   ); 
and two networks in country   (   and   ). Each network signs an IOT agreement with 
each foreign network. Each network is assumed to be a monopolist at the retail level and a 
duopolist at the wholesale level. Networks are assumed to have symmetric constant 
marginal costs normalized to zero and no fixed costs. Retail and wholesale prices are 
assumed to be linear57. 
 
We use Shubik and Levitan (1980) demand for a visited network given by  
   
 
 
 [   .  
 
 
/   
  
 
  ]  (       ) (   )  
If the prices are uniform (i.e.        ), the demands will be symmetric 
                                               
57 Roaming packages (or bundles) applicable on preferred networks may unnecessarily complicate the model. 
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 ,    -  
All networks are assumed to have symmetric demand parameters (     ), with       and 
with the substitutability parameter    .  
 
The pricing game is played in two stages. In Stage I, networks decide between vertical 
cross-ownership and unilateral strategies for their simultaneous setting of wholesale prices. 
In Stage II, networks set their independent retail prices simultaneously. The subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is solved by backward induction. As in the existing literature, the 
focus of the game is on whether or not there exists an individual incentive for cross-
ownership within the framework of our pricing game.  
 
We assume the NRA in each country does not approve a cross-ownership that involves both 
its licensed networks and a foreign network, due to competition concerns. Thus, in our case, 
each network decides to join at most one cross-ownership; in other words, there can be at 
most two cross-ownership pairs.  
 
The choice on a cross-ownership partner does not matter given networks are symmetric; in 
other words, asymmetry in demand parameters may result in a preferred cross-ownership 
partner. Given the vertical relationship and the two-way wholesale charging, we assume 
cross-ownership once chosen is internally enforceable.  
 
In line with the base model in Chapter (3), the subscript will refer to the network in question 
and the superscript for its IOT partner. For the sake of simplifying notations, we show the 
solutions for the case    and    engage in cross-ownership, while the other pair (   and 
  ) either plays non-cooperatively or engages in a counter cross-ownership. The game is 
detailed for discriminatory and uniform retail pricing policies respectively. 
 
4.1.2 Discriminatory Retail Policy 
 
Assume all networks apply discriminatory retail prices.    sets its retail price(s) to maximize 
its total profits from its two IOT agreements  
   
(   
     
  )
    (   
      
   )    
  (   
      
  )     
      
  (   
      
  ) 
 (   
      
   )    
  (   
      
  )     
      
  (   
      
  )  
(4.1) 
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As in the base model,   ’s discriminatory retail price mapping functions (RPMFs) are given 
by58  
   
   
      
  
  
     
and 
   
   
      
  
  
  
(4.2) 
The joint profit for the cross-ownership (     ) is given by 
 (     )      
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(4.3) 
The first order conditions (FOCs) for Eq. (4.3) with respect to the wholesale prices charged 
between    and    (the insiders) are given by 
  (     )
    
   
  (     )
    
       
where    
   and    
   are embedded in    
   and    
   RPMFs respectively. Showing the 
solution for    
  , we have 
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(4.4) 
where      (   ). By further substituting Eqs. (4.2) in Eq. (4.4) and solving for    
  , we 
have 
   
      
then from Eq. (4.2), we get the retail price solution 
   
   
 
  
   
(4.5) 
which is the monopoly price. 
  
The wholesale price charged between the insiders equals (the actual) marginal cost, 
regardless of the wholesale response function of the outsiders (   or   ), leading to the 
monopoly retail price for roaming on the insider’s network.  
 
                                               
58 Similar to the base model, the second order condition is negative in all retail (discriminatory or uniform) and wholesale 
maximization problems. 
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The insiders’ FOCs for Eq. (4.3) with respect to their wholesale prices to the outsiders are 
  (     )
    
   
  (     )
    
       
Showing the solution for    
  ,   ’s response function is given by 
    
   
 
 (   )
 
 
 
    
      
(4.6) 
which is the baseline unilateral response function.  
 
Eq. (4.5) and (4.6) will have different implications on price solutions depending on whether or 
not the pair (     ) engage in a counter cross-ownership.  
 
Lemma (4.1). With discriminatory retail policy of the model, if only one cross-ownership pair 
exists and if    , each of its members will receive independently a net payment from the 
outsiders. 
 
Proof. Consider the case only    and    engage in a cross-ownership. The insiders    and 
   will set the internal wholesale price at marginal cost as per Eq. (4.5), and will use the 
unilateral response function of Eq. (4.6) in choosing the wholesale prices to the outsiders 
(   and   ). Since they do not engage in cross-ownership,    and    each uses a unilateral 
response function similar to Eq. (4.6), by which they charge each other    , (   )- (i.e. 
the baseline unilateral wholesale price), and each charges   , (   )-  to the cross-
ownership members. In return,    and    will be charged the unilateral wholesale price. The 
(retail) demands facing an outsider are evaluated at the unilateral retail price   (  
 ) ,  (   )-. For example,   ’s demand for    (     ) is    
    (   ) , (   )-. By 
contrast, the demands facing an insider are asymmetric because the insider charges 
different retail prices: the monopoly price   (  ) to use the insider’s network and  (  
 ) ,  (   )- to use the outsider’s network. For example,   ’s demand for    is    
   
 (    ) , (   )-, while for   , it is    
      . The net payment between the insiders is 
zero; and the net payment between the outsiders is also zero, because the relevant IOT 
partners set identical wholesale prices and have identical demands. However, if    , the 
net payment between an outsider and an insider is non-zero: the outsider is a net payee to 
the insider because the outsider charges a lower wholesale price (e.g.    
      
  ) and has 
a higher demand (e.g.    
      
   ).             
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Lemma (4.1) shows asymmetry of prices and demands if one cross-ownership pair exists. 
For example, the net payment for    from its IOT agreement with    is  
     
   
 
 (   )
⏞   
   
  
 
 
 
⏞
   
  
  
  
 (   )
⏞   
   
  
 
 (   )
 (   )
⏞    
   
  
   
 (    )  
  (   ) 
    
where     (   ). 
 
Given discriminatory retail policy, the retail price for roaming on the insider’s network equals 
the monopoly price,   (  )  which is lower than   (   ) ,  (   )- (the price for roaming 
on the outsider’s network). As a consequence, the demands are asymmetric favouring the 
insider’s network. On the other side, as the outsider is being charged identical unilateral 
wholesale prices, it will set the unilateral retail price (i.e.   (   ) ,  (   )-) for the use of 
either visited network, resulting in equal demands. Each outsider has a higher demand for 
the insider than vice versa, where the former charges a lower wholesale price than the later. 
The result is a net payment from the outsider to the insider as long as networks are 
imperfect substitutes (i.e.,    ).  
 
Lemma (4.2). With discriminatory retail policy of the model, if two cross-ownership pairs 
exist, net payments are zero. 
 
Proof. Consider the case of two cross-ownership pairs, for example (     ) and (     ). 
In each pair, the insiders will set the internal wholesale price at marginal cost as in Eq. (4.5); 
and, with the unilateral response function of Eq. (4.6), they will set   , (   )- as the 
wholesale price to the outsiders. In each IOT agreement, wholesale prices are identical; and 
demands are identical too (i.e.   (    ) , (   )-  for the insider, and     for the 
outsider). Therefore, net payments are zero.                
 
Lemma (4.2) shows asymmetry in wholesale prices, but with zero net payments because 
networks engage in two counter cross-ownership pairs. Notice that if    , by moving from 
the case in Lemma (4.1) to the case in Lemma (4.2), the wholesale price charged by    and 
   to outsiders decreases (from    , (   )- to   , (   )-) and the retail price of    and 
   for roaming on    and    respectively decreases (from   (   ) ,  (   )-to   (  
 ) ,  (   )-). Lemma (4.1) and (4.2) lead to the following proposition.   
 
Proposition (4.1). With discriminatory retail policy of the model, if    , joining a cross-
ownership pair is a dominant strategy to each network. 
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Proof. Let   represent the baseline unilateral profit to a network from its both IOT 
agreements when no cross-ownership takes place in the market, all networks set wholesale 
prices unilaterally, and net payments are zero; where    (   )(   )   ,  (   ) -. 
From Lemma (4.1), the insider, for example   , can improve upon its unilateral profit to 
reach the cross-ownership profit    (    )   ,   (   )- plus the net payment with    
given by      (    )   ,  (   ) - . By contrast, the outsider’s unilateral profit is 
reduced by this net payment only if    . From Lemma (4.2), each network gets    and net 
payments are zero. Therefore, joining cross-ownership is a dominant strategy to each 
network.                
 
The following example demonstrates the dominant strategy as predicted by Proposition 
(4.1). Let (     ) be a possible cross-ownership pair and (     ) be a possible counter 
pair. Consider the decision in joining different pairs by    and   . Assume    . As given in 
the proof of Proposition (4.1), let   ,    and     respectively represent the unilateral profit, 
the cross-ownership profit and the net payment to these two IOT partners, where       
   , and    and    can be equal depending on   values. Table (4.1) shows the payoffs 
matrix. 
 
4Table (4.1) Payoffs matrix for joining a cross-ownership pair under the discriminatory retail policy. 
Possible cross-
ownership pairs: 
(     ) (     ) 
   
Join (     ) Don’t join 
 
   
Join (     )                     
Don’t join                     
                          . 
 
As can be seen from Table (4.1), the game has a unique equilibrium, which is joining a 
cross-ownership pair. The non-zero net payment is behind the individual incentive to join a 
cross-ownership. If one cross-ownership exists, its members can improve their payoffs 
beyond the unilateral profit, but reduce the unilateral profits of the outsiders by the net 
payments.  
 
The question of Pareto efficiency of the game depends on   values, where    . But there 
exists a critical  , which is        , at which      ; below which,      ; and above 
which,      . In the limit of  ,    and   equal the monopoly profit,    (  ). At   , the 
substitutability index given by     (   ) equals         . Therefore, the equilibrium of 
the cross-ownership game is Pareto efficient when substitutability is not very high. As 
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substitutability rises, the profit from the outsider decreases while the profit from the insider 
increases. In contrast, the baseline unilateral profit rises with substitutability, overcoming the 
cross-ownership profit when substitutability is too high.  
 
4.1.3 Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Assume all networks apply uniform retail prices without investing in steering technologies. 
Here, the substitutability parameter is removed from the demands.    sets its uniform retail 
price to maximize its total profits from its two IOT agreements  
   
(   )
     (     ̅ 
  )    (   )     
     (   )     
     (   )  
(4.7) 
where          
      
  , and  ̅ 
   
   
      
  
 
. 
 
  ’s uniform RPMF is given by  
     
     ̅ 
  
  
  
(4.8) 
Rewriting Eq. (4.3) for the uniform retail policy, the joint profit for the cross-ownership 
(     ) is given by 
 (     )  (        
  )    (   )     
      (   )  (        
  )    (   )     
       (   )  
(4.9) 
The FOCs for Eq. (4.9) with respect to the wholesale prices charged between the insiders 
are given by 
  (     )
    
   
  (     )
    
       
where    
   and    
   are embedded in     and    RPMFs respectively. Showing the solution 
for    
  , we have 
  (     )
    
     
    
    
     (   )   (        
  ) *
    (   )
    
  +     
     
       
  
  
   
(4.10) 
By further substituting Eq. (4.8) in Eq. (4.10) and solving for    
  , we have 
   
      
(4.11) 
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The wholesale price charged between the insiders equals (the actual) marginal cost, 
regardless of the wholesale response function of the outsiders (   or   ). 
 
The insider’s FOCs for Eq. (4.9) with respect to their wholesale prices to the outsiders are 
  (     )
    
   
  (     )
    
       
Showing the solution for    
  ,   ’s response function is given by 
   
   
 
 
 
   
  
 
   
(4.12) 
which is the baseline unilateral response function. 
 
Eq. (4.11) and (4.12) will have different implications on price solutions depending on whether 
or not the pair (     ) engage in a counter cross-ownership.  
 
Lemma (4.3). With uniform retail policy of the model, if only one cross-ownership pair exists, 
each of its members will pay independently a net payment to the outsiders. 
 
Proof. Consider the case only    and    engage in a cross-ownership. The insiders    and 
   will set the internal wholesale price at marginal cost as per Eq. (4.11), and will use the 
unilateral response function of Eq. (4.12) in their wholesale price setting to the outsiders (   
and   ). Since they do not engage in cross-ownership,    and    each uses a unilateral 
response function similar Eq. (4.12), by which they charge each other    ,  - (i.e. the 
unilateral wholesale price), but each charges     to the cross-ownership members. In 
return,    and    will be charged the unilateral wholesale price. The (retail) demands facing 
an outsider are evaluated at the unilateral retail price    ,  -. For example,   ’s demand 
for    (     ) is    
       . By contrast, the demands facing an insider are evaluated at 
the retail price    ,  -. For example,   ’s demand for    (     ) is    
       . The net 
payment between the insiders is zero; and the net payment between the outsiders is also 
zero, because the relevant IOT partners set identical wholesale prices and have identical 
demands. However, the net payment between an outsider and an insider is non-zero: the 
insider is a net payee to the outsider because the insider charges a lower wholesale price 
(e.g.   
      
   ) and has a higher demand (e.g.    
      
   ).                     
 
Lemma (4.3) shows asymmetry of wholesale prices and demands if one cross-ownership 
pair exists. For example, the net payment for    from its IOT agreement with    is positive,  
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⏞
   
  
 
 
 
⏞
   
  
  
  
  
⏞
   
  
 
 
  
⏞
   
  
  
   
   
    
Given uniform retail policy, each network will have a uniform retail, even if it engages in a 
preferential IOT agreement. In other words, retail prices do not reflect preferential wholesale 
prices, contrast to the case of the discriminatory retail policy. The retail price set by an 
insider is lower than the one set by the outsider, leading to a higher demand facing the 
insider compared to the outsider. In addition, given the insider charges a lower wholesale 
price to the outsider than the other way, a net payment is paid from the insider to the 
outsider. 
 
Lemma (4.4). With uniform retail policy of the model, if two cross-ownership pairs exist, net 
payments are zero. 
 
Proof. Consider the case of two cross-ownership pairs, for example (     ) and (     ). 
In each pair, the insiders will set the internal wholesale price at marginal cost as in Eq. 
(4.11); and, with the unilateral response function similar to Eq. (4.12), they will set     as 
the wholesale price to the outsiders. In each IOT agreement, wholesale prices are identical, 
and demands are identical too (i.e.    ). Therefore, net payments are zero.         
 
Lemma (4.4) shows asymmetry in wholesale prices, but with zero net payments because 
networks engage in two counter cross-ownership pairs. Notice that by moving from the case 
in Lemma (4.3) to the case in Lemma (4.4), the wholesale price charged by    and    to 
outsiders increases (from       to    ) and the retail price of    and    decreases (from 
      to      ). Lemmas (4.3) and (4.4) lead to the following proposition.  
 
Proposition (4.2). With uniform retail policy of the model, considering the game of joining a 
vertical cross-ownership, unilateral wholesale pricing is a dominant strategy to each network. 
 
Proof. Let   represent the baseline unilateral profit to a network from its both IOT 
agreements when no cross-ownership takes place in the market, all networks set wholesale 
prices unilaterally, and net payments are zero; where        ,   -. From Lemma (4.3), 
the insider’s profit from cross-ownership, for example   , is        ,   - minus the net 
payment to    given by         ,   -. This is less than the unilateral profit. By contrast, 
the outsider’s unilateral profit is increased by this net payment. From Lemma (4.4), net 
payments are zero and each network gets   . Therefore, unilateral wholesale pricing (i.e. 
no-cross-ownership) is a dominant strategy to each network.         
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The following example demonstrates the dominant strategy as predicted by Proposition 
(4.2). Let (     ) be a possible cross-ownership pair and (     ) be a possible counter 
pair. Consider the decision in joining different pairs by    and   . As given in the proof of 
Proposition (4.2), let   ,    and     respectively represent the unilateral profit, the cross-
ownership profit and the net payment to these two IOT partners; where       and 
         . Table (4.2) shows the payoffs matrix. 
 
5Table (4.2) Payoffs matrix for joining a cross-ownership pair under the uniform retail policy. 
Possible cross-
ownership pairs: 
(     ) (     ) 
   
Join (     ) Don’t join 
 
   
Join (     )                     
Don’t join                     
                          . 
 
As can be seen from Table (4.2), the game has a unique equilibrium, which is non-
cooperation (i.e. setting the wholesale price unilaterally). The non-zero net payment is 
behind the individual incentive not to join a cross-ownership pair. If one cross-ownership 
exists, the net payment improves the outsider’s profit if they do not form a counter cross-
ownership. 
 
The equilibrium is Pareto inefficient as all networks could be made better off if they form two 
cross-ownership pairs because the profit would be greater compared to baseline unilateral 
profit (i.e.      ); hence a prisoner’s dilemma situation. This result matches the result in 
Lupi and Manenti (2009), and is contrary to the discriminatory retail policy in Section (4.1.2). 
 
Notice with the uniform retail policy, the wholesale price solution (   ) charged between the 
outsiders is the price at which the demand equals zero (or reservations price). This is due to 
the perfect complementarity problem of visited networks in the demand equation: if the 
insider charges zero, the outsider charges the reservation price. However, the average 
wholesale price in this case is at the monopoly level (i.e.   (  )).  
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4.1.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
In this chapter, the two models for cross-ownership, one with discriminatory retail policy and 
the other with uniform policy, consider a vertically related IOT partners choosing wholesale 
prices cooperatively, while retail prices are set independently. The discriminatory policy is 
overlooked in the existing literature, while the uniform is analysed in Salsas and Koboldt 
(2004) and Lupi and Manenti (2009), where steering is ignored to maintain simplicity.  
 
As can be seen in Table (4.3) below, wholesale price solutions are found asymmetric under 
both retail policies: the cross-ownership members set the internal wholesale price at 
marginal cost and the external wholesale price is set above marginal cost. In the case of one 
cross-ownership pair, prices and demands are asymmetric with the outsiders, resulting in net 
payments in favour of the cross-ownership pair under the discriminatory policy, but in favour 
of the outsiders under the uniform policy.  
 
6Table (4.3) Standardised prices under discriminatory and uniform retail policies in the cross-
ownership game. 
   
 
 
        
 
 
  . 
  ,   ). 
 
Based on the findings of the models, joining a cross-ownership pair is a dominant strategy to 
each network under the discriminatory policy59. On the other hand, joining a cross-ownership 
pair is not a dominant strategy under the uniform policy, as also predicted by Lupi and 
Manenti (2009). 
                                               
59 Without detailed modelling, this result is referred to by Salsas and Koboldt (2004). 
Scenario 
  
Pricing with 
each 
partner 
Discriminatory retail policy Uniform retail policy 
Wholesale cost Retail price Wholesale cost Retail price 
One cross-
ownership 
pair 
The joining 
network 
With insider          
 
 
          
 
 
 
With outsider    
 
   
     
   
 (   ) 
          
 
 
 
The non-
joining 
network 
With insider    
 
    
     
   
 (   ) 
    
 
 
      
 
 
 
With outsider    
 
    
     
   
 (   ) 
    
 
 
      
 
 
 
Two cross-
ownership 
pairs 
Each 
network 
With insider          
 
 
          
 
 
 
With outsider    
 
   
    
   
 (   ) 
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The equilibrium under the discriminatory policy is Pareto efficient if the substitutability level is 
not too high. With the uniform policy, the equilibrium is inefficient as networks can be made 
better off if they form two cross-ownership pairs. This is because with cross-ownership, the 
average wholesale price is reduced, eliminating some of the double-markup effects. 
 
The discriminatory retail pricing policy relies on the consumer choosing (manually through 
his handset) the visited network with the cheapest retail price. By contrast, the uniform retail 
policy applies a uniform retail price. Given absence of steering and consumer’s indifference 
when retail prices are identical (i.e. handset on automatic mode), neither the home network 
nor the consumer would change the default choice on visited networks, despite the 
existence of a preferred visited network which charges a lower wholesale price. Therefore, 
uniform retail is ineffective without steering. Next, we assume uniform retail is the main 
assumption for the steering model, but we need to explore the impact of market shares 
asymmetry on results under the uniform retail policy in the next section. 
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4.2 Uniform Price With Asymmetric Market Shares 
 
This section explores the impact of market share asymmetry on wholesale price solutions 
when the retail price is uniform. Uniform retail price is assumed necessary for steering to 
exist, otherwise manual network selection by the roamer overrides steering made by home 
network. We follow the steps of Salsas and Koboldt (2004), and Lupi and Manenti (2009) 
who use asymmetric market shares in their modelling of steering, and explain how 
asymmetry in shares does not impact the final wholesale price charged to the home network, 
nor the uniform price it sets, which undermines the need for steering. 
 
This section follows the wholesale unilateral pricing strategy assuming uniform retail policy 
(as in the Sections 3.2.7 and 3.2.8iv) except that we replace the simple average wholesale 
price with a weighted average wholesale price, where the weights are the market shares of 
visited networks.  
 
Let us consider the retail maximization problem for    when its subscriber roams in country 
 , as in Eq. (3.7), but replace the simple average wholesale price  ̅ 
   with this weighted 
average ( ̃ 
      
     
      
     
  ), where    
   and    
   are the market shares of    and    
respectively in hosting   ’s subscriber.  By solving for    , the RPMF becomes  
     
     ̃ 
  
  
  
(4.13) 
The above RPMF is a markup on the weighted average wholesale price. The unilateral 
wholesale price strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the unilateral wholesale profit, 
leading to, as an example, the following unilateral response function for    
   
   
      
     
  
     
    
(4.14) 
Notice Eq. (4.14) equals the baseline unilateral response function if market shares are 
symmetric (i.e.    
   (   )     
    ). By substituting symmetrically for    
   in Eq. (4.14), 
we get these solutions 
   
   
  
     
     
and 
   
   
  
     
     
(4.15) 
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By taking the weighted average of the solutions in Eq. (4.15), using their market shares as 
weights, we have 
 ̃ 
      
     
      
     
   
   
   
  
(4.16) 
Obviously, the weighted average wholesale price in Eq. (4.16) equals the baseline solution 
of the unilateral wholesale price. It is clear from Eq. (4.15) that the network’s own market 
share reduces its wholesale price. However, the asymmetry in market shares does not 
impact the average wholesale price (whether weighted average or simple) charged to the 
home network. In this case, market shares asymmetry does not change the fact that visited 
networks appear in the demand as perfect complements. Therefore, the home network’s 
retail price is unchanged.  
 
The above results match the ones found in Salsas and Koboldt (2004), Lupi and Manenti 
(2009), and Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011); and are also similar to the results found in Gans and 
King (2000) who modelled fixed-to-mobile access. As noted in Gans and King (2000), with 
linear demands, the changes in wholesale prices due to changes in market shares exactly 
offset each other. Therefore, the (uniform) retail price is independent from market shares. 
 
The main problem in this setting, where retail price is uniform and market shares can be 
asymmetric, is that if the home network is able to steer (and effectively manipulates market 
shares of visited networks), it does not cause downward pressures on wholesale prices. This 
undermines the efficiency gains steering investment is assumed to bring.  
 
Another problem in using the uniform retail price in this setting is that the substitutability 
parameter is removed from the demands. As substitutability does not exist in all relevant 
solutions, the expressions of market shares do not reflect substitutability. We assumed 
visited networks are substitutable if their coverages overlap, where steering is possible only 
in the overlapping areas. In the next section on steering model, the expressions of market 
shares take into consideration substitutability between visited networks. 
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4.3 Roaming Alliance Model 
 
Traffic steering techniques allow the home network to manipulate the market shares of its 
IOT-agreement partners in the visited country. This practice was deemed in the European 
NRAs analyses, before the EC roaming regulation, as a countervailing buyer power to pay 
cheaper wholesale prices. Moreover, the nature of the two-way access of IOT agreements 
enabled the emergence of two-way steering, (hereafter roaming alliance).  
 
In order for steering to exist, three conditions we assume are necessary: a uniform retail 
price to avoid roamer’s overriding selection (i.e. handsets on automatic mode to allow 
steering); expected efficiency gains (if wholesale prices are high to justify steering 
investment); and of course overlapping coverages (i.e., substitutability between visited 
networks).  
 
Salsas and Koboldt (2004) use complex expressions for market shares, exploring the case 
when all networks steer to the cheapest visited network. Depending on the ability to steer, 
the authors think wholesale prices will approach marginal costs, dragging down retail prices. 
 
Lupi and Manenti (2009) offer a detailed model for steering. They assume full overlapping 
coverage, and use a rate of steering success. They concluded that with perfect success rate, 
wholesale price is driven to marginal cost; if imperfect, there is no equilibrium in pure 
strategies. That is, there will be asymmetry in wholesale prices: a low price to the home 
network that commits to steer, and a high price if it steers away. The baseline unilateral price 
is between these two prices, which is charged to the home network that does not steer to 
any (i.e. does not acquire steering technology). As a consequence, each visited network 
offers a menu of wholesale prices: a high and low price, and the unilateral price. In addition, 
they found steering investment is the equilibrium in pure strategies; which is a waste of 
resources since it does not impact retail prices that bear the double marginalisation problem. 
 
However, the aforementioned papers rely on uniform retail price in the demand; thus, the 
weighted average wholesale price to a home network equals the baseline unilateral 
wholesale price, as demonstrated in Section (4.2). Therefore, retail prices and demands are 
unaltered, given visited networks appear as perfect complements in this case.  
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Next section addresses our model backgrounds in the context of the existing literature. Then 
two games are detailed: a network’s choice on steering investment; and a network’s choice 
in joining a roaming alliance. Results are discussed finally. 
 
4.3.1 Model Background 
 
The existing steering models relied on the uniform retail policy. Yet this policy has four 
problems. First, as explained previously, the uniform policy is inferior to the discriminatory 
policy in the non-cooperative wholesale price setting. That is, the uniform policy is not 
optimal for a retailer network with monopoly position. Second, the demand under this policy 
makes visited networks appear as perfect complements rather than substitutes, which 
removes upstream competition by removing the substitutability parameter necessary for 
effective steering. Third, as explained in Section (4.2) and found in Lupi and Manenti (2009), 
there will be no wholesale price equilibrium in pure strategies since changes in market 
shares create asymmetric solutions. Fourth, complication of the steering model through 
market share asymmetry in a two-stage pricing game is unnecessary since the retail price is 
independent from market shares asymmetry, as also explained in Section (4.2). 
 
We avoid the uniform retail policy assumed in the existing literature because of the above-
mentioned problems. Rather, we skip the retail maximization problem in the steering game, 
and assume instead each home network chooses uniform retail price. It does not matter 
which uniform price is chosen in this game as long as the status quo net payments are zero. 
However, if net payments are zero such that the profit equals the retail revenue and given 
unconstrained retailers, the optimal retail price is the monopoly price. In this case, the 
unconstrained monopolist gains the monopoly retail revenue. Such monopoly price is 
uniform by definition as it is common for the use of any visited network.  
 
We maintain the same assumptions as in Section (4.1.1), unless mentioned otherwise. The 
retail stage, Stage II, is skipped in this game by assuming all networks set the monopoly 
retail price. For simplicity, the game is split into two static games:  
 
i. A two-stage game, where each network at the retail level decides simultaneously on  
steering investment, followed by simultaneous wholesale price setting; and  
 
ii. A game whereby each network decides simultaneously on joining a roaming alliance, 
where an alliance can take at most two vertically-related networks. 
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Note that, along with symmetry in demand parameters and in the absence of steering 
investment, the assumption of monopoly retail price provides no incentive for wholesalers to 
undercut because this does not raise own market share. In this situation, wholesale price is 
fixed at the monopoly level and net payments are zero. Additionally, as explained in 
Appendix (C), the assumption on monopoly retail price is in accordance with an infinitely 
repeated game equilibrium. As a consequence, steering investment is deemed to be feasible 
in this situation because efficiency gains are possible given wholesale prices are at the 
monopoly level. 
 
Networks are assumed to incur a common sunk cost,  , for buying the steering technology. 
Undercutting is given by the unilateral response function (e.g.    
     , (   )-      
    ), 
where the baseline unilateral wholesale price is    , (   )-  and     (   ) , the 
substitutability index. Therefore, we can maintain the substitutability parameter,  , indicating 
coverage overlapping where steering can be exercised. Additionally, we can insure that 
market share manipulation does not affect unilateral wholesale price equilibria. 
 
In addition, we assume the home network’s success of steering depends only on coverage 
overlap. Accordingly, there are no random traffics since the level of randomness that exists 
in overlapping areas is successfully eliminated via steering. Let the visited network that is 
being steered to receives the market share (   )  , and the remaining (   )    goes to 
the visited network that is being steered away, where     (   )60.  
 
Coverages are assumed symmetric 61 . Steering between two visited networks implies 
preferring only one network, where full steering can only exist in the limit of  . Nonetheless, 
given networks are assumed imperfect substitutes, an alliance formed for instance between 
   and    can coexist with the existing roaming agreements with the other partners,    and 
  . Furthermore, the choice on an alliance partner does not matter since networks are 
symmetric. In other words, asymmetry in demand parameters may result in a preferred 
alliance partner. 
 
Based on the model backgrounds, in the status quo, both the retail and wholesale prices 
equal the monopoly price,   (  ). Accordingly, the monopoly retail revenues are unaffected 
by market shares manipulation, because market shares add up to one. Moreover, the 
                                               
60 These market share expressions are derived from Shubik and Levitan (1980) demand: if firm 1 drives firm 2 out from the 
market, the demand to firm 1 becomes    ((   )  )) ,     -, where (   )   (   ) (   )  and     (   ) , 
representing the line (     ) in Figure (3.2). 
61 Contrary to Ambjørnsen, et al. (2011) who model investment decision to expand coverage in airports for example, we 
maintain the base model’s assumption that networks installed their coverages competing for home subscribers only, not for 
hosting visitors.  
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demand for a visited network is given by its market share times    . We only show net 
payments as payoffs to simplify presentations. 
 
4.3.2 Steering Investment Game 
 
Assume all home networks set the retail price at the monopoly level and the status quo 
wholesale prices equal the monopoly price. Assume a two-stage game. In Stage I, home 
networks decide simultaneously on investing in steering technology, which costs    . In 
Stage II, wholesale prices are set non-cooperatively. The solution method for the Subgame 
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is backward induction.  
 
Proposition (4.3). In the steering investment game, conditional on       , (   ) -, the 
SPNE of the game is such that each network invests in steering and sets wholesale prices 
unilaterally. 
 
Proof. The status quo is when steering investment does not exist, where visited networks 
sustain the wholesale price at the monopoly level (i.e.    ,  -), because undercutting is 
unattractive as it does not raise market shares. When a home network invests in steering, 
depending on the substitutability level, it can increase the market share of the cheapest 
visited network to (   )  , while the other network gets (   )  , where     (   ). In 
this case, each visited network charges the baseline unilateral wholesale price (i.e.     
, (   )-), which is the dominant strategy in Stage II. In Stage I, the home network gains 
from the net payment with each visited network that does not invest in steering due to 
asymmetry in wholesale prices (i.e., monopoly price by the former compared to baseline 
unilateral price by the later). The expected gain makes investment a dominant strategy in 
Stage I, as long as the fixed cost of investment       , (   ) -.        
 
Proposition (4.3) can be demonstrated as follows. Let     denotes the net payment from an 
IOT agreement, with subscript refers to the network in question and the superscript to its 
partner. If    invests in steering,    and    will set the baseline unilateral price (   
   , (   )-). If    does not invest,    will set the monopoly price (     ,  -); hence 
   will get a positive net payment as follows 
     
       
 
 
      
 
 
 
   
  (   )
    
The incurred fixed cost   must be less than or equal to the expected gain from each IOT 
agreement. It is clear from the above example that the gain from wholesale price differentials 
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requires positive  , which allows steering to be effective since visited networks are 
substitutable.  
 
The above net payment gain increases by   (i.e. derivative of     with respect to    is 
positive). With    , net payments are zero since the baseline unilateral wholesale 
price,  , equals the monopoly price,  .  
 
Predictably, investing in steering causes downward pressures on wholesale prices in the 
similar way as the consumer’s substitutability with discriminatory retail prices.  
 
Proposition (4.3) shows the prisoner’s dilemma at both wholesale and retail levels: the SPNE 
has unilateral wholesale prices and sunk costs of investments without improving payoffs. In 
other words, the status quo profit to each network, given by the monopoly retail revenue, is 
reduced by the investment fixed cost. Next we explore networks’ temptations to take 
advantage of the steering technology. 
 
4.3.3 Roaming Alliance Formation Game 
 
Proposition (4.3) predicts that all networks invest in steering and choose the baseline 
unilateral wholesale price. In this case, steering does not effectively take place, because 
wholesale prices are symmetric (at   ). This section explores incentives to a home network 
in engaging in steering unilaterally, or mutually with an IOT partner (i.e. forming a roaming 
alliance). For simplicity, the payoffs shown below regard a network’s net payments with its 
IOT partners, as we ignore the retail revenues and the fixed cost of steering investment, 
which are common to all networks.  
 
Denote     for the net payment from an IOT agreement. The subscript refers to the network 
in question and the superscript to its partner, with subscript/superscript (  ) for the case 
steering is made by a network to the partner, or (  ) for steering away from that partner. 
Before we get to the main findings of the game, we state the following Lemmas with their 
proofs for the different scenarios of roaming alliance formations.  
 
Lemma (4.5). Assume all networks invested in steering and charged the unilateral wholesale 
price. If    , where     (   ), and if only one network unilaterally steers, it will not 
improve its payoffs. 
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Proof. Assume only    steers unilaterally to   .   ’s payoffs are  
       
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
  
   
  (   )
   
and 
       
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
 
   
  (   )
  
The net gain to    is zero.               
 
Lemma (4.6). Assume all networks invested in steering and charged the unilateral wholesale 
price. If    , where     (   ), and if only two networks engage in mutual steering, 
they will improve their payoffs. 
 
Proof. Assume only    and    engage in mutual steering (i.e. form a roaming alliance).   ’s 
payoffs, for example,  are 
       
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
and 
       
      
 
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
 
   
  (   )
  
The net gain to    is positive.              
 
Lemma (4.7). Assume all networks invested in steering and charged the unilateral wholesale 
price. If    , where     (   ), and if two pairs of networks engage in mutual steering, 
the payoffs will be zero to each network. 
 
Proof. Assume    and    form a roaming alliance and    and    form another roaming 
alliance.   ’s payoffs, for example, are 
       
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
and 
       
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
The net gain to    is zero.               
 
Lemma (4.8). Assume all networks invested in steering and charged the unilateral wholesale 
price. If    , where     (   ), and if one network unilaterally deviates from a mutual 
steering, it will not improve its payoffs. 
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Proof. Assume    and    form a roaming alliance and    and    form another roaming 
alliance, similar to the case in Lemma (4.7). First, assume   , for example, deviates by 
steering away from   .   ’s payoffs are 
       
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
 
   
 (   )
  
and 
       
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
(   )
 
 
 
 
  
   
 (   )
  
The net gain to    is still zero. Second, assume    deviates by the refrain from steering. 
  ’s payoffs are 
     
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  (   )
  
and 
     
        
(   )
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  (   )
  
The net gain to    is also zero. Similarly, if only one roaming alliance exists, say between    
and   , the deviant will not improve its payoffs.            
 
All results of the Lemmas (4.5) to (4.8) require    , which is the case where steering can 
be effective because visited networks have overlapping coverages. From Lemma (4.5), one 
can see that if a network’s unilaterally manipulate visited networks’ market shares, it affects 
the payoff with each, but does not improve its total gains. From Lemma (4.6), a mutual 
steering improves the payoffs to each member of the roaming alliance at the expense of the 
non-members which did not form a counter alliance. From Lemma (4.7), with two roaming 
alliances, all gains/losses from net payments cancel out, so the payoffs are zero to each 
network. From Lemma (4.8), there is no incentive to a network to deviate from a mutual 
steering with its roaming alliance member, whether deviation is by steering away from its 
member or by the refrain from steering. Of course, such deviation harms the complying 
member.  
 
We conclude from Lemmas (4.5) and (4.8) that only mutual steering can be profitable, which 
can sustain roaming alliance cooperation. Members will break even in their own net 
payment, where each expects a positive net payment with the non-member due to market 
share asymmetry (buying less through steering away compared to selling more at default 
market share). Lemmas (4.5) to (4.8) lead to the following proposition.  
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Proposition (4.4). Assume all networks invested in steering and charged the unilateral 
wholesale price. If    , where     (   ), then joining a roaming alliance is a dominant 
strategy to each network. 
 
Proof. From Lemmas (4.5) and (4.8), mutual steering is sustained within the roaming alliance 
members. From Lemmas (4.6), any network that does not join an alliance will pay a net 
payment to its IOT partner that joined an alliance. From Lemmas (4.7), joining an alliance 
provides non-negative payoffs to each network.             
 
The following example demonstrates the dominant strategy as predicted by Proposition 
(4.4). Let (     ) be a possible roaming alliance and (     ) be a possible counter 
alliance. Consider the decision in joining different alliances by    and   . Let     represents 
their non-zero net payment from their IOT agreements. Table (4.4) shows the payoffs matrix.   
 
7Table (4.4) Payoffs matrix for joining a roaming alliance. 
Possible roaming 
alliances: 
(     ) (     ) 
   
Join (     )  Don’t join 
 
   
Join (     )              
Don’t join              
  In Proposition (4.4),    the substitutability index, is assumed positive; hence      .  
 
This game has zero-sum payoffs, where joining a roaming alliance is its unique equilibrium. 
The non-zero net payment if one network joins while the other does not is an externality that 
makes joining an alliance a dominant strategy. If only one pair forms an alliance, its 
members can improve their statues quo payoffs at the expense of the counter pair. 
Therefore, two alliances are formed in equilibrium, and their net gains are zero. 
 
4.3.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
The roaming alliance model in this chapter is based on assuming all networks apply the 
same uniform retail price, which is assumed to be the monopoly price. If steering is absent, 
the wholesale price also equals the monopoly level. Through investment in steering, a home 
network can cause downward pressures on wholesale prices, seeking a gain from the net 
payment due to asymmetry in wholesale prices if its IOT-agreement partner does not invest 
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in steering. The equilibrium of this two-stage game is such that each network invests in 
steering and wholesale prices are set non-cooperatively (see Table 4.5 below).  
 
8Table (4.5) Standardised prices when all networks apply the monopoly retail price in the steering 
investment game.  
Home network decision to invest in 
steering 
Wholesale cost Retail price 
Do not invest in steering    
 
 
    
 
 
 
Invest in steering    
 
   
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
        
 
 
  . 
  ,   ). 
 
Therefore, the game does not predict unilateral menu prices as in Lupi and Manenti (2009) 
who used a uniform retail pricing different from our model, nor it predicts above marginal 
cost pricing as in Bühler (2010) who looked at the impact of wholesale prices on retail two-
part tariffs set by home networks competing for home subscribers.  
 
In the game of joining a roaming alliance, we found only mutual steering is profitable, and 
alliance networks can sustain cooperation. Thus, steering is necessary for alliance 
formation, as predicted in Bühler (2010) and Hualong and Shoulian (2009). The model 
shows that the higher is the substitutability parameter, the higher will be the expected gains 
from steering, reflecting the role of coverage overlapping in steering effectiveness. Each 
network has a dominant strategy to join an alliance in order to gain from the net payment, or 
to balance its net payment with the outsider which joined a counter alliance. The model 
predicts two alliances are formed in equilibrium, but do not lead to exclusive IOT agreements 
because the substitutability parameter is bounded. With two roaming alliances formed in 
equilibrium, the monopoly retail revenues are reduced by steering investment. Such 
investment is then a waste of resources as predicted by Lupi and Manenti (2009), and by 
Ambjørnsen, et al (2011). 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Cross-ownership and alliance models are inspired by the existing literature that addresses 
the impact of IOT preferential agreements on game equilibria. In this chapter, our results are 
all based on the implications of net payments. In the situation whereby only one pair of 
networks has a preferential agreement, the net payment of an IOT agreement between an 
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insider and outsider is non-zero because of asymmetric demands; and, in the cross-
ownership case, because of asymmetric wholesale prices. 
 
In the cross-ownership model, the potential gain from the net payment with the outsider 
provides the incentive to join a cross-ownership pair if discriminatory retail policy is assumed 
and networks are imperfect substitutes. But the opposite is true with the uniform retail policy 
without steering investment: the potential gain from the net payment exists for the outsider 
when it does not join a cross-ownership pair. Therefore, with discriminatory policy, vertical 
cooperation through cross-ownership is a dominant strategy to each network; while with 
uniform policy, non-cooperation is the dominant strategy. 
 
In the alliance model, monopoly retail price is assumed. Each network has a dominant 
strategy to invest in steering to induce wholesalers to set unilateral wholesale prices. Each 
network expects a gain from the net payment with its IOT partner through wholesale price 
differential had that partner did not invest in steering.  
 
With all networks acquiring steering technology and charging wholesale prices non-
cooperatively, a unilateral steering by a home network does not improve its payoffs. Unless 
engaged in mutual steering (i.e. roaming alliance), the home network does not improve its 
payoffs. Each network has a dominant strategy to join an alliance in order to gain from the 
net payment with the non-member IOT-agreement partner had this partner did not join a 
counter alliance. Such gain requires visited networks to be substitutable, and rises with 
substitutability reflecting the effectiveness of steering. 
 
In this chapter, we found a dominant strategy in each game (cross-ownership and alliance), 
which are all driven by the implications of net payments. In all models, networks are 
assumed symmetric; thus the choice on a preferred partner does not matter.  
 
Yet since net payment plays a role in each model, a relatively larger network (e.g. with 
higher market size) will always be a net payee in its IOT agreements. Therefore, under the 
preferential agreements where vertical cooperation is a dominant strategy (i.e. the cross-
ownership with discriminatory retail prices and the roaming alliance), each network will prefer 
to choose the largest network as a partner. At the same time, a large network is better off 
choosing, as a preferential partner, the largest network amongst its IOT-agreement partners, 
in order to minimize negative net payments. We expect the choices of preferential partners 
in this case would be: large networks against small networks. Our expectation contradicts 
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with the scenarios analysed in Shortall (2010) and Lacasa (2011), who found small networks 
would prefer to form an alliance.  
 
Next chapters will use a dataset on outbound roaming by Etisalat. The dataset contains 
wholesale prices and market shares of visited networks. It also contains information on the 
visited networks that are cross-owned by Etisalat, as well as the networks that are roaming 
alliances to Etisalat. The dataset will be used to test empirically the predictions of the 
theoretical models in Chapters (3) and (4) about the base model and its extension.  
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Chapter (5). Dataset Description 
 
In this chapter, we describe the dataset on Etisalat62 (the incumbent mobile network operator 
in the UAE) outbound roaming that shall be used for empirical estimations. The purpose is to 
introduce the reader to the specifics of the dataset. The dataset contains information which 
is relevant in understanding upstream competition, complementary to the theoretical 
predictions of previous chapters.  
 
Section (5.1) discusses the applicability of the dataset to the theoretical models of previous 
chapters. Section (5.2) provides a brief on Etisalat retail prices. Section (5.3) details the 
available information on visited networks. Data collection procedures and dataset description 
are provided in Sections (5.4) and (5.5) respectively. We conclude in Section (5.6) with 
linking the dataset to the empirical models of next chapters.  
5.1 Relevance Of Dataset  
 
The theoretical models in Chapters (3) and (4) focus on wholesalers’ competition in hosting 
the visiting subscriber of their Inter-Operator Tariffs (IOT) agreement partner. The home 
network is assumed to be a monopolist at the retail level. The games assumed retail price is 
either discriminatory (i.e. differs by visited network in the same visited country) or uniform. 
The substitutability between visited networks is interpreted as the visited networks coverage 
overlap, whereby roamers can choose between visited networks through manual-network-
selection feature of their handsets. Alternatively, home networks can steer to their preferred 
networks had they invested in steering technology and set the uniform retail price such that 
roamers put their handsets on automatic mode. Preferred IOT agreements are assumed 
under cross-ownership or roaming alliance strategies. 
  
The dataset in hand allows us to investigate some of the theoretical predictions of the 
previous chapters. It contains all foreign networks that were visited by Etisalat’s travelling 
subscribers (hereafter roamers) around the world during the years 2008-2011. It includes 
average wholesale prices for the relevant roaming traffics (hereafter quantities), where 
wholesale prices are unregulated and hence should represent the market outcome. 
 
                                               
62 Etisalat was ranked 140th among the Financial Times Top 500 Corporations in the world in terms of market capitalization, 
expanding in 18 countries (Gulfnews.com, 2009).  
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In addition, visited networks did not price discriminate at the wholesale level between 
Etisalat63 roamers (e.g. postpaid versus prepaid), which is expected given a visited network’s 
knowledge is supposed to be limited to knowing the home network of the visitors. Therefore, 
visited networks are thought to treat an Etisalat roamer as a representative consumer of all 
Etisalat roamers. 
 
The study period witnessed Etisalat’s retail policy shift from generally discriminatory retail 
prices during the years 2008-2009 to uniform during the years 2010-2011. This policy shift is 
supposed to allow Etisalat to steer its roamers to its preferred visited networks as long as 
roamers are indifferent between visited networks. We gathered information on visited 
networks’ relationships with Etisalat in order to explore the impact of such relationships with 
Etisalat on market outcome. 
 
In the UAE, there has been hardly any room for new subscribers when Du, the second 
mobile operator, launched its services in 2007, as the market was saturated with mobile 
penetration exceeding 100% (Dam, R. 2011). Since there was no mobile number portability 
in the UAE during the study period, an Etisalat subscriber would not retain his mobile 
number had he switched to Du. If international roaming is mainly about the convenience of 
using the same mobile number abroad, we can assume Etisalat subscribers do not switch to 
Du for roaming purposes. Therefore, based on the above, we can carry on the theoretical 
assumption that the retailer (Etisalat) holds a monopoly position downstream.  
 
5.2 Brief On Etisalat Retail Prices 
 
The NRA of the UAE issued a directive obliging its licenced operators (Etisalat and Du) to 
send free SMS to their travelling subscribers informing them about the applicable retail 
prices for making and receiving calls. This directive entered into force by the end of 2007 
(NRA-UAE, 2007). Therefore, in our dataset, Etisalat’s subscribers are assumed to be aware 
of applicable retail prices. 
 
International roaming had been exclusive to postpaid subscribers, but then Etisalat extended 
it to prepaid subscribers as the Customized Applications for Mobile Enhanced Logic 
(CAMEL) technology has been implemented by Etisalat and many of its IOT-agreement 
partners. At the retail level, Etisalat discriminates between its postpaid and prepaid 
                                               
63 This statement was communicated verbally by Etisalat. 
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subscribers: Etisalat generally charges higher prices to prepaid subscribers compared to the 
postpaid. Retail prices vary across roaming services: outgoing and incoming calls, outgoing 
SMS and data roaming, whilst incoming SMS is free.  
 
Mobile retail prices are subject to regulation by the NRA of the UAE. Etisalat would submit a 
price control request to the NRA, an ex-ante price regulation procedure, only if Etisalat plans 
to introduce or renovate prices and packages. However, a retail price change due to 
changes in wholesale prices would not be notified to the NRA, including for example retail 
international roaming.  
 
Recently, a regional regulation agreement was reached between the GCC member states, 
known as the Intra-GCC Roaming Charges. The regulation imposes retail and wholesale 
price caps for outgoing calls when roaming within the GCC. The NRA at the UAE side issued 
a directive that set a cap on both wholesale and retail prices for outgoing calls  regardless of 
contract type (postpaid or prepaid) (NRA-UAE, 2010). However, we will show later in this 
chapter that wholesale price caps were ineffective during our study period. 
 
From the beginning of the last decade till February 2010, Etisalat offered international 
roaming based on discriminatory retail prices, i.e. differentiated by visited networks. The 
available discriminatory retail prices are summarized in Table (5.1). For comparison 
purposes, the regions are divided into three: the neighbouring GCC countries, the remainder 
of the Arab countries and the rest of the world. 
 
9Table (5.1) Etisalat international roaming average retail prices in AED for postpaid roamers in 2009.  
Region 
Incoming 
call 
Outgoing 
local call 
Outgoing 
call to UAE 
SMS* 
GCC 2.55 (0.35) 1.80 (1.20) 3.43 (1.26) 0.98 (0.43) 
Arab countries 3.46 (1.24) 2.54 (1.31) 7.35 (3.35) 1.26 (0.56) 
Rest of the world 4.62 (2.36) 2.78 (1.65) 10.26 (4.33) 1.13 (0.57) 
All 4.49 (2.31) 2.74 (1.63) 9.89 (4.40) 1.13 (0.57) 
*The prices of SMS made to local and international destinations are averaged out for each visited network, which 
are very similar with most visited networks. The standard deviation in parentheses is then taken for each region. 
- Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source: Adapted from Etisalat (2009). 
 
The standard deviations in the above table give us a hint on how Etisalat set its retail prices 
across visited networks within a region. It is obvious that retail prices vary substantially for 
outgoing calls (to local or to UAE). This is generally true because, within the region, prices of 
outgoing calls vary by visited networks in a given country. With respect to incoming calls, 
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there is variation between regions, but retail price is uniform within most countries, which is 
also true with SMS. 
 
Since February 2010, Etisalat applied uniform retail prices by regions: GCC, Arab countries 
and the rest of the world (Gulfnews.com, 2010). Table (5.2) shows the (uniform) retail prices 
in 201064 for Etisalat postpaid65. As can be seen, prices of incoming and outgoing local calls 
tend to be similar, which are about half the prices of outgoing calls to UAE.  
 
10Table (5.2) Etisalat international roaming retail prices in AED for postpaid roamers in 2010.  
Region 
Incoming 
call 
Outgoing 
local call 
Outgoing 
call to UAE 
SMS 
GCC 1.25 1.30 3.00 1.00 
Arab countries 3.00 3.00 6.00 1.50 
Rest of the world 4.00 5.00 10.00 2.00 
Prices for international outgoing calls to non-GCC destinations are variable. 
- Any international outgoing call has a setup charge of 2.5 AED. 
- Optional roaming packages are available for incoming calls and data roaming. 
Source: Adapted from Etisalat (2010b).  
 
We face difficulties combining information on retail prices with our dataset. First, the 
information on retail prices is incomplete. For example, the retail prices in 2008 are not 
available; and data roaming retail prices are not available in the years 2008-2009. Second, 
retail prices are complex, as they may involve call setup charges and optional roaming 
packages (such as for incoming calls and data roaming). Third, for outgoing calls, the 
available retail prices differ by call destination (e.g. to local or to international; international to 
UAE or to third country), which makes it impossible to combine with our dataset that does 
not breakdown the wholesale prices for outgoing calls by destination. Finally, the dataset 
would not have enough variations for empirical estimations if we are to use the uniform 
(zonal) retail prices in the period 2010-2011. 
 
To overcome the above-mentioned problems, one should use average retail prices (or 
revenue per unit). This was requested, but was not supplied as explained next. 
 
 
 
                                               
64 If Table (5.2) has standard deviations similar to the case in Table (5.1), they would be zero because of uniform retail pricing. 
65 Prepaid prices are also uniform (Etisalat, 2010c).  
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5.3 Data Collection  
 
In 2012, we approached the NRA of the UAE for information regarding mobile international 
roaming. The NRA shares our interest in knowing whether or not mobile networks compete 
in this service, given unjustified high prices that led regional regulators to consider regulation 
similar to the EC roaming regulation. In addition, the NRA is interested in knowing the 
effectiveness of its existing policies regarding the service, as mentioned in Section (5.2).  
 
We agreed to focus on information regarding UAE outbound roaming; that is, the UAE 
subscribers travelling abroad. Such information should be provided at the visited network 
level. The choice on years was agreed to be the year after the entry of Du (i.e., 2008), to the 
most recent year, which was 2011. Moreover, because international roaming is known to be 
seasonal (e.g. summer holiday travels), we agreed to look for annualized data to avoid 
seasonality effects. Monetary data was requested to be converted to AED for the relevant 
year.  
 
The period 2008-2011 was of relevant importance to the retail pricing policies by Du and 
Etisalat: Du began offering uniform retail pricing for some of its services from late 2008 
(EITC, 2008); and Etisalat implemented similar retail policy since the beginning of 2010 
(Gulfnews.com, 2010). 
 
The NRA issued the following requests for information to its licensed mobile operators, 
Etisalat and Du. The requests contain the following items, for each visited network in each 
year over the period 2008-2011: 
 
1. Quantities per mobile service (e.g. outgoing calls, incoming calls, etc.); 
2. Wholesale total charges in AED; 
3. Listed wholesale prices in AED as stated in IOT-agreement; 
4. Retail revenues in AED; 
5. Listed retail prices in AED as communicated to subscribers (e.g. in website, SMS 
notification, etc.); and  
6. Number of distinct outbound roamers by subscription type (prepaid and postpaid). 
 
Du’s response was limited to the visited networks in the neighbouring GCC countries for the 
period 2010-2011. On the other hand, Etisalat’s response included all visited networks 
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around the world. However, Etisalat did not provide any information on the retail side. 
Moreover, neither Etisalat nor Du provided accurate numbers of distinct outbound roamers. 
 
The data provided in Etisalat response66 constitutes our dataset that will be used for the 
empirical estimations in the next chapters. Etisalat dataset is comprehensive with regards to 
the wholesale level, for it includes all outbound roaming quantities and their respected 
average wholesale prices at the visited network level for each of the years 2008-2011. Such 
dataset should be relevant for testing the impact of Etisalat’s retail policy shift (from 
discriminatory to uniform) on wholesale price competition. 
 
5.4 Information On Foreign Networks 
 
The only information provided in the dataset about foreign networks visited by Etisalat 
roamers are the names of those networks, countries in which they operate, and the TAP 
code used for billing in international roaming. It is important to note that country information 
is not always accurate as some names either had changed, or they did not specify regions 
within a country if the country has regional licensing67.  
 
We redefined geographic markets to ensure any derivation on the market-level, such as 
market shares, is as accurate as possible. Each visited network is rechecked, through its 
website or search engine using its given name and Tap code68, in order to ensure it operates 
in the correct geographic market69.  
 
We considered visited networks that have ties with Etisalat (i.e. preferred by Etisalat) for 
analytical purposes. We relied on information contained in Etisalat’s response to the NRA 
and from Etisalat’s website. In an attachment to its response to the NRA, Etisalat states its 
roaming alliance networks (thereafter Alliance networks). By roaming on alliance networks, 
Etisalat roamers can buy roaming packages (for incoming calls and data roaming). In 
addition, some networks are partially or fully cross-owned by Etisalat (thereafter Cross-
owned networks) (Etisalat, 2011).  
                                               
66 Disclaimer: Etisalat had an IOT agreement with each visited network in the dataset, which is confidential. Therefore, access 
to the dataset is restricted to the UAE NRA’s employees. We can show summary statistics and estimation results without 
disclosing price and quantity information at the visited network level. 
67 Regional markets were adjusted for: India (into 23 regions); Iran (into Kish island and Iran); UK (into Great Britain, Isle of 
Man, Jersey, and Guernsey); Finland (into Alands and Finland); and the disputed region of Karabakh. We lack information to 
adjust any possible regional markets (e.g. Brazil, Russia and USA).  
68 The TAP code is used as a network identifier, which usually differs from the MCC-MNC code (a combination of the Mobile 
Country Code and the Mobile Network Code) used to hunt information on mobile network operators.  
69 See Appendix (G) for full list of visited networks and their geographic markets. 
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Etisalat preferred networks are listed in Table (5.3). Notice that Etisalat cross-owned 
networks are in developing countries. Given low mobile penetration, perhaps Etisalat seeks 
investment opportunities in markets where potential subscription growth is possible. 
Moreover, Etisalat has no more than one cross-owned network in a given market, due 
probably to local merger control.  
 
On the other side, most alliance networks are in developed countries, where Etisalat has 
more than one alliance in some markets. Given that Etisalat roamers come from the UAE, 
one of the world’s highest GDP per capita, perhaps Etisalat seeks efficiency gains in 
markets visited frequently by its subscribers. 
 
In addition, we considered visited networks with CAMEL technologies, as they can allow 
prepaid roaming. As of 2010, there are 165 visited networks that have CAMEL technologies 
and allow roaming by Etisalat prepaid subscribers (thereafter networks With CAMEL) 
(Etisalat, 2010a). Table (5.4) lists the countries in which these networks operate. 
 
Furthermore, while gathering information on visited networks, we found that some mobile 
operators own more than one network in the same geographic market (e.g. CEDMA and 3G 
networks operated by KT in South Korea). This might be a result of network licensing 
procedures in some jurisdictions. We also found some visited networks involved in horizontal 
merger or acquisition. All such networks are considered as multinetworks within their 
markets (thereafter Multinetwork). 
 
An observation in the dataset represents a visited network in a given year, where all visited 
networks are segregated by the TAP codes. We do not change how visited networks appear 
in the dataset; rather, we control for Multinetwork with the use of a dummy variable70 (one if 
a visited network has multinetworks within the market; zero otherwise). Table (5.5) lists 
visited networks that have multinetworks. 
 
  
                                               
70 This was suggested by Professor Summit Majumdar, where in Majumdar (2010) and Majumdar et al (2012) a dummy 
variable equals one if the firm experienced a merger event.  
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11Table (5.3) Etisalat roaming alliance and cross-owned visited networks by country. 
Country Alliance network(s)* 
Cross-owned network** 
(Effective year in parenthesis) 
Afghanistan - Etisalat (license since 2006) 
Armenia Orange - 
Austria   Orange & T-Mobile - 
Bahrain Batelco - 
Belgium Mobistar  - 
Benin - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Bulgaria Globul - 
Burkina Faso  - Telecel (acquisition since 2005) 
Central African Republic  - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Czech T-Mobile - 
Egypt Etisalat Misr Etisalat Misr (license since 2006) 
France Orange - 
Gabon  - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Germany T-Mobile - 
Greece Cosmote - 
Hungary T-Mobile - 
India Vodafone India Etisalat DB (acquisition since 2008) 
Indonesia - Excelcomindo (acquisition since 2007) 
Italy Vodafone Italia - 
Ivory Coast - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Jordan Umniah - 
Kuwait Zain - 
Luxembourg Orange - 
Malaysia Maxis - 
Moldova Orange - 
Netherlands T-Mobile - 
Niger  - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Nigeria - Etisalat (license since 2007) 
Oman Omantel - 
Pakistan - Ufone (acquisition since 2005) 
Poland Orange & T-Mobile - 
Romania Cosmote & Orange - 
Saudi Arabia  Mobily Mobily (license since 2004) 
Slovakia Orange & T- Mobile - 
Spain Orange - 
Sri Lanka - Etisalat (acquisition since 2009) 
Switzerland Orange - 
Tanzania - Zantel (acquisition since 1999) 
Thailand AIS & DTAC - 
Togo - Moov (acquisition since 2005) 
Turkey Turkcell - 
UK O2, Orange & T-Mobile - 
USA Cingular & T-Mobile - 
* Alliance networks were provided as of August 2012. 
** Cross-owned networks were provided till the end of 2011 (Etisalat, 2011).  
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12Table (5.4) Number of visited networks with CAMEL technologies by country as of 2010.  
Country 
Networks with 
CAMEL 
Country 
Networks with 
CAMEL 
Afghanistan 3 Macedonia 1 
Albania 1 Malaysia 2 
Algeria 1 Maldives 1 
Argentina 1 Mauritania 1 
Armenia 2 Mauritius 1 
Australia 3 Moldova 1 
Austria 1 Morocco 2 
Azerbaijan 1 Netherlands 1 
Bahrain 2 Niger 1 
Bangladesh 4 Nigeria 2 
Belgium 3 Oman 2 
Benin 1 Pakistan 4 
Brazil 3 Palestine 1 
Bulgaria 2 Philippines 1 
Burkina Faso 1 Portugal 1 
Cameroon 1 Qatar 1 
Canada 1 Romania 1 
Croatia 2 Russia 2 
Cyprus 1 Saudi Arabia 3 
Czech Republic 3 Serbia 1 
Egypt 3 Singapore 1 
Estonia 1 Slovenia 1 
France 2 South Africa 1 
Germany 3 Spain 3 
Greece 2 Sri Lanka 3 
Hong Kong 1 Sudan 2 
Hungary 2 Switzerland 3 
Iceland 1 Syria 2 
India* 21 Tajikistan 1 
Indonesia 5 Tanzania 3 
Iraq 3 Thailand 3 
Isle of Man 1 Tunisia 2 
Italy 3 Turkey 1 
Ivory Cost 1 Uganda 2 
Japan 1 UK 3 
Jordan 3 Ukraine 1 
Kazakhstan 2 USA 1 
Kuwait 3 Uzbekistan 1 
Kyrgyzstan 1 Yemen 2 
Libya 1 Zambia 1 
Luxembourg 1 Total 165 
Source: Etisalat (2010a). 
* Indian networks with CAMEL operate in 11 regional markets. 
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13Table (5.5) Visited networks with Multinetwork by country.  
Country Networks which have Multinetwork 
Austria 3G & Vodafone merged in 2009 
Brazil Brasil Telco & TNL merged in 2009 
Hong Kong 
CSL & NW merged in 2006 
H3 operates two distinct networks:  2G & 3G 
PCCW operates two distinct networks: 2G & 3G 
India 
In Karnataka market: Spice merged with Idea in 2008 
In Punjab market: Spice merged with Idea in 2008 
In Rajasthan market: Airtel acquired Hexacom in 2004 
In Chennai market: Airtel acquired Skycell in 2000 
Iraq Zain acquired Iraqna in 2008 
Netherlands Orange & T-Mobile merged in 2007 
South Korea KT operates two distinct networks: CDMA & 3G 
Taiwan Far East acquired KG in 2003 
Tajikistan 
Tcell operates two distinct networks: North & South; which had 
operational merger in 2011 
UK Orange & T Mobile merged in 2009 
Ukraine 
URS acquired Golden Telecom in 2008, forming Beeline 
Beeline & Kyivstar merged in 2010 
Source: Information from multiple search engines. 
 
5.5 The Dataset  
 
In our aggregated dataset, we observe foreign networks that were visited by Etisalat 
roamers during the years 2008-2011: Etisalat is the home network; and visited networks are 
the wholesalers. Visited networks billed Etisalat for the use of their networks. The dataset 
includes average wholesale prices (computed by dividing the billed charges by the used 
units) for each of the four roaming services: minutes of outgoing calls (to any destination), 
minutes of incoming calls, originated SMS (to any destination) and MB of data roaming. 
Wholesale prices are available in AED. 
 
These IOT bills are assumed to include any payment discounts given to Etisalat 71 . 
Nevertheless, these bills are not the net IOT payments between Etisalat and visited 
networks; rather, they are part of Etisalat net payments. More specifically, they represent 
Etisalat wholesale costs, or visited networks’ wholesale revenues.  
 
There are few observed visited networks72 that offer mobile telephony via satellite or other 
enabling technologies on airplanes or ships, which charged excessive wholesale prices. As 
                                               
71 Value added tax (VAT) is also included in these bills if imposed by the visited country. However, such tax does not affect 
wholesale competition because it would be applied similarly to all networks in a given country.  
72 Namely, AeroMobile, Maritime Communications, Maritime Seanet, Oceancel, OnAir, Telecom Italia Maritime, Thuraya and 
Digicel Maritime. 
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they operate in wider geographic markets that include more than one jurisdiction, networks 
of this type were removed from the dataset in order to focus on conventional mobile 
networks.  
 
We make use of the information provided in Tables (5.3 to 5.5). This information indicates 
the relationship between Etisalat and the visited networks in terms of possible preferential 
IOT agreements that lead to preferential wholesale pricing and/or steering arrangements. In 
addition, we control for multinetworks, because such visited networks may enjoy market 
power in their wholesale price setting. Therefore, we created the following dummy variables 
to be used for empirical estimations: 
  
 Cross-owned by Etisalat: a dummy variable that equals one if the visited network is 
cross-owned by Etisalat, zero otherwise. This variable can vary over time (see Table 
5.3). 
 
 Alliance to Etisalat: a dummy variable that equals one if the visited network is recognized 
by Etisalat as an alliance network, zero otherwise. We have this information for 2012 
(see Table 5.3), but lack information for the years 2008-2011
73
. We consider such 
networks to be alliances during the full study period; hence the variable is time invariant.  
 
 With CAMEL: a dummy variable that equals one if the visited network allows Etisalat 
prepaid roamers, zero otherwise (see Table 5.4). We have information for 2010, but lack 
information for other years
74
. We consider such networks to be with CAMEL during the 
full study period; hence the variable is time invariant. 
 
 Multinetwork: a dummy variable that equals one if the visited network experienced a 
horizontal merger or acquisition, or owned more than one network in the same market, 
zero otherwise (see Table 5.5)
75
. The dummy variable takes the value of one for each 
visited network that has multinetworks. For the merger/acquisition events, the year in 
effect is considered; hence the variable varies by year. For example, in the merger event 
in the UK between Orange and T-Mobile in 2009, the dummy value is zero in 2008 and 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
73 In fact, the number of Etisalat alliance networks rose from 38 networks in 2012 as in Table (5.3) to 143 as of July 2013 
(Etisalat, 2013b).  
74 In fact, the number of networks with CAMEL that allow Etisalat prepaid roamers rose from 165 networks in 2010 as in Table 
(5.4) to 280 as of May 2013 (Etisalat, 2013a). 
75 In Indian regional markets, we noted four merger/acquisition events in Table (5.5). However, our dataset shows the event 
partners as one network, contrary to other countries where the dataset would still show the event partners as distinct networks. 
We conclude that those merger/acquisition events took place across-regions, not within region, perhaps to allow one network to 
enter a regional market. Because such events do not affect the number of existing networks or horizontal competition, none of 
the Indian networks is considered to have multinetworks. 
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one in 2009-2011 for each network. For the ownership of more than one network (due to 
probably licensing reasons) the dummy variable takes the value of one in the full study 
period, zero otherwise. For example, in Hong Kong, H3 owns 2G and 3G networks, so 
the dummy value is one for the years 2008-2011 for each network. 
 
Summary statistics are provided in Table (5.6) for the dataset variables. We have 552 visited 
networks observed over the years 2008-2011; thus the dataset has 2,208 observations. The 
number of (active) visited networks that sold any roaming unit increases from 438 in 2008 to 
539 in 2011.  
 
Any difference between active networks and the number of observed visited networks, 552, 
should mean some networks did not host Etisalat subscribers in the given year. This can be 
due to not being licensed that year, or due to other reasons such as Etisalat roamers chose 
not to roam on them or Etisalat did not have an IOT agreement with them. It is also possible 
that these networks were in markets not visited by the Etisalat roamers in the given year.  
 
The increase in the number of active networks over time indicates the expansion of Etisalat 
IOT agreements. This is true despite the existence of Etisalat’s preferred networks (Alliance 
or Cross-owned). Therefore, the existence of preferred networks did not lead to exclusivity, 
which confirms conventional assumptions that mobile networks are not perfect substitutes.  
 
Our dataset identified 204 distinct visited markets in 182 countries, where some countries 
(e.g. India) have regional markets. Etisalat roamers visited 191 in 2008, 193 in 2009, 201 in 
2010, and 202 in 2011. Notice on average, each market has 2.7 observed visited networks. 
This reflects the oligopoly nature of the mobile industry. 
 
The means in Table (5.6) do not change for Alliance or CAMEL because the dummy variable 
does not change over time. In contrast, Cross-owned and Multinetwork vary overtime, but as 
can be seen, the mean does not vary by much. Overall, on average, cross-owned networks 
represent 5.4% of observations, roaming alliance networks represent 8%, networks with 
CAMEL represent 29.9%, and 5.3% of networks own multinetworks within their markets. 
 
Table (5.6) also shows a downward trend in average quantity of outgoing and incoming 
calls76. With SMS, apart from the spike in 2009, a downward trend is also apparent. On the 
other hand, there is an upward trend in data roaming. 
 
                                               
76 The total of outgoing/incoming calls also has a downward trend.  
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14Table (5.6) Dataset summary statistics.  
Summary statistics 2008 2009 2010 2011 All 
Observations 552 552 552 552 2208 
No. of  active visited networks 438 448 516 539 1941 
Mean of Cross-owned networks by Etisalat   
(1 if Yes; 0 otherwise) 
0.053 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 
Mean of Alliance networks to Etisalat   
(1 if Yes; 0 otherwise) 
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Mean of networks with CAMEL allowing Etisalat prepaid  
(1 if Yes; 0 otherwise) 
0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 
Mean of Multinetwork (networks horizontal ownership) 
(1 if Yes; 0 otherwise) 
0.043 0.054 0.056 0.06 0.053 
Outgoing 
calls 
Mean of Quantity  (1000'minutes) Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Mean of Price  (AED/minute)* Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Incoming 
calls 
Mean of Quantity  (1000'minutes) Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Mean of Price  (AED/minute)* Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
SMS 
Mean of Quantity  (1000'SMS) Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Mean of Price  (AED/SMS)* Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Data 
roaming 
Mean of Quantity  (1000'MB) Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
Mean of Price  (AED/MB)* Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  Redacted  
* Constant prices, using 2007 as the base year (NBS, 2013).   
- Data redacted as per NRA-UAE’s data confidentiality policy.  
 
Etisalat roamers travelled to many countries, as the following map suggests. However, 
visited markets have high variations in their total quantities sold to Etisalat roamers. Based 
on outgoing calls per visited market during the study period, the mean is around 786 
thousand minutes, while the median is around 126 thousand minutes. In the next chapter, 
we will show how heterogeneity of visited markets, (which is assumed to be a sampling 
problem), impacts our estimations. The shading areas of the world map in Figure (5.1) 
illustrate the highly visited markets. 
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5Figure (5.1) Map for highly visited markets by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011.  
- Based on market total minutes of outgoing calls above the median. 
- The map does not show small size countries or regions such as the Indian regions. 
 
We use CPI deflator77 to adjust prices for inflation. There is no substantial change in the 
price movement if, instead, current prices were used78. 
 
In Table (5.6), the (average wholesale) prices a visited network charged to Etisalat for a 
minute of outgoing call and a MB of data roaming show a downward trend. The year 2010 
witnessed an increase in the means for a minute of incoming call and an SMS. Wholesale 
prices differ by roaming service due to probable differences in marginal costs. The highest 
price is for a MB of data roaming, followed by a minute of outgoing call.  
 
There are a few price outliers. The main outlier is an Etisalat cross-owned visited network 
that charged a very high price for outgoing calls and SMS. The other outliners involve zero 
pricing, which can be due to pricing policies. Few visited networks did not charge Etisalat 
when usage was very low. This practise is a known bill-and-keep arrangement in 
interconnection agreements.  
                                               
77 The price in year t is multiplied by 100/CPIt. 
78 The CPI is 100 in 2007 (the base year), where inflation rose afterwards due to rising property prices. However, during our 
study period (2008-2011), inflation grew by less than 2%, as follows: CPI is 112.25 in 2008, 114.0 in 2009, 115.0 in 2010, and 
116.01 in 2011 (NBS, 2013). 
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However, there are many observations with zero pricing for incoming calls despite high 
quantities. This might be due to the fact that with incoming calls, foreign networks are 
already compensated by international settlement rates because a roaming incoming call 
requires international calling: Etisalat pays such settlement rates to route the call back to the 
visited network. This explains why Etisalat sets a positive retail price despite a very low (IOT) 
wholesale price. 
 
Visited networks in the GCC charged lower wholesale prices for outgoing and incoming calls 
than the average in Table (5.6); while they sold more units than the average in each of the 
four roaming services. Although the Intra-GCC Roaming Charges regulation is supposed to 
reduce wholesale prices charged between networks in the GCC, we show in Figure (5.2) 
that such regulation is ineffective during our study period. 
 
In Figure (5.2), clearly the GCC networks charged Etisalat wholesale prices for outgoing 
calls above the GCC caps, except for one network79. This finding shows how regulation 
across different jurisdictions is difficult to enforce. Therefore, we can carry on the assumption 
that wholesale prices in the dataset are free from regulation. 
 
 
6Figure (5.2) Wholesale price for a minute of outgoing call by GCC visited networks by year.  
- The horizontal lines represent wholesale price caps set by the Intra-GCC Roaming Charges for outgoing calls
80
. 
- The years 2010-2011 are considered because they are relevant in the NRA-UAE’s directive (NRA-UAE, 2010). 
- Data redacted as per NRA-UAE’s data confidentiality policy.  
 
                                               
79 The wholesale price of network 10 in Figure (5.2) is still above the local call price cap. Charging below the international call 
price cap is not a response to regulation; rather, it is in line with prior periods (before regulation): network 10 increased its 
wholesale price compared to the previous two years before regulation (i.e. 2008-2009). 
80 GCC price caps are converted from SDR to AED according to the effective dates in the NRA-UAE directive (NRA-UAE, 
2010), using the SDR Valuation History for the exchange rate of the US dollar ($0.27=1 AED) from the International Monetary 
Fund website (www.imf.org). 
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For later use, we will create a dummy variable for Etisalat uniform retail policy (one for the 
years 2010-2011; zero otherwise). This variable will be used as an explanatory variable for 
estimating the impact of Etisalat retail policy shift (from discriminatory to uniform) on 
wholesale pricing of visited networks and steering by Etisalat. 
 
Furthermore, we look at correlations between the four roaming services in terms of prices, 
quantities and market shares (computed by dividing a visited network’s quantity by the total 
quantities of the relevant geographic market). This is done to know how interdependent the 
services are, especially outgoing and incoming calls, following the EC (2006). 
 
In Table (5.7), there are missing observations in wholesale prices due to some networks 
being inactive in some of the years. The missing observations in market shares are due to 
some geographic markets having a zero total quantity for some roaming services in some of 
the years, mainly for MB of data roaming.  
 
15Table (5.7) Correlations between roaming services. 
 
Correlation of  
quantities  
(2,208 observations) 
 
Outgoing 
calls 
 
Incoming 
calls 
 
SMS 
 
Data 
roaming 
Outgoing calls 1 - - - 
Incoming calls 0.986 1 - - 
SMS 0.305 0.320 1  
Data roaming 0.566 0.526 0.082 1 
          
Correlation of  
average wholesale prices  
(1,344 observations) 
 
Outgoing 
calls 
 
Incoming 
calls 
 
SMS 
 
Data 
roaming 
Outgoing calls 1 - - - 
Incoming calls 0.018 1 - - 
SMS 0.310 0.478 1 - 
Data roaming 0.284 0.117 0.419 1 
          
Correlation of  
market shares  
(1,851 observations) 
 
Outgoing 
calls 
 
Incoming 
calls 
 
SMS 
 
Data 
roaming 
Outgoing calls 1 - - - 
Incoming calls 0.982 1 - - 
SMS 0.972 0.971 1 - 
Data roaming 0.834 0.811 0.800 1 
 
 
As seen in Table (5.7), all correlations are positive; this concurs with our preliminary intuition 
that the four services are non-substitutes. Notice the high significant correlation between the 
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quantities of outgoing and incoming calls, while the correlation of their wholesale prices is 
very low, reflecting the gap in prices (i.e., in Table (5.6), the average wholesale price is 6.36 
AED for a minute of outgoing call compared to 0.88 AED for a minute of incoming call). We 
relate the gap in prices to the involvement of another wholesale price agreement, which is 
international settlement rate agreement, as follows. 
 
If an Etisalat roamer makes an outgoing call, the visited network bears the cost of call 
origination. In addition, the visited network bears the cost of call termination, which is paid as 
an access price if the call is destined to another network. If the terminating network is 
located in a different country, such as Etisalat, the visited network has to pay an access 
price called international settlement rate, which tends to be above the actual cost of 
terminating the call. To cover such costs, the visited network sets high IOTs for outgoing 
calls. 
 
In comparison, if an Etisalat roamer receives an incoming call, the visited network bears the 
cost of call termination on its own network, without paying any access price. Instead, the 
visited network receives an international settlement rate from Etisalat 81 . Therefore, the 
visited network charges low IOTs for incoming calls. This explains the gap in wholesale 
prices between outgoing and incoming calls.  
 
With roaming incoming calls, Etisalat pays the settlement rates, thus it charges a positive 
retail price for incoming calls. If Etisalat does not charge for incoming calls, its subscribers 
may view incoming and outgoing calls as substitutes; and we would expect a negative 
correlation between quantities of incoming and outgoing calls.  The EC (2006) believes that 
a home network has an incentive to keep a high retail price for incoming calls; otherwise, 
consumers would prefer to receive the call instead of originating it.  
 
Furthermore, the low correlations between the prices suggest differences in actual marginal 
costs between the four roaming services. Notice the high correlations between market 
shares, suggesting visited networks would have similar market shares across the roaming 
services they provide to roamers. 
 
                                               
81 This is because the call is routed from Etisalat in the UAE to the visited country. The visited network that handles the 
incoming call either receives the full settlement rate from Etisalat, or a portion of it if a third party is involved (e.g. the call is 
routed through another network in the same country which has an international gateway). 
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5.6 Discussion 
 
We will be using the dataset described in this chapter for the empirical estimations in the 
proceeding chapters, for the sake of understanding visited networks wholesale competition. 
 
Given that most interconnection prices (including international settlement rates with foreign 
networks) are widely regulated, our dataset has information on wholesale prices (IOTs) 
assumed to be set freely by market forces. Additionally, the dataset is comprehensive as it 
includes all foreign networks visited by subscribers of the same home network. Etisalat 
witnessed a shift from discriminatory retail policy to uniform. Such a policy shift is assumed 
to make roamers shift the network-selection-modes of their mobile handsets from manual to 
automatic, by which steering by Etisalat is assumed possible. 
 
Etisalat retail policy shift is assumed to influence the demands for outgoing calls because 
outgoing calls experienced price restructuring as compared to the rest of roaming services. 
In addition, outgoing calls were not offered in roaming packages; thus the roamer is 
assumed to leave his handset on automatic mode, enabling steering by Etisalat.  
 
In contrast, incoming calls and SMS generally experienced uniform retail (within visited 
countries) prior to the policy; while information is unavailable on retail prices for data roaming 
prior to the policy. Incoming calls and data roaming are offered in roaming packages that can 
be purchased only from alliance networks, thus they may involve network manual selection 
by roamers. Moreover, at the wholesale level, outgoing calls have positive wholesale prices 
compared to incoming calls that widely involve a zero-pricing policy. Furthermore, quantities 
and prices for outgoing calls seem to be less affected by the time trend in Table (5.6), 
compared to the rest of roaming services. 
 
The next chapters will focus on quantities and wholesale prices of outgoing calls, similar to 
the studies done by the NRAs in the EU. We will test how wholesale competition is affected 
by the shift in Etisalat’s retail policy and by the fact that Etisalat has preferred visited 
networks. More specifically, we will estimate the demand for visited networks by Etisalat 
roamers; and test for the impact of Etisalat’s uniform retail policy shift on wholesale prices 
and market shares. The last part will investigate whether steering by Etisalat was exercised, 
and to what extent it enabled Etisalat to cause downward pressures on the wholesale prices 
it paid to visited networks. 
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Chapter (6). Demands For Visited Networks 
 
International roaming services are governed by Inter-Operator Tariff (IOT) agreements, 
which are a type of two-way access/interconnection wholesale agreements. Such 
agreements entitle the subscribers of a home network to use their mobile phones while 
roaming on foreign networks.  
 
For the aim of understanding wholesale competition under IOT agreements, we make use of 
the dataset described in Chapter (5) for empirical estimations in this chapter and the next 
two chapters. The dataset has usages and wholesale prices (IOTs) of all foreign networks 
visited by Etisalat roamers.  
 
The study period witnessed Etisalat shifting from discriminatory retail pricing policy (during 
2008-2009), whereby prices would differ by visited networks, to uniform policy (during 2010-
2011). The two different retail policies82 are the main theme of the theoretical modeling in 
Chapters (3) and (4); thus this dataset will be used to test the hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical predictions. 
 
In this chapter, we estimate the demand by Etisalat roamers for visited networks to 
understand their responsiveness in a foreign land to price and non-price characteristics of 
visited networks before and after Etisalat uniform retail policy. The results from demand 
estimation will be compared to results from policy-impact analyses of policy on market 
outcomes in the next two chapters, where we will explore the relationship of wholesale 
pricing (IOTs) and market structure, and the effectiveness of steering in the presence of the 
policy.  
 
This chapter is planned as follows. Section (6.0) introduces the structural model to be used 
in this chapter. Section (6.1) introduces the dataset. Section (6.2) outlines the empirical 
methodology. Demand estimation results are discussed in Section (6.3). The chapter 
concludes in Section (6.4). 
 
 
 
                                               
82 Retail prices are discriminatory or uniform across visited networks, not across roamers. 
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6.0 Simple Logit Demand 
 
In this chapter, we use a structural model to estimate Etisalat roamers’ demands for visited 
networks, borrowing from discrete choice models of product differentiation. The simple logit 
demand model assumes that demand can be described by a discrete choice model where 
prices are endogenously determined by price-setting firm(s). The implied mean utility level 
from product i is found by inverting the market share equation, which is then used as the 
dependant variable acting in similar way as the observed output quantities of homogenous 
goods (Berry, 1994). Consumers’ tastes are assumed homogenous, so the marginal utilities 
of product characteristics are identical for all consumers.  
 
The following explanation borrows from section (5.4.2) in Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). 
Suppose the consumer can choose between n products in a given market and an outside 
good,   ̅̅ ̅, which gives him zero utility. Market share for product i can be written as  
   
   *  ̅+
  ∑    *  ̅+
 
   
   
where all consumers have the same mean utility level,   ̅. The mean utility takes the form 
  ̅                 
where    is the price of product  ,     is a vector of observed product characteristics, and    
contains all unobservable product characteristics.    is considered the error term in the 
following transformed market share equation, 
 
  (  )    (  )                 
(6.0.1) 
where    is share of the outside good. Eq. (6.0.1) represents the simple logit demand, which 
can be estimated using linear regression. The price elasticities are given by  
 
    
   
   
  
  
  
     (    ) if      (i.e. own price elasticity), 
       otherwise (i.e. cross price elasticity). 
(6.0.2) 
 
Two major limitations of the simple logit model lie in its estimation of elasticities. With respect 
to the own price elasticity, the functional form implies that the lower-price firm must enjoy a 
higher markup (i.e. elasticity is low if price is low, and high if price is high). In addition, the 
substitution pattern among products may be unrealistic (i.e. a product can have identical 
cross price elasticities).  
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Alternative discrete models of product differentiation, for instance the random coefficients 
logit, overcome the limitation on cross price elasticity. Given our lack of information on 
visited networks’ nests/groups 83 , brands fixed effects 84 , and on Etisalat roamers 
demographics85, we will follow the simple logit demand model.  
 
6.1 The Dataset 
 
The dataset86 has aggregated traffics (hereafter quantities) used by Etisalat roamers while 
roaming on foreign networks, which were annualized to remove the seasonality effects in the 
data. These quantities are provided on the visited network level per year for each of the four 
roaming services (minutes of outgoing calls and incoming calls, SMS and MB of data 
roaming), along with their relevant average wholesale prices.  
 
The dataset has all foreign networks visited by Etisalat subscribers (prepaid and postpaid) 
around the world during the years 2008-2011. There are 552 visited networks, and thus we 
have 2208 observations. The number of active visited networks is less than 552, which 
means some visited networks did not sell any roaming unit in a given year, due to entry/exist 
or other unknown reasons. 
 
The four roaming services (outgoing calling, incoming calling, SMS and data roaming) are 
assumed to be separate services (i.e. non-substitutes to one another)87, where the roamer 
can buy each service from any visited network.  
 
During the study period, Etisalat shifted its retail policy from (generally) discriminatory retail 
prices (in the years 2008-2009) to a uniform retail policy (by region or zone) (in the years 
2010-2011). We assume outgoing calling is exposed to the effects of the uniform retail 
policy. The other services, to a great extent, experienced retail price uniformity during the 
whole study period88. Furthermore, incoming calls and data roaming were offered in optional 
                                               
83 Possible nests can be the radio technology used by visited networks in a given market (e.g. CDMA and GSM; or 2G and 
3G). However, any technology would typically handle roaming outgoing calls with similar quality. 
84 It is difficult to know the brands for the 552 mobile networks visited by Etisalat roamers, mainly because of language barriers 
to access their information. Moreover, many mobile networks have multiple names/brands; and we found many networks 
rebranded themselves (e.g. Orange and T-Mobile to Everything Everywhere in UK; Vimpelcom to Beeline in Russia, etc…). 
85 Such information may help to account for the heterogeneity of Etisalat roamers in different visited markets (e.g. in market r, 
roamers distribution by postpaid/prepaid, business/consumer, male/female, etc…), which is unavailable in our case. For this 
information to be relevant, it must be provided per visited market.  
86 See Chapter (5) for a description of the dataset. 
87 See Section (1.1) on definition of roaming and Chapter (2) on literature review. 
88 See Section (5.2) on Etisalat retail prices. 
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roaming packages that would apply on alliance networks and hence may require manual 
network selection, which would override steering by Etisalat. Therefore, for the sake of all 
estimations in this chapter and the next two chapters, we only focus on the data related to 
outgoing calls. 
 
In our dataset, we observe average wholesale prices89. During the discriminatory policy 
period, retail prices are assumed to be a markup over the (observed) wholesale prices; thus 
variation in retail prices should reflect variations in wholesale prices. During the uniform 
policy period, retail prices became uniform based on three zones (GCC neighbouring 
countries, the rest of the Arab states, and the rest of the world).  
 
We do not use the zonal retail prices in demand estimation because they do not have 
enough variation for analysis90. Therefore, we will rely on wholesale prices provided in the 
dataset because they vary by visited networks. With respect to the choice between visited 
networks in the case of uniform retail price, roamers may be steered by Etisalat to preferred 
visited networks. 
 
Visited networks are assumed unconstrained by regulation in choosing their wholesale 
prices to Etisalat, because, during the study period, no wholesale regulation existed that 
involve Etisalat91. Moreover, visited networks did not price discriminate between Etisalat’s 
subscribers (e.g. postpaid versus prepaid)92.  
 
Etisalat roamers are assumed to be aware of retail prices, since Etisalat is obliged by NRA in 
the UAE to send SMS to its travelling subscribers informing them of the applicable retail 
prices in a given visited market93.  
 
Etisalat retail policy shift is assumed to make its roamers indifferent in choosing between 
visited networks based on price, allowing Etisalat to steer to its preferred networks. That is, if 
roamers are indifferent, their handsets would be on automatic mode which allows for 
steering.  
  
                                               
89 Wholesale prices were provided to us in averages: total IOT bill divided by total quantity for each roaming service. 
90 A better way is to get average retail prices (total retail revenues divided by total quantity), which was not provided to us. See 
Section (5.3) on the original data requested from Etisalat.  
91 Intra-GCC Roaming Charges regulation within the GCC countries, which addresses wholesale prices charged to Etisalat, 
was ineffective during the study period (see Section 5.5). 
92 This statement was communicated verbally by Etisalat. Visited networks charge Etisalat for the total usage of its roamers. 
On the other side, Etisalat price discriminates at the retail level, where the retail price is usually lower for postpaid subscribers 
(see Section 5.2). 
93 In line with the thesis focus on wholesale competition, the empirical chapters ignore retail competition in the UAE. In light of 
the non-existence of mobile number portability in the UAE during our study period, we assume retail competition is absent 
because the main purpose of international roaming is to use the same home number abroad. 
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6.1.1 Visited Networks Characteristics 
 
Additional to the variables in the dataset of wholesale prices and quantities, we included 
dummy variables on visited networks characteristics that are available in Etisalat’s website. 
These characteristics are assumed to be the key non-price information relevant to roamers’ 
decisions in choosing between (foreign) visited networks. 
 
The first characteristic is the networks that are cross-owned by Etisalat, which represent 
5.4% of visited networks. These networks usually bear the name of Etisalat (e.g. Etisalat-
Egypt and Etisalat-Nigeria), and thus roamers are assumed to be familiar with cross-owned 
networks.  
 
In addition, roamers may care about cross-owned networks during the discriminatory retail 
price period. This is because, as predicted in the cross-ownership model (Section 4.1.2), a 
cross-owned network should charge wholesale price equivalent to its marginal cost, which 
should translate into lower retail prices. 
 
All cross-owned networks operate in developing countries. Among which is Etisalat-DB, 
which by itself represents half of cross-owned networks. Etisalat DB operated in 15 regional 
markets in India, and has very low market share in each Indian regional market. This is a 
structural problem for this specific network as it is new in the Indian mobile industry. The rest 
of cross-owned networks were acquired recently by Etisalat or launched with a new mobile 
licence. Therefore, cross-owned networks should be in the early phase of operation, where 
expansion of coverage rollout might be their priority.  
 
The second characteristic is the networks that are roaming alliance to Etisalat, representing 
8% of visited networks. These networks operate in different markets that seem to be 
frequently visited by Etisalat roamers. Etisalat would include the name of its alliance 
networks in the SMS sent to roamers, and thus roamers are assumed to be familiar with 
alliance networks. 
 
By roaming on alliance networks, Etisalat roamers can buy roaming packages (at better 
retail prices) for incoming calls and data roaming. Nonetheless, these packages do not apply 
to outgoing calls, which is the focus of all empirical estimations. Given independence 
between roaming services, when Etisalat shifted from discriminatory retail policy to uniform, 
roamers should be indifferent regarding the prices of outgoing calls. We proceed by 
assuming limited take-rate for roaming packages, and thus as far as outgoing calls are 
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concerned, the impact of such packages on roamers’ choice between visited networks 
during the uniform policy should be very limited94. 
 
The third characteristic is the networks that allow Etisalat prepaid roaming, which represent 
around 30% of visited networks. Etisalat prepaid roamers can only roam on these networks, 
and such networks must have a CAMEL technology95. As the service is costly to the home 
network96, Etisalat charges a higher retail for prepaid roamers compared to postpaid; while 
visited networks do not price discriminate at the wholesale level97. 
 
Furthermore, two time related variables are used as non-price characteristics. The first is the 
year discrete variable that helps to capture the effect of time. Time may affect demand if 
technological improvement improves the quality of network (e.g. coverage). The second is a 
dummy variable for the existence of Etisalat uniform retail policy. This policy is likely to be 
associated with consumer discretion in demand across visited networks: demand-side 
substitution before the policy and supply-side substitution via steering after the policy. In 
other words, the policy should help us know why a visited network is chosen98. 
 
6.1.2 Variables 
 
The dataset has 2208 observations, consisting of 552 visited networks in each of the four 
years (2008-2011) in 204 different markets. The relevant notations and variables used in 
demand estimations are listed in Table (6.1) below.  
 
The year variable, YEAR, is used to control for the effect of time. The policy dummy variable, 
POLICY (1 if uniform; 0 otherwise), will be used to estimate the impact of Etisalat shift in its 
retail policy (from discriminatory to uniform) on outcomes. POLICY will be interacted with 
networks characteristic dummy variables to understand the impact of the characteristics on 
demand before and after the uniform policy.  
 
                                               
94 For example, the roamer can make outgoing call while roaming on network 1 and receive a call while roaming on network 2. 
His selection is assumed to be manual when price mattered during the discriminatory policy period. Under uniform policy, the 
only plausible way not to choose automatic mode based on prices would be for opting in roaming packages. Our assumption 
regarding the independence between roaming services still hold, but once the roamer manually selected a network to buy a 
roaming package (which does not include outgoing calls), it is implausible to assume he would switch his handset to automatic 
in order to make outgoing calls. However, we need the independence of roaming services to hold in order to simplify the 
modelling; so we proceed with assuming limited take-rate for roaming packages.     
95 CAMEL technology is a real-time system that requires the communications of both home network and the visited network to 
deduct instantly from the balance of the prepaid roamer according to his usage (European Parliament, 2006).  
96 This is according to a study by European Parliament (2006). 
97 This statement was communicated verbally by Etisalat. 
98 The choice between visited networks after the policy will be studied in depth in Chapter (8), where the effectiveness of 
steering is investigated through interacting the policy with the relative price of the visited network to the market arithmetic mean. 
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For demand estimation, we derive the market shares for the inside good (visited networks in 
a given market) and the outside good in the market, using the multiplier explained in Section 
(6.2.2). 
 
16Table (6.1) Notations and variables related to estimations. 
Notation  Description 
j Subscript for visited networks, where (j=1,…,552). 
t Subscript for year, where (t=2008,2009,2010,2011). 
r Subscript for geographic market, where (r=1,…,204). 
Time variables  Description 
YEAR Discrete variable for the study years, where (1=2008, 2=2009, 3=2010, 4=2011). 
POLICY 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2010-2011 (when Etisalat implemented 
its uniform retail policy); 0 otherwise.  
Price variables Description 
PRICEjt 
j’s average wholesale price per minute of outgoing call in year t (in constant 
AED with 2007 as base year). 
Visited network’s 
characteristic 
variables  
Description 
CROSSOWNEDjt Dummy variable equals 1 if j is cross-owned by Etisalat in year t; 0 otherwise. 
ALLIANCEj Dummy variable equals 1 if j is a roaming alliance to Etisalat; 0 otherwise. 
CAMELj Dummy variable equals 1 if j allows Etisalat prepaid roaming; 0 otherwise. 
Market shares 
variables  
Description 
     j’s market share in minutes of outgoing calls in market r and year t. 
    Outside good market share in year t. 
 
All prices provided in nominal AED are converted to constant prices using 2007 as the base 
year (NBS, 2013). All results do not statistically change if we use other base years, or if we 
use nominal prices because inflation is very low during the study period99. In addition, three 
observations have extreme price values: two observations have zero prices due to the bill-
and-keep arrangement for very low quantity; and one observation for a cross-owned network 
by Etisalat with an abnormal price. These three observations will be excluded in all 
estimations of this chapter and the next chapters. 
                                               
99 Inflation during the study period grew annually by less than 2% (see Section 5.5).  
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6.1.3 Sampling Problem 
 
During the years 2008-2011, Etisalat roamers visited 204 different geographic markets (in 
182 countries)100. There are high variations between visited markets in the total quantities 
roamers consumed. With outgoing calls, the mean per visited market is around 786 
thousand minutes while the median is around 126 thousand.  
 
Later in the chapter, we will compare results for observations below or equal the median 
(labeled Low Visited Markets) to results above the median (labeled High Visited Markets), 
where we find opposite predictions with regards to roamers’ price sensitivity.  
 
Roamers seem to be price insensitive in the low visited markets, which may suggest that 
those markets are hosting a different type of roamers, for example diplomats or 
businessmen. Therefore, we are concerned that our dataset includes heterogeneous 
observations arising from having two different samples.  
 
To include all observations in a demand estimation, one should consider the use of a good 
exogenous101 variable to weight the dataset. Tourism statistics in those visited markets may 
not necessarily tell us about the travelling behaviors of the UAE people. According to our 
dataset for example, the Afghani market sold more roaming quantities than the markets of 
the Channel Islands. In addition, judging from distance to the UAE can be misleading. For 
example, the UK market sold more roaming quantities than the Iranian market. By looking at 
visited markets, it is not obvious if a macro-level statistics (e.g. GDP per capita) can explain 
why markets differ in hosting Etisalat roamers.  
 
The number of UAE travelers per visited markets seems to be a good weight if we are to 
include all observations to estimate demand, but is currently unavailable. In the demand 
estimation, we will be focusing on highly visited markets. 
 
6.2 Empirical Methodology 
 
This section outlines the empirical methodology used in demand estimation.  First, market 
definition is explained. Second, the estimation model and hypotheses to be tested are 
                                               
100 Some countries (e.g. India) have regional markets. 
101 Thanks to Professor Eugenio Miravete for this point. 
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presented. Finally, the endogeneity problem is addressed, where instrumental variables are 
proposed. 
 
6.2.1 Market Definition 
 
This section defines the relevant market in order to derive market-related variables (e.g. 
market size and market shares). We rely on the EC’s definition of this market, which is 
“wholesale national market for international roaming on public mobile networks”102 (O.J., 
2003).  
 
In the dataset, we recognize 204 geographic markets103 visited by Etisalat roamers over the 
span of the study period. The public mobile networks are the licensed networks in a given 
market that provide wholesale roaming services to home networks.  
 
The source of roaming utility for an Etisalat subscriber is assumed to come from consuming 
minutes of outgoing calls while roaming abroad with the same home phone number. His 
outside options include, for example, calling from public payphones/hotel, or calling with 
visitor-SIM cards. Outside options also include the refrain from making roaming outgoing 
calls. All such outside options are included in the outside good which gives the roamer zero 
utility. 
 
A precondition to making an outgoing call is to first roam on a visited network. Because the 
unit of observation in our dataset is the visited network, the product market for Etisalat 
roamers is the visited network that sold outgoing call minutes. Etisalat roamers can 
substitute between visited networks in the relevant geographic market based on price and 
non-price characteristics. 
 
Therefore, for Etisalat roamers, the geographic market is the visited market, and the visited 
networks are the product market. Notice our market definition involves Etisalat as the home 
network. This is to say that for the same visited networks and market, the demands by 
Etisalat roamers is different from the demands by another home network, where the 
difference can be, for example, in market sizes and incomes of the roamers. Visited network 
j is assumed to set different wholesale prices to different home networks, depending on their 
different demands and j’s two-way vertical relationships (i.e. IOT agreement) with each home 
                                               
102 This definition was known as Market (17) in the EC list of recommendation on relevant markets. In 2007, the EC removed 
Market (17) from this list after it issued roaming regulation (see Section 2.1.2). 
103 See Section (5.4) about the method used to define geographic markets. See also Appendix (G) for a list of all visited 
networks along with their relevant geographic markets. 
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network, which may involve preferential wholesale prices. This point will be revisited in 
details when possible instrumental variables are proposed in Section (6.2.4). 
 
6.2.2 Market Size  
 
Because the aim of all estimations is to understand upstream competition, the market, as 
defined in Section (6.2.1), is related to the visited networks in each visited market. Therefore, 
market size is the sum of the quantities (i.e. all minutes of outgoing calls) in a given market 
and year104. 
 
The outside good is included in the market size for demand estimation. We lack information 
on Etisalat roamers’ outside options. Therefore, we use a multiplier to calculate market size. 
Due to high variations in quantities between visited geographic markets105, market sizes 
need to differ according to visited markets.  
 
In order to calculate market size, we use a multiplier, mt,, to multiply the market quantity in a 
visited market, qrt,, which gives the market size in that market, Mrt (r indexes market and t 
indexes year). Market share for the outside good will be the same across all geographic 
markets.  
 
The choice on the multiplier is justified as follows. First, we look at the typical usage inside 
the home country, the UAE, which we consider as what roamers would consume had they 
stayed inside the UAE (i.e. did not travel). We use aggregate minutes of mobile-to-mobile 
calls made by Etisalat subscribers inside the UAE for each of the study years, denoted by 
MTMt. The difference between the typical usage inside the UAE, MTMt, and the aggregate 
roaming usage, denoted by Qt, is deemed to be the outside good. The outside good should 
reflect what roamers consumed of the outside options (e.g. calling from public payphones 
abroad) or their refrain from making roaming outgoing calls. mt is thus derived by dividing 
MTMt by Qt. 
 
However, we must attribute some of MTMt for international roaming, because not all Etisalat 
subscribers can be assumed to have travelled abroad. A proportion vt of MTMt is attributed 
to roaming, where vt is the estimated proportion of roamers in Etisalat total subscribers. 
 
                                               
104 If, instead, market size is considered as the aggregate quantities of all the 204 markets, then the demand estimation would 
focus on demands for visited markets (e.g. hot destinations), not for visited networks which is the focus in understanding 
upstream competition. 
105 See the sampling problem in Section (6.1.3). 
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We use the weights of postpaid/prepaid subscribers in roaming usage106: around 85% of 
quantity was made by postpaid subscribers. For each year, we weight the number of Etisalat 
subscribers by roaming behaviours (e.g. 85% postpaid; 15% prepaid) and divide them by 
Etisalat total subscribers to get vt.  
 
Table (6.2) summarizes the calculations related to market size. As can be seen from the 
table, around 22% of Etisalat subscribers are estimated to be roamers during the study 
period, which is plausible. The outside good market share varies in each year, and its 
difference from one represents the inside good market share for any visited market. 
 
17Table (6.2) Calculations related to market size. 
Relevant calculations 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Estimated proportion of roamers 
in total subscribers,    
0.216 0.224 0.226 0.230 
Market size multiplier: 
   
        
   
 
18.50 20.58 19.54 19.40 
Outside good market share: 
    
    
  
 
0.946 0.951 0.949 0.948 
 
6.2.3 Estimation Model 
 
Etisalat roamers’ mean utility from roaming on visited networks is regressed on price and 
visited networks’ characteristics (cross-owned, alliance and with CAMEL), which are 
observed by the roamers and by the econometrician. Other characteristics of visited 
networks observed by the roamers but not by the econometrician enter the error term of the 
model. The regressors will also include time variables (year and Etisalat uniform policy 
dummy variable), and the characteristics interacted with the policy.  
 
The model for the simple logit demand is given by Eq. (6.1), which is estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Second Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Subscript for year is 
dropped as data is pooled, and market subscript is dropped for convenience. 
  (  )    (  )                              
                                    
                                                             
(           )         
(6.1) 
                                               
106 This information does not belong to our dataset. It is provided by NRA-UAE’s for Etisalat roamers in GCC countries.  
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  (  ) is the natural log of the market share of visited network  ;   (  ) is the natural log of 
the outside good share; and  
 
 is the error term. All variables are as explained in Table (6.1). 
The product     refers to the outside good. 
 
The price used in Eq. (6.1) is the wholesale price charged by visited network   to Etisalat in 
year t. Any retail price markup, due to probably retail price discrimination between 
postpaid/prepaid, is unobserved and hence enter the error term.  
 
As shall be see in the results, the price coefficient is only negative and significant in the 
highly visited markets, due the sampling problem discussed in Section (6.1.3). Price 
endogeneity problem and proposed instrumental variable are discussed in the next section.  
 
We expect visited networks that are preferred by Etisalat (i.e. cross-owned or roaming 
alliance) to charge Etisalat lower wholesale prices, and have higher market shares through 
demand-side substitution when retail price is discriminatory. Because steering is assumed 
relevant only if retail price is uniform, we expect Etisalat after the policy, if its steering is 
effective, to raise the market shares of its preferred networks (i.e. supply-side substitution). 
 
We also expect visited networks that allowed Etisalat prepaid roaming (i.e. with CAMEL), to 
have higher market share because they host Etisalat prepaid roamers in addition to its 
postpaid. 
 
The choice on the market size multiplier affects the constant term in Eq. (6.1). Nonetheless, 
the own price elasticity is sensitive to the definition of the market. If the market is defined 
more broadly, the own market share decreases, and, as a result, own price elasticity 
increases in absolute value (Slade 2009).  
 
After estimating Eq. (6.1), the own price elasticity is given by  
      ̂        (    )        (           )  
(6.2) 
 
6.2.4 Endogeneity Problem 
 
This section addresses the endogeneity problem known in demand estimations, such as in 
Eq. (6.1), and proposes possible instrumental variables (IVs) to overcome this problem. 
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In estimating a demand model using OLS estimator where price is used as a regressor, the 
covariance of price and the error term of the model is not zero. This is because quantity and 
price are determined simultaneously in the market, such that a shock in demand or supply 
will affect the equilibrium quantity and price. In this case, price is not exogenous, which 
means OLS provides inconsistent estimates for the model. 
 
Our dataset lacks a possible instrument for price. Market structure variables, such as the 
number of visited networks, affect market shares (e.g. the higher the number of visited 
networks, the lower should be the own market share). The error term in Eq. (6.1) involves 
the unexplained variations in market shares, which can be affected by the number of 
networks. Therefore, the number of networks107 can be correlated with the error term; hence 
does not suit to instrument for price. 
 
Another reason that the number of networks can be correlated with the error term of demand 
comes from our assumptions on the error term. The unobserved network’s characteristics by 
the econometrical are assumed to be captured by the error term. Quality of network 
coverage is an example of unobserved characteristics, which can be affected by the number 
of networks as a response to competition; hence correlated. 
 
Furthermore, regional dummies, such as GCC and Europe, have effects on prices108. They 
can be a proxy for cost at the region-level (i.e. group of markets), but not on the market-level 
or network-level109. We sought external information for a better cost proxy, as explained 
next. 
 
In industrial organization literature, the price of a product in market (or city)   can be an 
instrument for the price of the same product in market   (Hausman et al., 1994)110. This 
requires the prices of the products in markets   and   to be correlated through cost, and the 
price in market   ( ) must be uncorrelated to the error term of the demand in market   ( ). 
 
The justification is as follows. On the supply-side, the product being sold in two different 
markets has a common marginal cost such that a cost shock will shift the prices in both 
markets111. On the demand-side, the fact that the product is being sold in different markets 
                                               
107 Chapter (7) explores market structure impact on wholesale pricing. 
108 Chapter (7) explores the impact of networks operating in Europe on their wholesale pricing for non-European networks 
(Etisalat in this case) for the possibility of a spill-over effect caused by the EC roaming regulation. 
109 In fact, if we use region dummies as IVs similar to Etisalat zonal retail prices (GCC, rest of Arab and rest of the world), we 
get very similar results to the 2SLS in model (6f) of this chapter, but with less significance level for price coefficient (10% level 
when regional dummies are used compared to 1% level in model 6f).   
110 Nevo (2001) uses a similar instrument approach. 
111 This may require controlling for market specific supply shifters (e.g. local wages). 
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means the demands are independent, such that a demand shock in one market does not 
affect the demand in the other market112.  
 
In our case, we deal with visited networks selling roaming outgoing call minutes. The product 
is the visited network in market r (the geographic market) in time t, composing the 
observations in our dataset. In order to maintain the same product, we should consider an IV 
related to the same visited network. In addition, we assume the visited network faces a 
common marginal cost in providing one minute of outgoing call. 
 
We propose that a good instrument for j’s wholesale price per minute of outgoing call (or 
IOT, our endogenous regressor) is any other price j charges per minute that involves call 
origination. On the wholesale level, examples include the wholesale price per minute j 
charges to domestic network k for national roaming by k’s subscriber (governed by national 
roaming agreement113), or to foreign network g other than Etisalat for international roaming 
by g’s subscriber (governed by international roaming agreement). On the retail level, 
examples include retail price per minute j charges to its subscriber for any outgoing call 
(domestic or international). Another retail-side example is the retail price per minute g 
charges (where g is a foreign network other than Etisalat) to its roamer when using j’s 
network. 
 
The proposed instrument is justified on two grounds. First, there is common marginal cost to 
network j for any minute of an outgoing call. For example, the cost per minute to originate a 
call on network j is similar whether it is done by j’s own subscriber (under any standard retail 
service), j’s rival subscriber (under national roaming agreement), or by a visitor roaming on 
j’s network (under international roaming agreement). Therefore, the proposed IV and the 
endogenous IOT would be correlated via the common cost of call origination.  
 
Second, the proposed IV is assumed to be uncorrelated with the demands of Etisalat 
roamers. If the IV is for retail prices for international roaming by a home network other than 
Etisalat, then roamers of Etisalat and roamers of that IV’s home network are assumed to 
differ in their incomes, market sizes, and marginal utilities 114  regarding j’s (the visited 
network) price and non-price characteristics. These two justifications need to hold in order to 
proceed with the proposed IV. 
 
                                               
112 This may require controlling for market specific demand shifters (e.g. demographics). 
113 See Section (1.1) for the difference between national and international roaming agreements. 
114 In the simple logit demand, roamers are assumed to have identical marginal utilities within the home network. 
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Among the examples for possible IV, we propose the retail prices of international roaming by 
another home network than Etisalat, as they are publically available and can be found at the 
network level (which is the product in our case).  
 
The NRA in the Sultanate of Oman provided us with the retail prices of one of its licensed 
operator, Nawras, as of August 2013 (NRA-Oman, 2013). Oman has another mobile network 
operator, Oman-Mobile, on which we also gathered similar information (Oman-Mobile, 
2013). We explored the two Omani networks as IVs for the endogenous regressor (i.e. for 
wholesale prices charged to Etisalat).  
 
In line with our focus on wholesale prices charged to Etisalat for outgoing calls (which is not 
provided by call destination, e.g. local call versus international call), we choose the retail 
prices charged by the Omani networks for calling Oman115 while roaming abroad. This is 
because calling Oman should involve more cost components (e.g. international settlement 
rates) that reflect cost asymmetry between visited networks and markets. For instance, since 
Oman and the UAE are neighbouring countries, routing the international call to Oman or to 
the UAE may involve similar costs for the visited networks in a given market. Therefore, 
visited networks in a given market are assumed to have similar costs compared to networks 
in other markets. 
 
The retail prices of the Omani networks, converted to AED currency, are provided at the 
network level for postpaid roamers. In each visited market, Nawras charges uniform retail 
price, while Oman-Mobile charges discriminatory retail (i.e. differs by visited networks). 
Oman-Mobile retail pricing policy is similar to Etisalat’s policy during the years 2008-2009, 
while Nawras is similar to Etisalat’s policy during the years 2010-2011, except that Nawras 
does not involve in zonal prices. The retail prices of both Omani networks vary across 
markets. 
 
The (observed) wholesale price Etisalat pays to visited network j is assumed to be correlated 
with the retail price of an Omani network through the underlying costs j faces (e.g. call 
origination cost), but the demands (of Etisalat and an Omani network) for j are assumed to 
be uncorrelated. 
 
                                               
115  The Omani networks provide retail price information by destination of the call (local within the visited market, or 
international call to Oman). Nawras also provides information for calling to the rest of the world.  
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The wholesale price j sets is assumed to equal its actual marginal cost116 plus its wholesale 
markup. This wholesale markup should be affected by wholesale competition or/and demand 
of the home network (e.g. roamers income). The markup may also depend on the 
relationship of j and the home network117. 
 
A good IV should be correlated with the endogenous regressor through the common cost. 
This crucial assumption is exposed to bias caused by the existence of possible preferential 
IOT agreements. As shall be seen in Chapter (7), visited networks’ characteristics 
demonstrate IOT preferential agreements (e.g. Etisalat alliance networks charge lower 
wholesale prices). However, given our data limitation, we cannot fully control for the bias 
with the available information on the characteristics. There can be other causes for 
preferential agreements such as the net payments from IOT118 and international settlement 
rate agreements, which are not available to us.   
 
One possible way to remove the bias of preferential IOT agreements is to consider, as an IV, 
retail prices that are uniform within the visited market, because such prices are neutral to 
preferential wholesale agreements within the market. An IV including uniform retail prices 
should tell us about cost asymmetries across markets, but it tells nothing regarding cost 
asymmetries within the market. However, it should overcome the bias caused by possible 
IOT preferential agreements. 
 
On the contrary, an IV including discriminatory retail prices reflects the embedded wholesale 
prices. Although it reflects wholesale asymmetries within markets, it is not clear if such 
asymmetries correspond to actual cost asymmetries in the presence of preferential IOT 
agreements. Put differently, it cannot overcome the bias at the wholesale level stemming 
from preferential agreements (e.g. alliance discounts).   
 
In our case, we have retail prices of Nawras, which applies uniform retail policy, and Oman-
Mobile, which applies discriminatory policy. We tried using both as IVs, separately and 
jointly, for wholesale prices charged to Etisalat (the endogenous regressor). In First Stage 
Least Squares (1SLS) regressions, each Omani network has a positive and significant 
coefficient at 1% level, reflecting probably common underlying costs. However, we found 
                                               
116 Marginal cost includes the actual cost of call origination as explained previously. In addition, it includes the actual cost of 
termination if the call is terminated on j’s network, or the perceived cost of termination (e.g. mobile termination rate or 
international settlement rate) if the call is terminated on another network. 
117 Section (2.1.1) describes how international roaming came into existence. In 1996, the GSM Association issued its 
Standard International Roaming Agreement (STIRA), which states that wholesale prices are non-discriminatory. This means j 
should charge same wholesale price to Etisalat or any other home network. Nevertheless, as found in EC (2000), networks 
involve in wholesale discounts, such as preferential prices between roaming alliance members.  
118 Our dataset only includes one side of the IOT net payment, which is Etisalat wholesale costs, or visited networks ’ 
wholesale revenues. 
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that only Nawras can be used as an IV in the 2SLS119. Therefore, Nawras retail prices will be 
used as the IV for the endogenous regressor. 
 
6.3 Results And Discussion 
 
This section presents and discusses the results for estimating Eq. (6.1) and (6.2). First, we 
compare between price results for all observations, low and high visited markets. Second, 
we look at the effect of time related variables. Third, we discuss price effect and own price 
elasticity of demand. Finally, we discuss the results of visited networks characteristics. 
Estimation results are presented in Table (6.3), and marginal effects of policy interaction 
terms are presented in Table (6.4). 
 
In Table (6.3), OLS estimator is used for all observations (model 6a) and for observations in 
low visited markets (model 6b) to demonstrate the sampling problem, using price and time 
related variables as regressors. We then use OLS for observations in highly visited markets 
with different specifications (models 6c-6e). Finally, we use 2SLS estimator for the highly 
visited markets (model 6f), using Nawras retail price as the IV for the (observed) wholesale 
prices charged to Etisalat.  
 
One can see the contradiction of the price coefficients under low versus high visited markets 
(models 6b-6c). The coefficient is positive and significant 120  at 5% level for low visited 
markets, and negative and significant at 5% level for high visited markets. With all 
observations, the coefficient is insignificant (model 6a). 
 
Given our data limitations to find a good weight that should solve the sampling problem 
described in Section (6.1.3), we proceed in this section with models related to the highly 
visited markets, with focus on comparing results under OLS (mainly model 6e) to 2SLS 
(model 6f). 
 
Results for the 1SLS used in estimating the 2SLS are deferred to Chapter (7) which includes 
wholesale price estimations. All can be said about 1SLS in this section is that Nawras IV has 
a positive and significant coefficient at 1% level (with t-value equals 23.46) in explaining the 
                                               
119 See Appendix (D) for the evaluation of the two IVs. 
120  We found the significance of the positive sign in the price coefficient is caused by not controlling for network’ 
characteristics. In other words, if we include the characteristics in the OLS for low visited markets, the price coefficient is 
positive but insignificant (see Appendix E). 
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(endogenous) wholesale prices. The positive sign indicates the correlation between the two 
variables rooted in the common (actual) marginal costs faced by the visited network. 
 
As shown in Table (6.3), time is found insignificant in all models. Etisalat uniform retail 
dummy variable is negative and significant at 10% level with OLS (model 6e) after including 
policy interaction terms. The policy is also significant at 5% level in 2SLS (model 6f). The 
significance of the policy in the demand is not clear here, but its impact will become clear in 
Chapter (8) as it is related to the effectiveness of steering.  
 
The price coefficient increases in significance and magnitude under 2SLS (6f) compared to 
the OLS models. In other words, Nawras IV improves the coefficient on price121. The uniform 
retail prices of Nawras might resemble roamers’ perception on retail prices, as compared to 
the given wholesale prices122.  
 
In model (6f), we have 273 observations with inelastic demand, representing around one 
third of the observations. This contradicts with profit maximizing wholesale price decisions123. 
Nevertheless, it is an improvement compared to model (6e), where almost all the 
observations have inelastic demands. This follows from using the larger price coefficient in 
absolute value with 2SLS compared to OLS, which increases the own price elasticity given 
by Eq. (6.2).  
 
 
  
                                               
121 This improvement is in spite of the loss of observations in model (6f) since Nawras prices are not available for each visited 
network in the dataset.  
122 Etisalat roamers are assumed to be aware of retail prices. Prior to 2010, when prices were discriminatory, if some roamers 
were aware of only one retail price for using a given visited network, they might consider the same price for using the rest of 
networks in the same market. If so, then these roamers would act as if the retail had been uniform. In this case, Nawras uniform 
retail prices better resemble roamers’ perception on prices. 
123 Comparison between OLS and 2SLS in terms of the number of inelastic demands are used in Table III of Berry, et al. 
(1995).  
133 
 
 
18Table (6.3) Simple logit demand models.  
Dependent variable: 
 
  (  )    (  ) 
OLS 2SLS 
All  
Observations 
 
 
(6a) 
Low  
Visited 
Markets 
 
(6b) 
High  
Visited 
Markets 
 
(6c) 
High  
Visited 
Markets  
 
(6d) 
High  
Visited 
Markets 
 
(6e) 
High  
Visited 
 Markets 
 
(6f) 
CONSTANT -4.266*** -3.856*** -4.305*** -5.112*** -5.006*** -3.865*** 
 
 
(0.168) (0.201) (0.253) (0.245) (0.252) (0.332) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.043 -0.102 -0.028 -0.006 -0.007 -0.060 
(0.082) (0.095) (0.125) (0.116) (0.116) (0.129) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-
2011) 
 
-0.349* -0.310 -0.379 -0.328 -0.526* -0.639** 
(0.184) (0.212) (0.282) (0.262) (0.290) (0.319) 
PRICEjt 
(Network own price) 
 
0.012 0.038** -0.056** -0.055*** -0.052** -0.203*** 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) 
Network characteristics: 
 
      
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
cross-owned by Etisalat) 
 
- - - -0.912*** -0.003 -0.342 
- - - (0.285) (0.504) (0.552) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
- - - 0.621*** 0.465* 0.439 
- - - (0.177) (0.248) (0.274) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat prepaid) 
 
- - - 1.328*** 1.092*** 1.042*** 
- - - (0.119) (0.174) (0.195) 
Interaction with POLICY: 
 
      
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
- - - - -1.286** -1.103* 
- - - - (0.610) (0.659) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
- - - - 0.293 0.133 
- - - - (0.353) (0.390) 
CAMELj - - - - 0.407* 0.563** 
- - - - (0.240) (0.266) 
Observations                                       1,927 932 995 995 995 831 
R
2
 0.015 0.039 0.017 0.158 0.164 - 
R
2
 Adjusted 
 
0.0137 0.0360 0.0141 0.153 0.157 - 
Observations with 
Inelastic Demands 
- - - - 993 273 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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With 2SLS (model 6f), the mean of own price elasticity is (-1.185), where the absolute value 
of elasticity declines over the four years (2008-2011). This is caused by higher density of 
inelastic observations over the years124. As a consequence, the distribution of elasticity is 
flatten overtime as shown in Figure (6.1).  
 
The negative trend of own price elasticity can be read as a shift towards inelastic demands, 
which is accompanied by wholesale price decline as demonstrated in Chapter (5) and found 
in Chapter (7). 
 
 
7Figure (6.1) Own price elasticity by year.  
- Based on Eq. (6.2) using the price coefficient in model (6f). 
 
The results regarding visited networks cross-owned by Etisalat imply that cross-owned 
networks reduce the mean utility of Etisalat roamers. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
is negative and significant at 1% level in model (6d). In models (6e) and (6f), where the 
interaction terms enter the model, we found that before the policy, the coefficient is 
insignificant, while after the policy, the coefficient becomes negative and significant at 1% 
level (see Table 6.4).  
                                               
124 The number of observations with inelastic demands is 273. By breaking it by year, we have 51 in 2008, 61 in 2009, 72 in 
2010, and 86 in 2011.  
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The intuition here is that, only after the policy, Etisalat roamers have less mean utility when 
roaming on Etisalat cross-owned networks125.  
 
A possible explanation for the negative utility is that most cross-owned networks are in the 
expansion stage since they are either new or have very low market share due to structural 
problems (unrelated to roaming). The reduction in mean utility is probably caused by 
roaming on networks that have low-coverage (i.e., low quality).  
 
19Table (6.4) Marginal effects on visited networks’ characteristics post Etisalat uniform retail policy. 
Network’s 
Characteristic 
Null Hypothesis 
Relevant 
model 
F-statistics P-value 
Cross-owned by 
Etisalat 
  ̂    ̂    
OLS (6e) 14.05 0.000*** 
2SLS (6f) 16.00 0.001*** 
Alliance to Etisalat   ̂    ̂    
OLS (6e) 9.14 0.003*** 
2SLS (6f) 4.28 0.039** 
With CAMEL   ̂    ̂    
OLS (6e) 83.02 0.000*** 
2SLS (6f) 78.68 0.000*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
- Based on Table (6.3) results. 
 
The alliance dummy variable has a positive and significant coefficient at 1% level in model 
(6d). When the interaction terms enter model (6e), the significance level of alliance becomes 
10% before the policy and 1% level after the policy (see Table 6.4). On the other side, in the 
2SLS (model 6f), alliance is positively related to mean utility, but only significant after the 
policy (at 5% significance level as shown in Table 6.4).  
 
The intuition here is that alliance networks increased the mean utility of Etisalat roamers, 
mainly after the policy. A possible interpretation of this result is that Etisalat chose roaming 
alliance networks that have strong coverage, such that steering towards them (after the 
policy) raises roamers’ utilities126.  
 
The findings regarding alliance networks are similar to the ones regarding networks with 
CAMEL that allow Etisalat prepaid roaming. However, the magnitude of the effect is much 
                                               
125 We shall see in the next chapters that Etisalat steers towards its cross-owned networks; despite they do not give Etisalat 
wholesale discounts. 
126 It could be also possible that roamers choose alliance networks to buy roaming packages for incoming calls and data 
roaming, even if the price for outgoing call is identical for any network in the market. Interdependence between roaming 
services is assumed away as explained in Section (6.1.1). 
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larger with CAMEL, as can be seen in the size of the coefficient in Table (6.3). The dummy 
variable for CAMEL accounts for visited networks that can host Etisalat roamers with prepaid 
subscriptions; thus it increases demand through raising the market size. 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
In the structural demand model, we focus on highly visited markets because of our concern 
that the dataset has sampling problems. Roamers are found price sensitive in highly visited 
markets. These markets seem to be visited by many Etisalat roamers of different types. We 
found visited networks with CAMEL raise the mean utility of roamers more significantly than 
the rest of networks’ characteristics, indicating the presence of prepaid roamers.  
 
On the other hand, the low visited markets have probably certain types of consumers, who 
seem to be price insensitive. In fact, when visited networks’ characteristics are included in 
the estimation for low visited markets, CAMEL is found insignificant before the uniform 
policy, and significant after the policy with positive but small coefficient compared to the 
highly visited markets (see Appendix E). This suggests that low visited markets do not 
significantly host prepaid roamers. We conclude that roamers in those markets have mainly 
postpaid phones, who might be businessmen, journalists or diplomats.  
 
Furthermore, Etisalat preferred networks (alliance and cross-owned) have opposite effects 
on mean utility, where they matter only after the policy. Alliance networks raise mean utility; 
while cross-owned networks reduce it. As the policy enables steering, Etisalat might be 
steering its roamers towards its preferred networks, despite reducing its roamers utility when 
they roam on cross-owned networks.  
 
We used Nawras retail prices to instrument for wholesale prices charged to Etisalat. Nawras 
applies uniform retail prices that vary across markets, and this variation is assumed to proxy 
cost differentials between markets. We think an IV with uniform price overcomes the bias in 
wholesale prices caused by preferential wholesale agreements or any other non-cost based 
reasons, compared to discriminatory retail price. 
 
We employed a structural model to estimate demand for visited networks. The mean own 
price elasticity is found to be (-1.185) in the highly visited markets. For the EEA networks, 
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the figure is (-1.295). Appendix (F) lists the mean own price elasticity of demand for the EEA 
markets, where the majority of those markets have elastic demands.  
 
These results regarding Etisalat roamers’ own price elasticity suggest demand for outbound 
roaming is more elastic than the industry crude studies by EC (2006), GSMA (2008), Europe 
Economics (2008) and CMT (2009) surveyed in Section (2.3.3). However, the focus of those 
industry studies is outbound roaming within the EEA networks, which excludes Etisalat.     
 
Next chapters will explore visited networks’ wholesale prices and steering by Etisalat, taken 
into account visited networks’ characteristics. We make use of the panel structure of the data 
to understand the effect of Etisalat uniform retail price policy. 
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Chapter (7). Visited Networks Wholesale Pricing 
 
In the theoretical chapters (3) and (4), we present pricing games for networks with IOT 
agreements, assuming two countries, each with two networks. With discriminatory retail 
policy, the unilateral wholesale price is predicted to decline by visited networks’ 
substitutability level; and between vertically cross-owned networks, wholesale price is set at 
marginal cost. If the uniform retail policy chosen at the monopoly level, all networks are 
predicted to invest in steering when the substitutability level is high enough to reduce 
wholesale prices, which brings efficiency gains. Then networks form roaming alliances in 
vertical pairs, where each pair engages in reciprocal steering to raise members’ market 
shares. 
 
This chapter tests empirically for the theoretical predictions regarding the IOTs (or wholesale 
prices). The chapter studies the effect of market structure, as a measure of competition, on 
wholesale prices charged by visited networks to Etisalat. In addition, the chapter studies the 
impact of visited networks’ characteristics on pricing, especially how Etisalat is charged by 
its preferred visited networks before and after the existence of its uniform retail policy that 
would enable its traffic steering.   
 
In this chapter, the dependent variable is wholesale price; hence the model shares similarity 
with the 1SLS used in Chapter (6). The model in this chapter does not re-estimate the supply 
model (1SLS), because it is concerned with the effect of market structure on prices; 
therefore, it will consider all observations (both high and low visited markets). 
 
Furthermore, we are interested to see if visited networks operating in the EEA were 
overcharging Etisalat, compared to the rest of networks in the dataset. This is because EEA 
networks experienced the EC roaming regulation, and given unregulated wholesale prices 
charged to Etisalat, EEA networks might involve in spill-over (or waterbed) effect due to their 
regional regulation127.  
 
This chapter is planned as follows. In Section (7.1), the estimation model and hypotheses to 
be tested are presented. Then estimation results are discussed in Section (7.2). The chapter 
concludes in Section (7.3). 
 
                                               
127 Thanks to Professor Tommaso Valletti for this suggestion. 
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7.1 Empirical Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to test the theoretical predictions in light of the impact of Etisalat 
uniform retail policy, relaying on the same dataset described in Chapter (5) and used in 
Chapter (6) for demand estimation. Therefore, we will be using panel regressions. The 
random-effect regression will be looking at the effect of time invariant variables; for instance, 
to test for the spill-over effect in the EEA. Fixed-effects and random-effects models will be 
compared using Hausman test. Due to visited networks entry and exist, the panel is (weakly) 
unbalanced.  
 
The relevant variables used in the estimations of this chapter are listed in Table (7.1) below. 
We use two variables for market structure. The first variable is NETWORKSrt, which is the 
number of active visited networks in market r and year t. This variable is calculated for each 
market by summing up all visited networks (in each year) that sold any roaming unit to 
Etisalat roamers.  
 
The second variable is MULTINETWORKjrt, which is a dummy variable with value one if visited 
network j in market r and year t experienced horizontal merger/acquisition event, or if it owns 
more than one network in the same market128; zero otherwise129. 
 
Networks which own more than one network in the same market (or have multinetworks) 
represent 5.3% of visited networks in the dataset. The dummy variable controls for local 
synergy and thus it is assumed to have the opposite effect to the number of visited networks.  
 
The wholesale price estimation model is given by the following equation.  
  (       )                            
                                     
                                                          
                                      
(         ) (                     ) (         )   
(7) 
                                               
128 This is probably due to licensing reasons in the market. For example, a network has two licensed networks, one with 2G 
technology and one with 3G technology. 
129 As explained in Chapter (5), the data given to us breaks down observations by the name of visited network (which has 
unique TAP code) and years. We do not change how the data looks; instead, we control for multinetworks with a dummy 
variable as suggested by Professor Summit Majumdar. 
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where the    (       ) is the natural log of price; and     is the error term. All variables are as 
listed in Table (7.1). 
 
20Table (7.1) Notations and variables related to estimations. 
Notation  Description 
j Subscript for visited networks, where (j=1,…,552). 
t Subscript for year, where (t=2008,2009,2010,2011). 
r Subscript for geographic market, where (r=1,…,204). 
Time variables  Description 
YEAR Discrete variable for the study years, where (1=2008, 2=2009, 3=2010, 4=2011). 
POLICY 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2010-2011 (when Etisalat implemented 
its uniform retail policy); 0 otherwise.  
Price variables Description 
PRICEjt 
j’s average wholesale price per minute of outgoing call in year t (in constant 
AED with 2007 as base year). 
Visited network’s 
characteristic 
variables  
Description 
CROSSOWNEDjt Dummy variable equals 1 if j is cross-owned by Etisalat in year t; 0 otherwise. 
ALLIANCEj Dummy variable equals 1 if j is a roaming alliance to Etisalat; 0 otherwise. 
CAMELj Dummy variable equals 1 if j allows Etisalat prepaid roaming; 0 otherwise. 
Market structure 
variables  
Description 
NETWORKSrt Number of active visited networks in market r and year t.  
MULTINETWORKjrt 
Dummy variable equals 1 if j owns more than one network in market r and year 
t; 0 otherwise. 
Region variables  Description 
EEAj 
Dummy variable equals 1 if j operates in the European Economic Area (EEA); 0 
otherwise. 
 
Eight regressors in Eq. (7) appear also in the demand estimation of Eq. (6.1). We will be 
reading the results of Eq. (7) in light of the 1SLS results used in demand estimation of Eq. 
(6.1). In other words, the price model in Eq. (7) can be compared to the reduced form of the 
supply model used as the 1SLS. However, there are two main problems that may lead to un-
similar results.  
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First, the 1SLS pools the data, whereas the price model in Eq. (7) uses panel regression. 
Second, the market structure variables, NETWORKSrt and MULTINETWORKjrt, are not assumed 
relevant in the 1SLS (see Section 6.2.4); but they are assumed relevant in this chapter for 
testing the effect of market structure on wholesale competition. We will present results of the 
1SLS next to the random-effect panel regressions that uses same specification130. 
 
The coefficients related to market structure are assumed to be measures of wholesale 
competition. As NETWORKSrt (the number of visited networks) increases, wholesale price is 
expected to decrease, reflecting the rise in the bargaining position of the buyer (Etisalat). 
 
In contrast, MULTINETWORKjrt dummy variable (one if the network owns more than one 
network in the same market; zero otherwise) is expected to do the opposite effect on 
wholesale price, because a mobile network operating multiple networks should relatively 
enjoy more market power.  
 
Furthermore, we explore whether EEA networks overcharged Etisalat due to possible spill-
over effect of the EC roaming regulation. 
 
In addition, we expect the coefficients related to Etisalat preferred networks (cross-owned or 
alliance networks) to be negative. That is, preferred networks are assumed to lower their 
wholesale prices to their affiliate, Etisalat.  
 
Moreover, the fact that some visited networks have CAMEL technology (and allow Etisalat 
prepaid roaming) is expected to be irrelevant in wholesale pricing decision. That is, visited 
networks do not involve in price discrimination at the wholesale level between prepaid and 
postpaid roamers.  
 
7.2 Results And Discussion 
 
This section discusses the results from estimating the wholesale price model for Eq. (7). 
First, results from the 1SLS regression are discussed, and compared to the random-effect 
panel regressions. Then we expand the analysis to focus on wholesale price competition by 
including the market structure variables and the EEA dummy variable using random and 
fixed effect panel regressions.  
                                               
130 Fixed-effect panel regression will drop Nawras IV because Nawras IV does not vary by time (i.e. observed in 2013). 
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Table (7.2) presents the 1SLS in model (7a), which uses pooled OLS for observations in 
highly visited markets. The table also presents the random-effect panel regressions for 
comparison purposes (model 7b for highly visited markets and 7c for all observations). In all 
these models, we use the given wholesale price (in level-form) as the dependent variable, 
which is also used in the 1SLS. Additionally, we include Nawras IV (as a market-level cost 
proxy) 131 and the other explanatory variables used in the 1SLS. 
 
It seems that model (7a) differs because of the choice on the estimator (Pooled OLS versus 
random-effect panel regression) or because of the choice on observations based on type of 
market (highly visited or all markets). The only discrepancy is in the coefficient related to 
cross-owned networks before the policy, which is negative and significant at 10% level. We 
found this is caused by the functional form of the dependant variable. That is, if wholesale 
price is in log-form instead, the coefficient becomes insignificant132.  
 
More importantly, Nawras IV is positive and significant at 1% level in all models of Table 
(7.2). The positive relation confirms the assumption that the two home networks (Etisalat and 
Nawras) are correlated through the actual costs borne by visited networks to handle 
outgoing calls.  
 
Next we expand model (7c) by including the market structure variables and the EEA dummy 
variable to estimate Eq. (7), where the results are presented in Table (7.3). The marginal 
effects of policy interaction terms are presented in Table (7.4). Notice the results from model 
(7c) are similar in significance to model (7d) of Table (7.3).  
 
  
                                               
131 Explanation for using Nawras retail prices as an IV is provided in Section (6.2.4).  
132 The log makes price outliers less significant. Since cross-owned networks are all in developing countries (see Section 5.4), 
the significance of their price perhaps reflects price outliers. 
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21Table (7.2) Wholesale price models with wholesale price in level-form. 
Dependent variable: 
 
PRICEjt 
 
High Visited Markets All observations 
OLS (1SLS) 
 
(7a) 
Random-effect 
 
(7b) 
Random-effect 
 
(7c) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
2.733*** 2.784*** 2.505*** 
(0.314) (0.331) (0.262) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.251* -0.252** -0.284*** 
(0.148) (0.102) (0.073) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-2011) 
 
0.655* 0.685*** 0.462*** 
(0.369) (0.256) (0.177) 
Network characteristics: 
 
   
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is cross-owned by 
Etisalat) 
 
-1.050* -0.208 -0.456 
(0.635) (0.650) (0.578) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is an 
alliance to Etisalat) 
 
0.671** 0.713* 0.370 
(0.315) (0.389) (0.351) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network allows Etisalat 
prepaid) 
 
0.575** 0.471* 0.154 
(0.225) (0.267) (0.222) 
Interaction with POLICY: 
 
   
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
1.513** 0.584 1.073** 
(0.760) (0.574) (0.499) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
-1.124** -1.114*** -1.057*** 
(0.448) (0.307) (0.244) 
CAMELj 
 
-0.489 -0.400* -0.212 
(0.307) (0.217) (0.160) 
NAWRAS IV: 
 
   
NAWRASj 
(Nawras retail price in AED in 2013 for 
roaming on j)  
0.262*** 0.259*** 0.327*** 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.015) 
Observations                                       831 831 1,403 
Visited Networks 241 238 396 
R
2
 0.413 - - 
R
2
adjusted 0.406 - - 
rho                  - 0.541 0.611 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
In Table (7.3) below, one can see that time has a negative and significant coefficient at 1% 
level, which shows the negative trend in real wholesale prices. In model (7g) for instance, 
price declines by 5.2% a year. 
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22Table (7.3) Wholesale price models with wholesale price in log-form for all observations. 
Dependent variable: 
 
Ln(PRICEjt) 
 
Random-effect Fixed-effect 
(7d) (7e) (7f) (7g) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
1.410*** 2.031*** 2.069*** 2.252*** 
(0.074) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.068*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.052*** 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-2011) 
 
0.091** 0.078** 0.078** 0.091*** 
(0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Network characteristics:     
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is cross-
owned by Etisalat) 
 
0.135 -0.058 -0.091 0.099 
(0.142) (0.119) (0.119) (0.333) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is an 
alliance to Etisalat) 
 
0.120 0.036 0.096 - 
(0.094) (0.097) (0.095) - 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network allows 
Etisalat prepaid) 
 
0.035 -0.009 -0.013 - 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) - 
Interaction with POLICY: 
 
    
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
0.277** 0.079 0.079 0.028 
(0.113) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
-0.343*** -0.303*** -0.303*** -0.298*** 
(0.055) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) 
CAMELj 
 
-0.034 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Market structure: 
 
    
NETWORKSrt 
(Number of networks)  
 
-0.120*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.146*** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
MULTINETWORKjrt 
(Dummy=1 if network owns more 
than one network) 
    
0.360*** 0.383*** 0.374*** 0.241** 
(0.089) (0.082) (0.082) (0.115) 
European Economic Area (EEA):     
EEAj 
(Dummy=1 if network operates in 
EEA) 
 
0.040 0.179*** - - 
(0.066) (0.062) - - 
NAWRAS IV: 
 
    
NAWRASj 
(Nawras retail price in AED in 
2013 for roaming on j)  
0.059*** - - - 
(0.004) - - - 
Observations                                       1,403 1,927 1,927 1,927 
Visited Networks 396 549 549 549 
rho                  0.695 0.778 0.780 0.823 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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23Table (7.4) Marginal effects on visited networks’ characteristics post Etisalat uniform retail policy. 
Network’s 
Characteristic 
Null Hypothesis Relevant model F-statistics P-value 
Cross-owned by 
Etisalat 
  ̂    ̂    
Random-effect (7d) 14.11 0.000*** 
Random-effect (7e) 0.04 0.838 
Random-effect (7f) 0.01 0.915 
Fixed-effect (7g) 0.15 0.700 
Alliance to Etisalat   ̂    ̂    
Random-effect (7d) 5.58 0.018** 
Random-effect (7e) 7.68 0.006*** 
Random-effect (7f) 4.78 0.029** 
With CAMEL   ̂    ̂    
Random-effect (7d) 0.00 0.977 
Random-effect (7e) 0.27 0.600 
Random-effect (7f) 0.33 0.564 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
- Based on Table (7.3) results. 
 
On the other hand, the uniform dummy variable has a positive and a negative coefficient in 
all models, with 5% level in the random-effect models and 1% with the fixed-effect model. In 
model (7g) for instance, wholesale price rises by 9.1% after the policy, which undermines the 
effectiveness of Etisalat steering to bring visited networks to the negotiation table. 
 
It is clear from Table (7.3) that all visited networks characteristics are insignificant in 
explaining the wholesale price before the policy. After the policy, some of the preferred 
networks become significant (cross-owned and alliance), while networks with CAMEL are 
still insignificant.  
 
After the policy, cross-owned networks are only significant in model (7d), with 1% 
significance level (see Table 7.4). Model (7d) suggests that cross-owned networks 
overcharged Etisalat. We can see that this result holds only when Nawras IV is included in 
the regression. A possible interpretation is provided below. 
 
We think cross-owned networks were in the expansion phase of their network roll-out, so 
their priority should be getting financed. Model (7d) suggests that once we control for 
market-level costs (with the help of Nawras IV), some cross-owned networks, perhaps with 
more need for finance, overcharged Etisalat when Etisalat became in charge of substitution 
between visited networks (i.e. via steering after the policy).  
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All results regarding cross-owned networks in Table (7.3) point to one conclusion: cross-
owned networks do not offer wholesale discount to Etisalat. This suggests non-cooperative 
pricing behaviour by the cross-owned networks, which is contrary to our theoretical 
predictions, despite Etisalat’s ability to steer after the uniform policy133.  
 
On the other hand, after the policy, Etisalat alliance networks lowered their wholesale prices 
significantly in the random-effect models (at least with 5% level as in Table 7.4). This is 
confirmed by the fixed-effect model, which shows that after the policy, the alliance networks 
reduced wholesale prices by 29.8% (at 1% significance level). The institution here is that 
alliance networks involved in preferential wholesale pricing with Etisalat when Etisalat is able 
to steer.   
 
With respect to networks with CAMEL, we conclude that allowing prepaid roaming does not 
matter in the setting of wholesale prices, before or after the policy. This result is in 
accordance with the fact that visited networks did not price discriminate at the wholesale 
level for hosting Etisalat prepaid/postpaid subscribers. 
 
Table (7.3) suggests that market structure matters in the setting of wholesale prices. The 
number of active visited networks decreases the wholesale price at 1% significance level in 
all the models. This result reflects wholesale price competition between (substitutable) 
visited networks, because Etisalat can increase its bargaining position. In model (7g) for 
example, we conclude that the price declines by 14.6% for each extra visited network. 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the dummy variable for horizontal multinetworks (one if 
visited network owns more than one network within same market; zero otherwise) has a 
positive coefficient, which is significant at 1% level with all the random-effect models, and 
5% with the fixed-effect model. Owning more than one network in the same market is 
assumed to raise market power, which does the opposite effect of the number of visited 
networks. In model (7g) for example, we conclude that the price rises by 24.1% for visited 
networks with horizontal ownership.  
 
The coefficient on the EEA dummy variable (one if EEA; zero otherwise) is positive and 
significant in model (7e) at 1% level134. The positive relation associated with being an EEA 
network and wholesale price might reflect spill-over effect.  
                                               
133 In spite of not getting wholesale discount, Etisalat steers towards its cross-owned networks, as predicted by the steering 
model in Chapter (8). 
134 The sing and significance level of the coefficient do not change at different specifications, starting from the specifications 
as in model (7e), then gradually removing each regressor except EEA. 
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However, comparing to model (7d), the above result is true only if Nawras IV is excluded 
from the model. Nawras IV is a market-level cost proxy, but at the same time Nawras is not 
immune from possible EEA spill-over effect, because, similar to Etisalat, Nawras operates 
outside the EEA135. 
 
The high wholesale price associated with EEA networks might reflect higher actual marginal 
costs in EEA markets, for which we have no cost data to control for. An ideal way to test for 
spill-over in EEA networks is to compare wholesale prices before the EC roaming regulation 
to after the regulation. This would require data on prices before 2007, the year when 
regulation entered into force. Given the study period in our dataset is post EU regulation, we 
cannot judge if EEA networks involved in spill-over. 
 
Finally, we compare between the random and fixed effect models (7f and 7g) 136 . The 
Hausman test (with the null hypothesis that no difference between the estimated coefficients 
of fixed-effect and random-effect models) has a chi2 of 29.5 (significant at 1% level). Hence, 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude the fixed-effect model is preferred over the 
random-effect model. Nevertheless, as obvious in Table (7.3), there is no contradiction in the 
significance level or sign of the coefficients under both the random and fixed effect models. 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter studies the effects of market structure on wholesale prices (IOTs) set by visited 
networks to Etisalat. The chapter also explores the effects of visited networks characteristics 
on wholesale pricing, and whether EEA networks overcharged Etisalat.  
 
A key finding is that wholesale prices decline by the number of visited networks. An 
additional network reduces price by 14.6%, reflecting the increase in Etisalat negotiation 
ability. This finding confirms our theoretical models (in Chapters 3 and 5) that networks are 
substitutes, where substitutability is our measure of competition that drives down wholesale 
                                               
135 If, instead, Nawras IV (weather logged or non-logged) is regressed on EEA (with or without the rest of regressors), EEA is 
found to be have a positive and significant coefficient, at 1% level.  
136 These results do not change in significance level if ALLIANCEj and CAMELj are excluded from model (7f) such that models 
(7f) and (7g) have the same regressors. 
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price. On the contrary, the existing theoretical literature predicts that wholesale price would 
rise with the number of visited networks137. 
 
Wholesale competition in IOT agreements is also found in some of the competition analyses 
carried out by the European NRAs (i.e., Austria, Italy, and Spain), as summarized in Table 
(2.1).  
 
In addition, we found merger/acquisition or any form of horizontal ownership permits 
overcharging. Moreover, networks operating in EEA are associated with higher wholesale 
price, which can be caused by waterbed effect due to the EC roaming regulation, or due to 
having higher actual costs. 
 
Within all visited networks’ characteristics, only alliance networks offer wholesale price 
discount, where the discount is offered only after the policy. This result may suggest that 
steering by Etisalat is effective, as shall be explored next chapter. Wholesale discount is also 
found by the NRAs in Austria and Spain, where the Austrian NRA found significant 
wholesale discounts given to alliance networks (see Table 2.1). 
 
Unlike alliance networks, cross-owned networks do not lower their wholesale prices. Such 
non-cooperative pricing might be explained by their financial needs for network-expansion. 
In addition, CAMEL technologies do not matter in wholesale pricing. This is interpreted as a 
reflection of non-price discrimination at the wholesale level that is known in this industry.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
137 See Section (2.3.1), where theoretical models in existing literature use demand that makes visited networks appear as 
perfect complements. 
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Chapter (8). Effectiveness Of Steering 
 
 
When a home network obtains traffic steering technology, it can affect the market shares of 
visited networks. We think three conditions are necessary for steering to be effective. The 
first is that the roamer does not obstruct steering, which means his handset must be on 
automatic mode. This is assumed to be the case when the retail price is uniform138, and the 
roamer cares mainly about the final price he pays. Second, the roamer is in coverage 
overlapping areas, where visited networks are substitutable. Third, there are efficiency gains 
to justify the home network’s investment decision in the steering technology. 
 
In Section (4.3), we modelled a game whereby all the three conditions are met. When visited 
networks are substitutable and home networks set uniform retail price at the monopoly level, 
wholesale prices equal the monopoly price since undercutting does not raise market share. 
In equilibrium, all home networks invest in steering for efficiency gains, and wholesale prices 
decline as a consequence. The game also predicts forming roaming alliances in vertical 
pairs, where each pair engages in reciprocal steering to raise the market shares of alliance 
members. 
 
Given data before and after the uniform retail pricing policy, the aim of this chapter is to help 
us explore the steering behaviours by Etisalat, which affects visited networks market shares. 
Although Etisalat owns steering technologies139, we lack prior information on its success and 
thus we try to explore the effectiveness of steering in this chapter. 
 
Because steering manipulates the market shares of visited networks, the dependent variable 
in this chapter is market share. The model in this chapter does not re-estimate the demand 
for visited networks (as in Chapter 6), because it is concerned with the effectiveness of 
steering by the home network in response to relative price; henceforth it can consider all 
observations. 
 
This chapter is planned as follows. Section (8.1) presents the estimation model and 
hypotheses to be tested. Section (8.2) discusses the estimation results. The chapter 
concludes in Section (8.3). 
 
                                               
138 If the retail price is discriminatory, the rational consumer can select manually between visited networks based on price and 
non-price characteristics.  
139 This statement was communicated verbally by Etisalat. 
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8.1 Empirical Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to test the theoretical predictions in light of the impact of Etisalat 
uniform retail policy, relaying on the same dataset described in Chapter (5) and used in 
Chapters (6) and (7). The dependent variable in this chapter is market shares. 
 
The market shares are calculated without the assumptions made on market size used in 
Section (6.2.2). That is, j’s market share equals the quantity of j divided by j’s market 
quantities, in each year. We will use fixed and random effect panel regressions for all 
observations. The relevant variables used in the estimations are listed in Table (8.1) below.  
 
The market shares variable is a proportion variable distributed on the interval [0,1]. We make 
use of the logistic transformation in order to map the variable to the real line. The 
transformed shares will remove observations with extreme values (i.e. zero and one), which 
is in line with the aim of the model to understand market share allocation within markets. The 
market share model for estimation is given by 
  (
    
      
)                                 
                                     
                                                          
                          
(         ) (                     ) (         )   
(8) 
where     is the error term; and all variables are as listed in Table (8.1).  
 
Notice the use of price relative to the market arithmetic140 mean, instead of the given price. 
In Appendix (E), we found that changes in market share (after the uniform retail policy, 
assumingly due to Etisalat steering) depend on the relative market price, not on the given 
price141. Therefore, the relative price is assumed to matter for relative quantities, from which 
market share is derived. 
 
                                               
140 Results are very similar if, instead, the geometric mean is used. 
141 We tried the estimation with the given price instead of relative price, and found the price coefficients insignificant. In 
Appendix (E), we re-estimate the demand model as in Eq. (6.1) with the interaction term of price and uniform policy dummy 
variable. The given price is only significant before the policy for networks operating in highly visited markets, and insignificant 
(before or after the policy) for networks in low visited markets and for all observations. However, with the relative price instead, 
price is insignificant (before or after the policy) in the highly visited markets, but significant only after the policy in the low visited 
markets and in all observations. To conclude, we think the given price suits the demand model as it represents roamers’ 
response to price (i.e. demand-side substitution), while relative price suits the steering model as it represents Etisalat’s 
response to price (i.e. supply-side substitution). 
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24Table (8.1) Notations and variables related to estimations. 
Notation  Description 
j Subscript for visited networks, where (j=1,…,552). 
t Subscript for year, where (t=2008,2009,2010,2011). 
r Subscript for geographic market, where (r=1,…,204). 
Time variables  Description 
YEAR Discrete variable for the study years, where (1=2008, 2=2009, 3=2010, 4=2011). 
POLICY 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2010-2011 (when Etisalat implemented 
its uniform retail policy); 0 otherwise.  
Price variables Description 
RPRICEjrt 
j’s average wholesale price per minute of outgoing call relative to the 
arithmetic mean of its market r in year t (in constant AED with 2007 as base 
year). 
Visited network’s 
characteristic 
variables  
Description 
CROSSOWNEDjt Dummy variable equals 1 if j is cross-owned by Etisalat in year t; 0 otherwise. 
ALLIANCEj Dummy variable equals 1 if j is a roaming alliance to Etisalat; 0 otherwise. 
CAMELj Dummy variable equals 1 if j allows Etisalat prepaid roaming; 0 otherwise. 
Market shares 
variables  
Description 
     j’s market share in minutes of outgoing calls in market r and year t. 
 
The use of relative price should help in interpreting the effectiveness of steering. If market 
shares respond to changes in relative price during the uniform policy, then steering by 
Etisalat is effective, given roamers are not overriding steering with manual network selection. 
That is, if Etisalat effectively steers (after the policy), then the coefficient on the interaction of 
policy and relative price is expected to be significant and negative. This hypothesis is 
explained below. 
 
With discriminatory retail pricing policy, the retail price to roam on network j reflects j’s 
wholesale price. If the wholesale price is negatively related to market shares, then roamers 
demand-side substitution is effective142. With uniform retail pricing policy, the retail price to 
roam on network j does not reflect j’s wholesale price; hence the roamer is indifferent 
                                               
142 However, demand-side substitution is related to the given price as in Eq. (6.1), not to the relative price.  
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between networks price-wise. In this case, visited networks have no reason to undercut if 
steering is absent because undercutting does not raise market shares.  
 
Based on the above, the effectiveness of a home network’s steering should be measured by 
how much it is able to replace its roamers’ demand-side substitution with its supply-side 
substitution through its ability to steer roamers to the cheapest network. In our case, the 
effectiveness of Etisalat steering should be known by how much Etisalat is able to cause 
downward pressures on relative wholesale prices during the years when the retail price is 
uniform. 
 
The coefficients of the interaction terms related to visited networks’ characteristics are also 
relevant in knowing if Etisalat steers to its preferred networks. The hypotheses in this regard 
are made in light of Chapter (7) results, where we learned how visited networks charged 
Etisalat. Etisalat pays lower wholesale prices to its alliance networks after the policy. Thus, 
we expect the coefficient of the interaction of policy and alliance to be positive. On the 
contrary, Etisalat gets no wholesale discount from its cross-owned networks. Thus, we 
expect the coefficient of the interaction of policy and cross-ownership to be negative. 
 
On the other hand, networks that allow Etisalat prepaid roaming (with CAMEL) are expected 
to have higher market shares, regardless of steering, because they affect market size. For 
example, Etisalat cannot steer its prepaid roamers to a visited network that does not have 
CAMEL technology. 
 
Market structure variables are not included in Eq. (8) because, similar to the demand given 
by Eq. (6.1), they are assumed to be correlated with the error term. Nonetheless, Eq. (8) 
may still have endogeneity problem because the relative price enters as a regressor and can 
be correlated with the error term. We will try instrumenting for it with the use of Nawras IV. 
 
8.2 Results And Discussion 
 
Results for market share estimations are provided in Table (8.2); where the marginal effects 
post the uniform policy are presented in Table (8.3). The Hausman test results recommend 
the fixed-effect models over the random-effect models. The Chi2 is (1598.59) for models (8a) 
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and (8c); and (61.37) for models (8b) and (8d); which are both significant at 1% level143. We 
discuss the results of model (8d) below, with reference to the other models only if they differ 
significantly. 
 
As can be seen in Table (8.2), time is insignificant, reflecting no trend in market shares. In 
model (8d), the dummy for Etisalat uniform retail policy and the relative price are separately 
insignificant, but their interaction term has a negative coefficient which is significant at 1% 
level144 (see Table 8.3).  
 
Notice that the policy and the relative price, independently, are significant only if their 
interaction term is excluded, (i.e. models 8a and 8c, where their coefficients are negative 
and significant at least at 5% level). In other words, the interaction term of those two 
variables (i.e. their combination) is what only matters in market shares compared to the 
variables independently.  
 
The above results on relative price suggest that only during the policy, a visited network’s 
market share is responsive to the wholesale price it chooses145. The question here is why 
the choice between visited networks (i.e. market shares) is responsive to wholesale prices 
only after the retail price became uniform, where roamers became assumingly indifferent 
price-wise. One possible answer is that Etisalat exercised steering. If it did not, the relative 
price should remain insignificant. Therefore, we conclude that, after the policy, Etisalat can 
effectively steer. 
 
To demonstrate the effect of steering on market shares after the policy, consider the case of 
a hypothetical market with three visited networks. Assume the networks are symmetric in 
marginal costs and all characteristics. Assume the status quo is such that each network sets 
the price per minute at 1 AED.  
 
If network j offers a 10% wholesale discount to Etisalat, j’s relative price is reduced by 7% 
(from 1 to 0.93). The marginal effect of such action is 0.052, which is the product of the 
change in relative price (i.e. -7%) and the coefficient of the relative price interaction term (-
0.761) in model (8d). By adding 0.052 to the logistically transformed market share (the 
                                               
143 These results do not change in significance level if ALLIANCEj and CAMELj are excluded from model (8a and 8b) such that 
all models have the same regressors. 
144 This result does not change significantly with or without controlling for visited networks characteristics.  
145 This can mean roamers did not care about prices when it was discriminatory. The demand models provided in Appendix 
(E) show that the relative price is insignificant in highly visited markets, but significant in low visited markets and in all 
observations only after the policy. However, when the given price is used instead, the given price is significant only before the 
policy in highly visited markets, but insignificant in low visited markets and in all observations. We conclude that roamers care 
about prices during the discriminatory period, assuming the given price suits demand estimation because roamers are sensitive 
to the level of prices. 
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dependent variable in Eq. (8)), we predict that network j will raise its market share by 3.5%. 
Table (8.4) demonstrates this hypothetical example. 
 
 
25Table (8.2) Market share models for all observations. 
Dependent variable: 
  (
   
     
) 
Random-effect Fixed-effect 
(8a) (8b) (8c) (8d) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
-1.197*** -1.834*** -0.818*** -1.366*** 
(0.207) (0.269) (0.187) (0.251) 
YEAR 0.018 0.016 0.008 0.006 
 
 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-2011) 
 
-0.364*** 0.498* -0.338*** 0.427 
(0.120) (0.263) (0.118) (0.263) 
PRICEARjrt 
(Network own price relative 
to arithmetic mean) 
 
-0.491*** 0.151 -0.404** 0.144 
(0.146) (0.227) (0.161) (0.233) 
Network characteristics:     
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
cross-owned by Etisalat) 
 
-2.056*** -1.826*** 1.255 1.423 
(0.457) (0.460) (1.168) (1.165) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
0.386 0.355 - - 
(0.355) (0.354) - - 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat prepaid) 
 
1.120*** 1.110*** - - 
(0.218) (0.217) - - 
Interaction with POLICY: 
 
    
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
0.707** 0.506* 1.059*** 0.873*** 
(0.295) (0.299) (0.295) (0.300) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
0.239 0.237 0.264 0.259 
(0.169) (0.169) (0.168) (0.167) 
CAMELj 
 
 
0.186* 0.186* 0.141 0.141 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107) 
PRICEARjrt 
 
- -0.858*** - -0.761*** 
- (0.233) - (0.234) 
Observations                                       1,706 1,706 1,706 1,706 
Visited Networks 499 499 499 499 
rho                  0.805 0.806 0.860 0.860 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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26Table (8.3) Marginal effects on networks’ characteristics and relative prices post Etisalat uniform 
retail policy.  
Network’s Characteristic 
And Relative Price 
Null Hypothesis Relevant model F-statistics P-value 
Cross-owned by Etisalat   ̂    ̂    
Random-effect (8b) 10.66 0.001*** 
Fixed-effect (8d) 3.96 0.047** 
Alliance to Etisalat   ̂    ̂    Random-effect (8b) 2.80 0.094* 
With CAMEL   ̂    ̂    Random-effect (8b) 36.80 0.000*** 
PRICEARjrt   ̂     ̂    
Random-effect (8b) 20.37 0.000*** 
Fixed-effect (8d) 12.69 0.000*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
- Based on Table (8.2). 
 
 
27Table (8.4) Hypothetical example of wholesale undercutting in a market with three visited networks.  
Relevant variables Status quo 
Undercut 
by 10% 
PRICEjt 
(Network’s own wholesale price) 
1.00 0.90 
Market arithmetic mean price 1.00 0.97 
PRICEARjrt 
(Network’s own wholesale price relative to the market arithmetic mean) 
1.00 0.93 
   (Network’s own market share) 0.33 0.35 
   (    ) 0.50 0.53 
   (   (    )) -0.69 -0.64 
Gain in market share - 3.5% 
 
 
Turning to visited network’s characteristics, model (8d) suggests that cross-owned networks 
are insignificant in the model before the policy; but become significant after the policy. In 
fact, after the policy, their market shares are raised at 5% significance level (see Table 8.3). 
The result is similar in the other fixed-effect model, (8c).  
 
Similarly, it is obvious that after the policy, the random effect models show an improvement 
in market share for the cross-owned networks (e.g. significant at 1% level in model 8b; see 
Table 8.3).  
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As found in Chapter (7), cross-owned networks do not offer wholesale discount to Etisalat. 
Nevertheless, the results on cross-owned networks after the policy suggest that Etisalat 
steers towards its cross-owned networks after the policy. Etisalat probably steers to its 
cross-owned networks to help financing them in their expansion stage. There can be other 
reasons for which we have no information to control for, related probably to reciprocal IOT 
agreements where we observe only one side of it. 
 
However, the contradiction in results between fixed and random effect models is for cross-
owned networks before the policy. The fixed-effect models, before the policy, suggest that 
cross-owned dummy variable is insignificant; while the random-effect models suggest it is 
significant at 1% level, with negative coefficient. An interpretation is provided below. 
 
We believe there is heterogeneity in visited networks market shares, especially by knowing 
that some networks, such as Etisalat cross-owned, inherited very low market shares 
because of structural reasons that are unrelated to roaming. For example, cross-owned 
networks have either a new license or have very low market share in local subscribers. The 
random-effect estimator assumes the intercept is a random variable, which is common to all 
networks. Therefore, the heterogeneity problem in market shares magnifies under the 
random-effect estimator. This is reflected in the highly significant negative coefficient of the 
cross-owned networks (before the policy) in the market share model, which is large in 
magnitude. 
 
In contrast, the fixed-effect estimator allows each network to have its own intercept; hence 
heterogeneity in market shares is taken into account. This is reflected in the insignificant 
coefficient of the cross-owned networks (before the policy) in the market share model.  
 
In addition, the fixed-effect models (8c) and (8d) show the coefficient related to the alliance 
dummy variable as insignificant; but we cannot compare the effect to the case before the 
policy (i.e. alliance dummy variable is time invariant). In contrast, the random-effect models 
(8a) and (8b) show a significant coefficient for the interaction term of the policy and the 
alliance dummy variable (at 10% level in model 8b; see Table 8.3). After the policy, the 
random-effect models show an improvement in alliance networks’ market shares, which 
might be caused by Etisalat steering, given the roamer is indifferent price-wise and alliance 
networks significantly charge lower wholesale price as found in Chapter (7). 
 
With regards to visited networks with CAMEL, the fixed-effect models show no impact of this 
characteristic on market shares after the policy. In the random-effect models, the policy 
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slightly improves the coefficient’s size of the CAMEL dummy variable. The related 
coefficients have the same significance (1%) level before and after the policy (see model 8b 
in Table 8.3). This is interpreted as networks with CAMEL can raise market size by hosting 
prepaid roamers; and if steering exists (after the policy), steering would be limited to prepaid 
roamers and the networks with CAMEL.  
 
Furthermore, similar to the treatment for the price endogeneity problem in the demand 
estimation (Section 6.2.4), we tried instrumenting for the relative price used in Eq. (8) with 
Nawras IV in the random-effect models (8a and 8b)146. In the 1SLS regressions, Nawras IV 
is found insignificant in explaining the relative price. Predictably, Nawras IV does not suit as 
an instrument for the relative price147. 
 
In our case, given no other available instruments, it is not feasible to solve the endogeneity 
problem when relative price is used as an endogenous regressor. We maintain the relative 
price in estimating Eq. (8) because the relative price is assumed to test if market share 
allocation (via steering) responds to wholesale price undercutting148. 
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, we modelled market shares to explore for steering, taking advantage of the 
dataset on market shares and wholesale prices which are assumed to matter in steering and 
roaming alliance formation. Additionally, given uniform retail enables steering, the panel 
structure of the dataset makes use of the uniform retail policy to infer about steering. 
 
The existing empirical literature overlooked the importance of the uniform retail in inference 
about steering or roaming alliance (see Section 2.3.3). Rieck et al (2005) found that only 
Vodafone roaming alliance networks involve in strategic alliance, relying on retail price 
information. In the European NRAs competition analyses, the surveys by the NRAs in 
Finland and Spain found steering is effective (see Table 2.1). 
 
                                               
146 The IV is time invariant; hence it cannot be used with fixed-effect model. Nawras IV interaction with the policy was also 
tried out for model (8b). 
147 This is not surprising, because the IV is supposed to pick up cost differentials that are reflected in prices, but in the case of 
relative prices, price differentials are minimized (i.e. price is standardised as it is divided by the mean). To confirm, we re-
estimated the 1SLS for the demand given by Eq. (6.1) using the relative price instead of the given price. In this case, Nawras IV 
does not work neither. 
148 As explained in Section (8.1), relative price is what matters for relative quantities. 
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In the steering model of this chapter, before the policy (when the retail price is 
discriminatory), roamers choice between visited networks does not matter with regards to 
the relative price. After the policy (when the retail price is uniform), the choice between 
visited networks is significantly sensitive to relative wholesale pricing. We believe steering by 
Etisalat is behind this result, as explained below. 
 
With uniform retail price, wholesale undercutting by visited network j does not raise j’s 
market share through roamers’ demand-side substitution because the retail price for roaming 
on j does not reflect j’s wholesale price. This leaves us with the possibility that the supply-
side substitution (i.e. Etisalat steering) exists and is effective because reduction in relative 
wholesale price significantly raises market share. 
 
Steering by Etisalat is found noticeable towards its alliance and cross-owned networks. After 
the policy, Etisalat preferred networks (alliance and cross-owned) experienced 
improvements in their market shares, particularly the cross-owned networks.  
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Chapter (9). Conclusion 
 
Mobile international roaming is a hot topic in the telecommunications industry, particularity in 
the EU where international roaming raised competition concerns that led to price regulation. 
The NRAs that studied their wholesale market concluded that the market was competitive; 
however, the EC was concerned that reductions in wholesale prices were not passed on to 
consumers. The EC was also concerned that prices (retail and wholesale) remained 
unjustifiably high with no sign of decline. 
 
A possible reason for the competition concerns is the high consumers’ switching costs that 
made retail prices unjustifiably high. Sources of switching costs include the inconvenience to 
use the outside options (e.g. public payphones or visitor-SIM card), the absence of mobile 
number portability at the retail market, and probably the roamers’ temporary nature of visit.    
However, the European NRAs competition analyses and the theoretical literature mainly 
focused on the wholesale market, which is also the focus of this thesis. 
 
This thesis studies the economics of mobile international roaming with emphasis on visited 
networks’ wholesale competition in hosting the visiting subscriber of their IOT-agreement 
partners. Areas tackled in the thesis are similar to the ones tackled by the existing theoretical 
literature. In addition, the thesis uses a dataset on Etisalat outbound roaming to test the 
theoretical predictions.  
 
All the existing published papers on the economics of international roaming assume uniform 
retail price. This thesis demonstrates that using such assumption in visited networks’ 
optimization problems leads to results that are inconsistent with wholesale competition, for 
example the number of visited networks increases wholesale price. The source of such 
inconsistency is the fact that visited networks appear in the demand as (perfect) 
complements. 
 
We compare equilibria under the two different assumptions on retail pricing policy (uniform 
and discriminatory). As found in Proposition (3.1), the discriminatory retail price suits for 
modelling wholesale competition, because visited networks appear in the demand as 
substitutes and price equilibria are in accordance with competition models.  
 
Wholesale competition is found in our empirical estimations on the effect of market structure 
on wholesale price (Chapter 7). We found that the number of visited networks, as a measure 
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of wholesale competition, significantly reduces wholesale prices. In addition, horizontal 
ownership (e.g. merger) enables visited networks to raise wholesale prices.   
 
In addition, our base model predicts that a nation’s (unweighted) welfare can be enhanced 
by (retail and wholesale) price reduction, supporting the argument for price regulation. 
Nonetheless, because of the cross-border nature of the IOT agreements, price regulation 
requires the cooperation of the relevant NRAs. 
 
Another policy implication is the use of a structural model for demand estimation (Chapter 6), 
similar to our simple logit model, to derive the own price elasticity that is crucial in industry’s 
impact assessment analyses on the EC roaming regulation. A future industry assessment 
can consider a European home network, say Vodafone-UK, to study quantities and prices149 
related to its outbound roamers within the EU. Of course, including information on Vodafone-
UK’s retail pricing policy (discriminatory or uniform) and information on Vodafone-UK’s 
relationship with visited networks (e.g. cross-owned or roaming alliance) will help in 
estimating the demands for visited networks.  
 
Our market size calculation can be used in future demand estimation, but with better 
information on, for example, the demographics of Vodafone-UK’s roamers in each visited 
market. Better information can allow for sophisticated demand estimation models, such as 
the random coefficients logit.  
 
The instrumental variable method used in our demand estimation can be suited for future 
research. In our experiment, we found that uniform retail prices are better instruments 
compared to discriminatory prices, which is interpreted as uniform prices overcoming the 
bias in wholesale preferential agreements.  
 
The two assumptions on the retail policy (discriminatory or uniform) lead to opposite results 
with regards to the incentive for vertical cross-ownership. At one hand, with discriminatory 
policy, the incentive for cross-ownership exists (Proposition 4.1). But with the uniform policy 
on the other hand, such incentive does not exist (Proposition 4.2). In the cross-ownership 
games (either with discriminatory or uniform retail policy), it is predicted that vertically cross-
owned networks charge internally preferential wholesale prices.  
 
                                               
149 Data on wholesale prices charged to Vodafone-UK may better suit the demand estimation for visited networks compared to 
Vodafone-UK’s retail prices if those retail prices are based on zones (e.g. a price to roam in EU and a price to roam outside 
EU) such that they lack enough variation for analysis. 
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However, empirically (Chapter 7), we found that Etisalat cross-owned networks do not offer 
preferential wholesale prices to Etisalat. We looked for the nature of cross-owned networks 
to seek an interpretation. All of these networks operate in developing countries, where 
penetration is relatively low; and many of them are new in their markets or/and have low 
market shares in local subscription. Therefore, these networks may be in the expansion 
phase; hence behaving non-cooperatively. 
 
After Etisalat uniform retail policy, Etisalat roamers are found to have negative mean utility 
by roaming on cross-owned networks, probably due to their low-quality of coverage. 
Paradoxically, after the policy, cross-owned networks significantly improved their market 
shares. This suggests that Etisalat exercise steering towards its cross-owned networks. 
Given data limitation, we do not know why Etisalat would steer towards its cross-owned 
networks despite, in return, not getting wholesale discount.   
 
By Proposition (4.3), all home networks are predicted to invest in steering technology for 
efficiency gains when substitutability is high enough to drive down wholesale prices. The 
roaming alliance model predicts that mutual steering between allied networks can be self-
sustained given no incentive to deviate. Proposition (4.4) predicts that networks will engage 
in roaming alliance pairing, because joining a roaming alliance is a dominant strategy to 
each network. The equilibrium is a prisoner dilemma situation where the status quo profit is 
reduced by the sunk cost of steering investment.  
 
In exploration for steering in our dataset (Chapter 8), we conclude that steering by Etisalat is 
effective because, after its uniform retail policy (where roamers are assumed indifferent 
price-wise), visited networks significantly reduced wholesale prices to gain market share. 
Additionally, Etisalat roaming alliance networks are found to offer lower wholesale prices to 
Etisalat only after the policy (Chapter 7). The improvement in their market shares after the 
policy is interpreted as a result of steering by Etisalat. 
 
All the equilibria in the games of preferential wholesale agreements do not lead to exclusive 
IOT agreements, because substitutability of visited networks is assumed to be bounded. 
This is reflected in the dataset, where Etisalat increases its IOT-agreement partners every 
year during the study period in spite of the existence (and the rise) of preferred visited 
networks. 
 
Given the role of net payments in all the games of the preferential wholesale agreements, 
we expect large networks (e.g. in market size) would prefer to be preferential partners to 
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minimize negative net payments. To understand the choice of preferential partner, an 
extension for future work is to consider asymmetry in networks in terms of market size, 
marginal cost, and the number of networks in a country. 
 
We ignored network-coverage decisions, relying on assuming such decisions are only 
relevant for home subscribers, not for hosting temporary roamers. Future work may consider 
an investment game to improve coverage in order to capture visitors in areas such as 
airports, learning from the model developed by Ambjørnsen et al (2011).  
 
Additional information on visited networks should improve our empirical estimations. The age 
of mobile networks can help control for networks in their early phase of expansion, in which 
case, those networks can rely on unregulated wholesale prices (e.g. IOTs) as interpreted for 
Etisalat cross-owned networks. Moreover, prices before the year 2007 can help test if there 
is waterbed effect caused by the EC roaming regulation. In addition, a visited network 
market share in local subscribers should be informative about its market share in roaming. If 
the network is dominant in the local market, it should have higher coverage or quality and 
hence higher share in hosting visitors. 
 
All empirical models in this thesis consider quantities and wholesale prices related to the 
service of roaming outgoing calls, because among roaming services, the service of outgoing 
calls is assumed to be exposed to the effects of the shift in Etisalat retail policy. The service 
of outgoing calls was also the focus of the NRAs’ analyses in the EU for the wholesale 
market of international roaming.  
 
We expect to have similar results if market share estimation is made for the other roaming 
services separately (i.e. incoming calls, SMS and data roaming). This is so because market 
shares of those independent services are found highly correlated due to demand-side or 
supply-side substitution (via home network steering) related to price, or non-price reasons 
(e.g. the quality of network-coverage).  
 
Future research may employ a model that comprehends all the roaming services. Retail 
roaming packages (e.g. Etisalat’s incoming calls and data roaming) should also be 
considered in future research. Instrumental variables can be used for each roaming service 
separately (e.g. Nawras’ retail prices for SMS as IV for SMS wholesale prices charged to 
Etisalat). 
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Nevertheless, some data problems may arise when expanding estimations to the other 
roaming services. As seen in our dataset with incoming calls, wholesale prices would include 
many observations with zero or near zero prices, because visited networks get compensated 
from international settlement rates. Moreover, with data roaming, the roamer may face 
difficulty in measuring his usage150.  
 
The implications of the net payment for the IOT-agreement partners are deemed to be the 
cause of all the incentives in the games of cross-ownership, steering and roaming alliance 
formation. However, our dataset is about Etisalat outbound roaming, i.e. Etisalat’s IOT out-
payments. If data on inbound roaming (i.e. foreign subscribers roaming on Etisalat network 
inside the UAE) is available, we would have Etisalat’s IOT in-payments. Information on the 
two sides of IOT net payments should enable investigating the determinants of IOTs (e.g. 
the level of IOTs), learning from the empirical model by Wright (1999). Additionally, 
information on the retail policy of Etisalat IOT-agreement partners is relevant, especially 
whether Etisalat is considered a roaming alliance at the side of those partners. Information 
on the two sides of an IOT net payment should enable testing for steering reciprocity in order 
to understand the behaviour of roaming alliances, as approached by Rieck et al (2005). 
 
Furthermore, the observed wholesale prices (IOTs) charged by the visited networks to 
Etisalat may be affected by Etisalat’s non-roaming interconnection agreements with those 
visited networks, such as the agreement of international settlement rates. Despite the 
independence of the IOT and the international settlement rate agreements, the bargaining 
positions of the parties involved can affect any wholesale price they choose.  
 
The theoretical models in this thesis assume monopoly retail, which is thought to be 
plausible if the market does not have mobile number portability, as with our case in the UAE. 
However, many markets have mobile number portability, where retail competition for 
subscribers may influence international roaming retail offering. A good example is the market 
in Saudi Arabia where mobile number portability exists. The new entrant Zain started offering 
free incoming calls for roamers to gain market share in subscribers. In response to the 
churn-rate caused by Zain, the other networks (STC and Mobily) matched Zain’s offer. The 
Saudi NRA considered free incoming calls as below-cost pricing (Sutherland, 2011). Future 
research should consider retail offering in modelling mobile networks that compete at the 
retail level in international roaming.   
 
                                               
150 According to NRA-UAE, most of consumer complaints are about their bill shocks for international roaming, in particular, 
data roaming. 
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The thesis, theoretically and empirically, focuses on the demands for visited networks to 
understand wholesale competition. An interesting future work is the demand for visited 
markets. There are hot destinations that attract UAE outbound tourists (where Etisalat 
roamers can serve as a proxy), such as neighbouring GCC countries and the UK. With a 
random-effect regression estimator, we tried out regressing the log of market quantity on 
time, the distance between the UAE and the visited market, GDP of the visited market, and 
the total trades between the UAE and the visited market. All these explanatory variables are 
highly significant except total trades: time and distance have negative coefficients; and GDP 
has positive coefficient. However, the coefficients are very small in magnitude.  
 
In the future, we plan to do a separate research on the demand for markets, by including 
additional information such as the number of flights and the foreign immigrants in the UAE. 
We plan to shade light on the low visited markets, which seem to host merely postpaid 
roamers. If those markets are mainly visited by the diplomats for example, one can consider 
including additional information on the number of staff in the UAE embassies.  
 
An observed business practise in this industry is the emergence of Inbound Roaming 
Promotion by visited networks (e.g. Viva-Kuwait and Batelco-Bahrain). The promotion is 
usually a draw to win a prize for roaming on a visited network. Visited networks inform about 
these prizes through advertisements contained in the welcoming SMSs sent to roamers. A 
model about the effect of such advertisement on demand for a visited network is awaiting 
future research.  
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Appendix (A). Choice On Retail Policy By A 
Monopolist 
 
In this appendix, we focus on the problem of a monopolist, ignoring any vertically related 
issues, in the choice of (linear) retail pricing policy.  
 
Consider a monopolist selling two substitutable goods that have different actual marginal 
costs. The monopolist’s problem is to choose a retail pricing policy. That is, the monopolist 
either chooses discriminatory prices (i.e. different prices based on marginal costs) or a 
uniform price (i.e. common price regardless of marginal costs). The demand for good   is 
given by Shubik and Levitan (1980) 
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If price is uniform, then the demand for each good is identical 
        
 
 
(    )   
Next, equilibria are presented for the discriminatory and the uniform policies. 
 
A1. Discriminatory Prices (Policy D) 
 
Under the discriminatory pricing policy (Policy D), the maximization problem is given by 
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The first order condition (FOC) for the above maximization problem leads to the following 
retail solution for good  . 
  
  
     
  
  
Therefore,  the equilibrium profit from selling good   is 
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and the total profit from selling both goods is 
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(A.1) 
A2. Uniform Price (Policy U) 
 
Under the uniform pricing policy (Policy U), the maximization problem is given by 
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where  ̅  (     )  , which is the average marginal cost. The FOC for the above 
maximization problem leads to the following uniform retail solution. 
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Therefore, the equilibrium profit from selling good   is 
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and the total profit from selling both goods is 
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(A.2) 
A3. Payoffs Comparison 
 
This section compares the payoffs from the discriminatory and uniform pricing policies. The 
difference between Eq. (A.1) and Eq. (A.2) is given by 
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(A.3) 
It is clear from Eq. (A.3) that if marginal costs are symmetric, the monopolist is indifferent 
between discriminatory and uniform pricing policies. This is true because the prices of the 
two goods would be symmetric. However, with asymmetric marginal costs, the monopolist is 
better off choosing the discriminatory policy than choosing the uniform. This conclusion is 
more appealing as the two goods become more asymmetric in marginal costs or/and more 
substitutable. 
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Appendix (B). Derivations Of Base Model Equilibria  
 
This Appendix shows the derivations of the base model equilibria presented in Chapter (3). 
 
B1. Model Background 
 
There are two networks in country   (   and   ); and two networks in country   (   and 
  ). Each network signs an IOT agreement with each foreign network. Each network is 
assumed to be a monopolist at the retail level and a duopolist at the wholesale level. 
Networks are assumed to have symmetric constant marginal costs normalized to zero and 
no fixed costs. Retail and wholesale prices are assumed to be linear. 
 
The game is played in two stages: in Stage I, networks set their wholesale prices 
simultaneously; and in Stage II, networks set their retail prices simultaneously. The subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is solved by backward induction.  
 
To simplify notations, we solve for the situation   ’s subscriber roaming on   ’s network 
under the (     ) IOT agreement. We show the retail price solution for    and the 
wholesale price solution for   . In such two-way access agreements, the solutions apply 
similarly the other way to all networks. The subscript refers to the network in question and 
the superscript refers to its IOT-agreement partner. 
 
The utility for   ’s subscriber is given by 
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(B.1) 
where        
      
    is the aggregate quantity demanded by   ’s subscriber in country  ; 
   
      
   are the applicable retail prices;   and   are positive demand parameters; and     
is the substitutability parameter. We will later write     (   ) to index the substitutability 
level in each country, where    ,   ). 
 
The roamer maximizes his utility for roaming in country   by choosing    
   and    
   
    
    
   
    
    
      
(B.2) 
The direct demand for roaming on networks    and    respectively are given by 
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(B.3) 
If the prices are uniform (i.e.    
      
      ), the demands will be symmetric 
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(B.4) 
The different wholesale pricing strategies explored in the models are considered under two 
alternative retail-pricing policies: with uniform constraint or without uniform constraint (i.e. 
discriminatory by visited networks). Such policies produce different retail price mapping 
functions (RPMFs), which are derived in Stage II. A RPMF is a function of wholesale 
price(s), which provides the optimal retail price given any previously set wholesale price(s), 
and is substituted for when solving for wholesale prices in Stage I151. 
 
B2. The Game 
 
B2.1 Stage II 
 
Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
Home network    faces the following profit maximization problem when its subscriber roams 
in country   
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(B.5) 
  ’s retail prices are inside its retail profits (the first and the third terms, where the demands 
are given by Eq. (B.3)). The RPMFs for both networks are derived by solving  
    
    
   
    
    
      
simultaneously, where 
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151 The second order condition is negative in all retail (discriminatory or uniform) and wholesale maximization problems. 
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and similarly for          
   ; yielding the following retail price functions 
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By solving for    
  , we have  
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where     (   ). After substituting for   in the above two equations, the last term in the 
numerator becomes zero. Then by multiplying the numerator and the denominator by (  
 ), the RPMF is given by 
   
   
      
  
  
  
and similarly for    
   
   
   
      
  
  
  
(B.6)  
Uniform Retail Policy  
 
In the absence of steering and with uniform retail, home network    sets identical retail 
prices in country  , resulting in identical demands. The average wholesale price    faces is 
 ̅ 
   (   
      
  )  . The following profit maximization problem is for    when its 
subscriber roams in country   
   
(   )
     (     ̅ 
   )    (   )     
     (   )     
     (   )  
(B.7) 
  ’s retail price is inside its retail profit (the first term, where the demands are given by Eq. 
(B.4)). The first order condition (FOC) must satisfy 
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By solving for    , the RPMF is given by  
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(B.8) 
Note importantly that, as compared to Eq. (B.6),     depends on both    
   and    
  .  
 
Next, four wholesale pricing strategies are presented. In each wholesale strategy, networks 
are assumed to set their (monopoly) retail prices independently according to the relevant 
RPMF. Any price cooperation between networks is only assumed upstream. The following 
first order conditions (FOCs) are with respect to    
   (i.e.   ’s wholesale price to   ), where 
  ’s retail price is given by the RPMFs of Eq. (B.6) for the discriminatory retail policy, or by 
the RPMF of Eq. (B.8) for the uniform retail policy. 
 
B2.2 Stage I 
 
B2.2i International Cartel Wholesale Pricing Strategy 
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the following international market profit 
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(B.9) 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.3), and substituting Eq. (B.6) in Eq. (B.9), we find    
   a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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where     (   ). Substituting further the relevant RPMFs (from Eq. B.6) in the above 
equation, we have 
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)  
 
 (   )
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By solving for    
  , we have 
   
       
   
 
 
[  
 
   
]  
The second term cancels in the above equation after substituting for  . The international 
cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
       
    
(B.10) 
Because   ,   ) , the only symmetric wholesale equilibrium is when    , otherwise 
   
       
  . Thus the equilibrium wholesale and retail solutions are 
      
then from Eq. (B.6) 
   
 
  
  
(B.11) 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.4), and substituting Eq. (B.8) in Eq. (B.9), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the RPMF (from Eq. B.8) in the above equation, we have 
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 *
  
  
 
  
  
By solving for    
  , the international cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
        
    
(B.12) 
The only symmetric wholesale price solution is zero. Thus the equilibrium wholesale and 
retail solutions are  
      
then from Eq. (B.8)  
    
 
  
  
(B.13) 
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B2.2ii National Cartel Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the national market profit. The maximization 
problem for networks in country   is 
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(B.14)  
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.3), and substituting Eq. (B.6) in Eq. (B.14), we find    
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direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the relevant RPMFs (from Eq. B.6) in the above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the national cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
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(B.15) 
where     (   ) . By substituting symmetrically for    
   in the above equation, then 
substituting for  , we get  
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then from Eq. (B.6), 
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(B.16) 
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Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.4), and substituting Eq. (B.8) in Eq. (B.14), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the RPMF (from Eq. B.8) in the above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the national cartel’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
    
    
(B.17) 
The symmetric wholesale price requires    
      
     ; thus Eq. (B.17) gives us 
    
 
 
     
     
 
  
  
Therefore, the equilibrium wholesale price solution that maximizes the national market profit, 
and its resulting retail price solution are  
    
 
  
   
then from Eq. (B.8),  
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(B.18) 
B2.2iii Narrow Vertical Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the vertical retail revenues of the two IOT 
partners within each separate IOT agreement (i.e. ignoring implications for other revenues 
received by the networks). The maximization problem for the networks in the (     ) IOT 
agreement is 
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  )     
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  )  
(B.19) 
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The above equation will result in symmetric wholesale prices for all networks, in line with the 
rest of the strategies of this chapter.  
 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.3), and substituting Eq. (B.6) in Eq. (B.19), we find    
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direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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where      (   ). By substituting further for the relevant RPMFs (from Eq. B.6) in the 
above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the vertical strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
   
   
  
  
  
(B.20) 
By substituting symmetrically for    
   in the above equation, we get  
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then from Eq. (B.6),  
   
    (
    
  (   ) 
*
  
  
 
  
 (  
  
    
*  
 
 
 (
    
    
*  
  
 (   )
    
(B.21) 
Since   ,   ),      if    . The negative wholesale price reduces the retail price and 
effectively enhances the demand for the IOT partner. Intuitively, the mutual wholesale price 
subsidy is necessary to bring down the retail price. 
 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.4), and substituting Eq. (B.8) in Eq. (B.19), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the RPMF (from Eq. B.8) in the above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the vertical strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
        
    
(B.22) 
The only symmetric wholesale price solution is zero. Thus the equilibrium wholesale and 
retail solutions are  
      
then from Eq. (B.8), 
    
 
  
  
(B.23) 
B2.2iv Unilateral Wholesale Pricing Strategy  
 
This strategy sets wholesale prices to maximize the own wholesale profit for each network. 
The maximization problem for    is 
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(B.24) 
Under Discriminatory Retail Policy  
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.3), and substituting Eq. (B.6) in Eq. (B.24), we find    
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direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the relevant RPMFs (from Eq. B.6) in the above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the unilateral strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 (   )
  
(B.25) 
where      (   ) . By substituting symmetrically for    
   in the above equation, then 
substituting for  , we get 
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then from Eq. (B.6),  
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(B.26) 
Under Uniform Retail Policy 
 
Using the demands as in Eq. (B.4), and substituting Eq. (B.8) in Eq. (B.24), we find     a 
direct function of    
  , and the FOC is 
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By substituting further for the RPMF (from Eq. B.8) in the above equation, we have 
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By solving for    
  , the unilateral strategy’s best wholesale price is given by 
   
   
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
(B.27) 
By substituting symmetrically for    
   in the above equation, we get  
   
   
   
   
then from Eq. (B.8),  
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Appendix (C). Networks Choice On Retail Policy 
 
In this Appendix, we show a game whereby mobile networks choose wholesale prices 
simultaneously, then decide on a retail policy (either discriminatory or uniform at-the-
monopoly-level).  
 
C1. Model Background 
 
Assume there are two countries; each has two networks. Each network signs an IOT 
agreement with each foreign network. Each network is a monopolist downstream and a 
duopolist upstream. Networks have symmetric constant marginal costs normalized to zero, 
no fixed costs, and no steering technology. Retail and wholesale prices are linear. 
 
The one-shot pricing game is played in two stages. In Stage I, networks simultaneously 
choose wholesale prices. In Stage II, networks simultaneously either choose retail prices 
discriminated by visited networks (hereafter discriminatory policy) or choose a uniform retail 
price that equals the monopoly price (hereafter uniform policy). The subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium (SPNE) is solved by backward induction.  
 
The demand for visited network   is given by Shubik and Levitan (1980) 
   
 
 
 [   .  
 
 
/   
  
 
  ]  (       ) (   )  
Networks have symmetric demand parameters (      ), with       and     (the 
substitutability parameter). If the prices are identical (i.e.        ), the demands will be 
symmetric, 
        
 
 
 ,    -  
Consider the unilateral equilibria of the discriminatory retail pricing policy of the base model 
in Section (3.2.8iv). When wholesalers set wholesale prices non-cooperatively, the 
equilibrium wholesale and retail prices are, respectively,       , (   )- and    
 (   ) ,  (   )- . Therefore, the demand for a visited network is     (   ) 
, (   )-. 
 
Consider the case the home network chooses the monopoly price, which equals     
  (  ). The demand for a visited network, therefore, is       . Given uniform retail price 
and absence of steering, wholesalers do not have an incentive to undercut because 
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undercutting does not raise market shares. In this case, the wholesale price will equal the 
monopoly price, i.e.      (  ).  
 
In the following game, we will be comparing profits, where the profit to each network from 
each IOT agreement consists of a retail revenue and a net payment. The net payment is the 
difference between a network’s wholesale profit and wholesale cost with its IOT-agreement 
partner. Each term in the net payment (either wholesale profit or wholesale cost) consists of 
a wholesale price times a demand.  
 
In our case, the wholesale profit/cost to any network is either      or     . Notice that 
     (  )        , (   )- as long as    ; otherwise     . Notice also that 
            (   ) , (   )- except in the limit of  , where        , (because the 
respective retail prices would be equal).  
 
Assume network  , where   is any network, chooses the discriminatory policy while its IOT-
agreement partner chooses the uniform policy. Then, the net payment to network   is  
     
 
  
⏞
  
 
 
 
⏞
  
 
  
 (   )
⏞   
  
 
 (   )
 (   )
⏞    
   
   
  (       )
  (   ) 
    
(C.1) 
Network   receives the net payment from its IOT partner because   charges a higher 
wholesale price (i.e.      ) and has a lower (retail) demand (i.e.       ). 
 
C2. The Game 
 
The total profits,  , to any network from its both IOT agreements if all networks apply the 
same policy will equal its total revenues,  . This is because net payments are zero in this 
case. 
 
When all networks apply the uniform policy, the total profits/revenues to each network are 
      
  
  
   
(C.2) 
When all networks apply the discriminatory policy, the total profits/revenues to each network 
are 
 
183 
 
      
(   )(   )  
  (   ) 
   
(C.3) 
The difference between Eq. (C.2) and (C.3) is positive,  
            
  
  
 
(   )(   )  
  (   ) 
 
  
 (   ) 
    
(C.4) 
Therefore, all networks are better off if they all choose the uniform policy (with retail price at-
the-monopoly-level). However, there is an incentive to deviate from such cooperation, as 
explained next. 
 
If network   plays the discriminatory policy, and only one of its IOT-agreement partners plays 
the uniform policy,  ’s total payoffs are 
        
  (    )
  (   )
   
(C.5) 
where      is given by Eq. (C.1).  
 
The difference between Eq. (C.5) and (C.2) is  
         
  
    
  (   )
    
(C.6) 
which is positive only if    . If, instead, both IOT partners of network   play uniform policy, 
network   will have two net payments; hence Eq. (C.5) will increase to         .  
 
Therefore, each network has an incentive to deviate from cooperation in choosing uniform 
policy by playing the discriminatory policy. As a result, discriminatory policy is a dominant 
strategy to each network, which is the equilibrium in this one-shot game as long as visited 
networks are substitutes (i.e.    ).  
 
C3. Discussion 
 
In this one-shot game, the equilibrium payoffs to each network is   , which is inefficient 
because it is less than    when all networks choose the uniform policy (i.e. retail price at-
the-monopoly-level). In a repeated game with infinite time horizon, networks can sustain 
setting the retail price at the monopoly level. Because steering is assumed absent, the 
uniform retail price provides the wholesaler with no incentive to undercut, as undercutting 
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does not increase market share. Thus, wholesale price at the monopoly level is 
consequently self-sustained.  
 
Intuitively, cooperation to play the uniform retail policy eliminates net payments, which are 
the source of deviation incentives. A similar cooperation in the context of balancing net 
payments is found in Shy (2001) model on international settlement rates. 
 
The game can be depicted in the following extensive form. The bold inner segments 
represent the one-shot and repeated game equilibria. In the one-shot game, the retailer non-
cooperatively plays discriminatory retail policy,   , and the wholesaler plays unilateral price 
  . If the game is repeated infinitely, uniform retail policy,   , with wholesale monopoly 
price fixing,   , are the equilibria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8Figure (C) Networks choice on retail policy in extensive form.   
 
 
  
      
Wholesaler 
Retailer 
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Appendix (D). Instrumental Variables 
 
 
In this appendix, we evaluate the use of the Omani networks (Nawras and Oman-Mobile), 
separately and jointly, as instrumental variables (IVs) in the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
estimation of Chapter (6), for the following model. 
  (  )    (  )                              
                                    
                                                             
(           )  
(D) 
The variables are defined in Table (6.1). The observations are limited to highly visited 
markets as explained in Chapter (6).  
 
In Table (D.1) below, model (D5) is the same 1SLS used in Chapter (7); and model (D6) is 
the same 2SLS used in Chapter (6). In the first-stage regression, the coefficients of the 
Omani networks IVs, separately and jointly, are positive and significant at 1% level. As 
shown in Table (D.2), the associated coefficient has F-statistics above 10.  
 
However, their implications on the endogenous regressor (i.e. wholesale prices charged to 
Etisalat) in the 2SLS differ considerably. Only with Nawras IV we find a negative and 
significant price coefficient. In contrast, the price coefficient is negative and insignificant with 
Oman-Mobile IV, and incorrect (i.e. with positive sign) and insignificant when both IVs are 
used.  
 
We checked for the validity of using both Omani networks as IVs, using the over 
identification restrictions test, where the null hypothesis states that all instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term,  
 
, of Eq. (D). As shown in Table (D.2), at 5% significance 
level, we fail to reject the null that both IVs are valid.  
 
We think the validity of both IVs comes from the ability of each IV to reflect cost differentials 
across markets, as will be elaborated next.  
 
Furthermore, we run Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests for the null hypothesis that the OLS 
estimator is equivalent to the 2SLS estimator using the Omani networks IVs, separately and 
186 
 
jointly. If OLS and 2SLS are similar, then there is no need for the instrument because OLS is 
efficient; in other words, the endogenous regressor, PRICEjt, should be treated as exogenous.  
 
However, we know in our case that the OLS estimator is biased due to the endogeneity 
problem. With these tests, we try to know which IV(s) should recommend using 2SLS. Only 
with Nawras IV we find significance: we reject the null hypothesis at 1% significance level, 
and conclude the OLS and the 2SLS estimators are different. Therefore, the use of 2SLS is 
only recommended when Nawras IV is used. 
 
Therefore, in Chapter (6), we proceeded in the 2SLS estimation with the price of Nawras as 
an IV. Next, we provide an interpretation why Nawras can be a better IV compared to Oman-
Mobile. 
 
A variable of a home network’s retail prices (other than Etisalat) is chosen as an IV based on 
the assumption that the retail prices reflect actual costs of visited networks. If the IV has 
discriminatory retail prices, as with Oman-Mobile, it should reflect actual costs within a 
market and across markets. However, because a discriminatory retail price reflects the 
embedded wholesale price, this IV does not overcome any bias at the wholesale level 
stemming from preferential agreements (e.g. alliance discounts). This bias can be in the IV 
itself (e.g. Oman-Mobile retail prices), in the endogenous regressor (e.g. wholesale prices 
charged to Etisalat), or in both variables if preferential agreements differ between home 
networks. 
 
On the other hand, an IV using uniform retail pricing, as with Nawras, is assumed to reflect 
the common costs of visited networks in a given market, providing cost differentials across 
markets. Although it does not tell about costs asymmetry within a market, an IV using 
uniform retail pricing is neutral to preferential agreements and hence it overcomes the bias 
caused by preferential wholesale prices.  
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28Table (D.1) Instrumental variables for simple logit demand models with Oman-Mobile.  
Market High Visited Markets 
Instrumental Variable(s) Oman-Mobile & Nawras Oman-Mobile Nawras 
Estimator 1SLS 2SLS 1SLS 2SLS 1SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable PRICEjt   (  )    (  ) PRICEjt   (  )    (  ) PRICEjt   (  )    (  ) 
Model (D1) (D2) (D3) (D4) (D5) (D6) 
CONSTANT 2.107*** -4.860*** 3.255*** -4.764*** 2.733*** -3.865*** 
 
 
(0.306) (0.253) (0.283) (0.253) (0.314) (0.330) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.310** -0.031 -0.262* -0.071 -0.251* -0.060 
(0.141) (0.103) (0.139) (0.100) (0.148) (0.128) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-2011) 
 
0.773** -0.797*** 0.518 -0.533** 0.655* -0.639** 
(0.355) (0.258) (0.348) (0.250) (0.369) (0.318) 
PRICEjt 
(network’s own price) 
 
- 0.021 - -0.015 - -0.203*** 
- (0.027) - (0.027) - (0.037) 
OMAN_MOBILEj 
(Oman-Mobile retail price in 
AED in 2013 for roaming on j)  
 
0.150*** - 0.298*** - - - 
(0.018) - (0.011) - - - 
NAWRASj 
(Nawras retail price in AED in 
2013 for roaming on j)  
 
0.207*** - - - 0.262*** - 
(0.018) - - - (0.011) - 
Network characteristics:       
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
cross-owned by Etisalat) 
 
-0.795 -0.024 -0.798 0.052 -1.050* -0.342 
(0.605) (0.440) (0.596) (0.429) (0.635) (0.549) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is 
alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
0.459 0.135 0.476* 0.319 0.671** 0.439 
(0.289) (0.211) (0.288) (0.207) (0.315) (0.273) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat prepaid) 
 
0.331 0.649*** -0.050 0.766*** 0.575** 1.042*** 
(0.216) (0.156) (0.208) (0.149) (0.225) (0.193) 
Interaction with POLICY:       
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
1.341* -1.688*** 0.814 -1.621*** 1.513** -1.103* 
(0.723) (0.526) (0.721) (0.518) (0.760) (0.655) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
-1.133*** 0.434 -1.081*** 0.392 -1.124** 0.133 
(0.411) (0.300) (0.409) (0.295) (0.448) (0.388) 
CAMELj -0.454 0.717*** -0.083 0.539*** -0.489 0.563** 
(0.292) (0.212) (0.286) (0.205) (0.307) (0.264) 
Observations                                      765 765 907 907 831 831 
R
2
 0.509 - 0.442 - 0.413 - 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.502 - 0.436 - 0.406 - 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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29Table (D.2) Tests for the instrumental variables used in Table (D.1).  
Instrumental Variable(s) 
Oman-Mobile & 
Nawras 
Oman-Mobile Nawras 
Test/Result 
Score 
or  
F-statistics 
P-value 
Score 
or  
F-statistics 
P-value 
Score 
or  
F-statistics 
P-value 
1SLS coefficient’s significance 
(H0: IV’s coefficient is insignificant) 
374.195 0.000*** 689.083 0.000*** 550.561 0.000*** 
 
Over identification restrictions 
(H0: Both IVs are valid) 
      
Sargan  5.105 0.024** - - - - 
Basmann  5.066 0.024** - - - - 
 
Price endogeneity: 
(H0: OLS and 2SLS are the same) 
      
Durbin  1.703 0.192 0.748 0.388 37.980 0.000*** 
Wu-Hausman  1.682 0.195 0.739 0.390 39.272 0.000*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Furthermore, we try Oman-Mobile IV, but after taking its average retail price in the relevant 
market. By doing so, we try to eliminate what we call the wholesale bias, as explained 
previously, by turning the discriminatory nature of the IV to something like uniform IV.  
 
In Table (D.3) below, the number of observations for Oman-Mobile prices rises from 907 to 
987, because the missing visited networks in Oman-Mobile IV take the market average. The 
average price has a positive and significant coefficient at 1% level in the 1SLS models (D7) 
and (D9). Notice the significance of the endogenous regressor, PRICEjt, in Table (D.3), 
compared to the previous models (D2) and (D4). The sign of the coefficient is negative with 
1% significance level. The size of the coefficients in models (D6), (D8) and (D10) is similar. 
Moreover, model (D10) has very similar results to model (D6) regarding the rest of 
regressors; and the same is true with model (D8) except for POLICY and ALLIANCEj. 
 
Table (D.4) below presents test results related to the market average of Oman-Mobile. 
Interestingly, the null hypothesis related to price endogeneity is rejected with 1% significance 
level, compared to Table (D.2) when we failed to reject it. The lesson learned here is that the 
discriminatory IV can be a good instrument if we take its market average, intuitively, because 
of removing preferential wholesale bias. 
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30Table (D.3) Instrumental variables for simple logit demand models with average Oman-Mobile. 
Market High Visited Markets 
Instrumental Variable(s) Average Oman-Mobile  
Average Oman-Mobile & 
Nawras 
Estimator 1SLS 2SLS 1SLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable PRICEjt   (  )    (  ) PRICEjt   (  )    (  ) 
Model (D7) (D8) (D9) (D10) 
CONSTANT 2.754*** -3.954*** 2.498*** -3.976*** 
 
 
(0.288) (0.312) (0.313) (0.325) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.212 -0.045 -0.252* -0.055 
(0.136) (0.120) (0.146) (0.127) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-2011) 
 
0.455 -0.481 0.604* -0.647** 
(0.340) (0.299) (0.363) (0.316) 
PRICEjt 
(network’s own price) 
 
- -0.216*** - -0.186*** 
- (0.035) - (0.036) 
AVERAGE_OMAN_MOBILEr 
(Oman-Mobile average retail price in AED 
in 2013 for roaming in market r)  
 
0.315*** - 0.135*** - 
(0.012) - (0.026) - 
NAWRASj 
(Nawras retail price in AED in 2013 for 
roaming on j)  
 
- - 0.172*** - 
- - (0.021) - 
Network characteristics:     
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network is cross-owned 
by Etisalat) 
 
-1.143* -0.272 -1.063* -0.315 
(0.590) (0.521) (0.625) (0.545) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network is alliance  to 
Etisalat) 
 
0.843*** 0.568** 0.754** 0.423 
(0.294) (0.260) (0.310) (0.271) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network allows Etisalat 
prepaid) 
 
0.259 1.086*** 0.437* 1.038*** 
(0.205) (0.180) (0.223) (0.192) 
Interaction with POLICY:     
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
1.246* -1.101* 1.494** -1.124* 
(0.714) (0.629) (0.748) (0.651) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
-1.121*** 0.119 -1.127** 0.152 
(0.418) (0.369) (0.441) (0.385) 
CAMELj -0.152 0.417* -0.426 0.567** 
(0.281) (0.247) (0.303) (0.262) 
Observations                                      987 987 831 831 
R
2
 0.407 - 0.431 - 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.401 - 0.424 - 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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31Table (D.4) Tests for the instrumental variables used in Table (D.3).  
Instrumental Variable(s) Average Oman-Mobile  
Average Oman-Mobile & 
Nawras 
Test/Result 
Score 
or  
F-statistics 
P-value 
Score 
or  
F-statistics 
P-value 
1SLS coefficient’s significance 
(H0: IV’s coefficient is insignificant) 
646.622 0.000*** 296.585 0.000*** 
 
Over identification restrictions 
(H0: Both IVs are valid) 
    
Sargan  - - 5.400 0.020** 
Basmann  - - 5.364 0.021** 
 
Price endogeneity: 
(H0: OLS and 2SLS are the same) 
    
Durbin  39.9823 0.000*** 32.8469 0.000*** 
Wu-Hausman  41.2059 0.000*** 33.7459 0.000*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
191 
 
Appendix (E). Additional Estimations For Demand 
And Steering Models 
 
 
This appendix provides additional estimations that are referred to in the demand models 
(Chapter 6) and the effectiveness of steering models (Chapter 8). Those two chapters share 
similarities in the fact that they have visited networks’ market shares as the dependent 
variable.  
 
The main purpose of this appendix is to support the argument that we should have a 
demand model that is separate from a steering model such that the demand model reflects 
demand-side substitution made by Etisalat roamers, while the steering model reflects 
supply-side substitution made by the home network, Etisalat. In addition, the wholesale price 
set by a visited network as given in the dataset (hereafter given price) suits the demand 
model; and the wholesale price set by a visited network relative to its market arithmetic 
mean (hereafter relative price) suits the steering model.  
 
For the sake of the above argument, we will use the simple logit demand model similar to 
Eq. (6.1) of Chapter (6) under different specifications using either the given price or the 
relative price, with and without the interaction term of price and policy. Moreover, we will 
compare estimations between highly visited markets, low visited markets and all markets. 
Since we shall be testing for steering also and for the sake of the above argument, we found 
the results are very similar if, instead, we used the functional form as in Chapter (8) for 
steering models. 
 
The model for the simple logit demand is provided by Eq. (E.1) with the given price, which is 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Subscript for year is dropped as data is pooled, 
and market subscript is dropped for convenience. 
 
  (  )    (  )                              
                                    
                                                         
                      
(           )         
(E.1) 
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  (  ) is the natural log of the market share of visited network  ;   (  ) is the natural log of 
the outside good share; and  
 
 is the error term. The product     refers to the outside good 
(see Table 6.2). All the variables that will be used in this appendix are listed in Table (E.1) 
below. 
 
In addition, we will also re-estimate the demand using the relative price in the following 
model. 
 
  (  )    (  )                               
                                    
                                                         
                       
(           )         
(E.2) 
 
The key variable that can support the aforementioned argument lies in the interaction term of 
the price and the policy dummy variable (1 if uniform; 0 if discriminatory), which tells us 
about the effect of wholesale price on a visited network’s market share before and after 
Etisalat retail pricing policy. The reason behind this is the consumer’s discretion regarding 
price as assumed throughout the thesis. That is, before the policy, roamers care about price 
(since the retail price reflects the wholesale price) and thus should choose manually 
between visited networks; while after the policy, roamers leave handsets on automatic mode 
since retail price is common to use any network in a given market (assuming roamers’ 
decisions on network selection are mainly based on price). Automatic network selection 
allows Etisalat to choose between visited networks via its steering technologies. In other 
words, before the policy, demand-side substitution is assumed; and after the policy, supply-
side substitution is assumed. Accordingly, the testable hypotheses are listed and explained 
as follows. 
 
 H1:   ̂     
o That is, before the policy (i.e. during the years when Etisalat retail price was 
discriminatory by visited networks), the price coefficient is insignificant.  
o If the coefficient is insignificant, we fail to reject H1 and conclude that roamers do not 
care about price before the policy such that they leave their handsets on default-
automatic mode. This conclusion can also mean that roamers are price insensitive. In 
addition, it means steering by Etisalat can be enabled, but is ineffective because 
market share does not respond to changes in wholesale price.  
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o If the coefficient is negative and significant, we reject H1 and conclude that roamers 
care about price before the policy such that they use their handsets to manually 
select the visited network with the cheapest price. This also means that steering by 
Etisalat is disabled because steering requires handsets to be on automatic mode.  
 
 H2:   ̂     ̂   . 
o That is, after the policy (i.e. during the years when Etisalat retail price became 
uniform), the joint coefficients of price and the interaction term are insignificant. 
o If the joint coefficients are insignificant, we fail to reject H2 and conclude that roamers 
do not care about price after the policy such that they leave their handsets on default-
automatic mode. This conclusion also means steering by Etisalat can be enabled, but 
is ineffective because market share does not respond to changes in wholesale price. 
o If the joint coefficients are negative and significant, we reject H2 and conclude that 
market share is responsive to wholesale price after the policy. Given automatic 
network selection that enables steering, this conclusion is interpreted in terms of 
buyer power as steering by Etisalat is effective because market share responds to 
changes in wholesale price. 
 
The results of testing the above hypotheses together will be interpreted to judge which 
model should be considered a demand model, a steering model, and a demand or steering 
model, or none of these (see Table E.0 below). Then based on such judgement, we justify 
why we should use the given price and why we should use the relative price. 
 
32Table (E.0) Possible scenarios for the hypotheses test results and our intuitions. 
Possible hypotheses test 
results 
Explanation  
Suggested use of the 
model 
Reject both H1 and H2 
Price is significant before and after the 
policy  
Demand or steering  
Reject H1 but fail to reject 
H2 
Price is significant only before the policy  Demand only  
Fail to reject H1 but reject 
H2 
Price is significant only after the policy  Steering only 
Fail to reject both H1 and 
H2 
Price is insignificant before and after the 
policy  
None  
 
Demand estimations are presented for highly visited markets in Table (E.2), for low visited 
markets in Table (E.3), and for all markets (i.e. all observations) in Table (E.4). The marginal 
effects of price and policy are reported in Table (E.5). 
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33Table (E.1) Notations and variables related to estimations. 
Notation  Description 
j Subscript for visited networks, where (j=1,…,552). 
t Subscript for year, where (t=2008,2009,2010,2011). 
r Subscript for geographic market, where (r=1,…,204). 
Time variables  Description 
YEAR Discrete variable for the study years, where (1=2008, 2=2009, 3=2010, 4=2011). 
POLICY 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2010-2011 (when Etisalat implemented 
its uniform retail policy); 0 for the years 2008-2009 (when Etisalat implemented 
discriminatory retail policy).  
Price variables Description 
PRICEjt 
j’s average wholesale price per minute of outgoing call in year t (in constant 
AED with 2007 as base year). 
RPRICEjrt 
j’s average wholesale price per minute of outgoing call relative to the 
arithmetic mean of its market r in year t (in constant AED with 2007 as base 
year). 
Visited network’s 
characteristic 
variables  
Description 
CROSSOWNEDjt Dummy variable equals 1 if j is cross-owned by Etisalat in year t; 0 otherwise. 
ALLIANCEj Dummy variable equals 1 if j is a roaming alliance to Etisalat; 0 otherwise. 
CAMELj Dummy variable equals 1 if j allows Etisalat prepaid roaming; 0 otherwise. 
Market shares 
variables  
Description 
     j’s market share in minutes of outgoing calls in market r and year t. 
    Outside good market share in year t. 
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34Table (E.2) Simple logit demand models for observations in Highly Visited Markets.  
Dependent variable: 
 
  (  )    (  ) 
 
(E1) 
 
(E2) 
 
(E3) 
 
(E4) 
 
(E5) 
 
(E6) 
 
(E7) 
 
(E8) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
 
-4.305*** -5.112*** -5.006*** -4.749*** -4.352*** -5.320*** -5.283*** -5.743*** 
(0.253) (0.245) (0.252) (0.307) (0.289) (0.279) (0.284) (0.466) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.028 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 0.008 0.006 0.004 
(0.125) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.126) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-
2011) 
 
-0.379 -0.328 -0.526* -0.916** -0.392 -0.342 -0.539* 0.052 
(0.282) (0.262) (0.290) (0.393) (0.283) (0.262) (0.290) (0.556) 
PRICEjt 
(network own price) 
 
-0.056** -0.055*** -0.052** -0.095*** - - - - 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.036) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
(network own price 
relative to arithmetic 
mean) 
 
- - - - -0.313 -0.147 -0.060 0.411 
- - - - (0.203) (0.189) (0.192) (0.424) 
Network 
characteristics: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is cross-owned by 
Etisalat) 
 
- -0.912*** -0.003 -0.070 - -0.847*** 0.069 0.140 
- (0.285) (0.504) (0.506) - (0.286) (0.506) (0.509) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
- 0.621*** 0.465* 0.488** - 0.610*** 0.440* 0.425* 
- (0.177) (0.248) (0.249) - (0.178) (0.249) (0.249) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat 
prepaid) 
 
- 1.328*** 1.092*** 1.088*** - 1.330*** 1.098*** 1.086*** 
- (0.119) (0.174) (0.174) - (0.120) (0.175) (0.175) 
Interaction with 
POLICY: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
- - -1.286** -1.208** - - -1.318** -1.357** 
- - (0.610) (0.612) - - (0.617) (0.617) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
- - 0.293 0.281 - - 0.335 0.330 
- - (0.353) (0.353) - - (0.356) (0.355) 
CAMELj 
 
 
- - 0.407* 0.412* - - 0.400* 0.408* 
- - (0.240) (0.239) - - (0.241) (0.241) 
PRICEjt 
 
 
- - - 0.065 - - - - 
- - - (0.044) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
 
- - - - - - - -0.592 
- - - - - - - (0.475) 
Observations                                       995 995 995 995 995 995 995 995 
R
2
 0.017 0.158 0.164 0.166 0.013 0.152 0.159 0.161 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.0141 0.153 0.157 0.158 0.0105 0.147 0.152 0.152 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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35Table (E.3) Simple logit demand models for observations in Low Visited Markets.  
Dependent variable: 
 
  (  )    (  ) 
 
(E9) 
 
(E10) 
 
(E11) 
 
(E12) 
 
(E13) 
 
(E14) 
 
(E15) 
 
(E16) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
 
-3.856*** -3.760*** -3.754*** -3.715*** -2.621*** -2.512*** -2.583*** -3.613*** 
(0.201) (0.199) (0.199) (0.233) (0.241) (0.240) (0.240) (0.404) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.102 -0.101 -0.100 -0.100 -0.115 -0.108 -0.107 -0.107 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-
2011) 
 
-0.310 -0.285 -0.319 -0.386 -0.303 -0.281 -0.306 1.037** 
(0.212) (0.209) (0.212) (0.299) (0.210) (0.205) (0.208) (0.473) 
PRICEjt 
(network own price) 
 
0.038** 0.024 0.026 0.020 - - - - 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
(network own price 
relative to arithmetic 
mean) 
 
- - - - -0.955*** -1.055*** -0.972*** 0.047 
- - - - (0.180) (0.178) (0.178) (0.368) 
Network 
characteristics: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is cross-owned by 
Etisalat) 
 
- -1.314*** 0.133 0.120 - -1.501*** -0.207 0.086 
- (0.236) (0.400) (0.402) - (0.231) (0.396) (0.405) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
- -0.230 -0.439 -0.440 - -0.295 -0.373 -0.448 
- (0.226) (0.326) (0.326) - (0.222) (0.322) (0.321) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat 
prepaid) 
 
- 0.281** -0.031 -0.028 - 0.236* -0.046 -0.015 
- (0.129) (0.182) (0.183) - (0.127) (0.179) (0.179) 
Interaction with 
POLICY: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
- - -2.160*** -2.139*** - - -1.921*** -2.231*** 
- - (0.489) (0.494) - - (0.484) (0.492) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
- - 0.387 0.393 - - 0.147 0.175 
- - (0.446) (0.447) - - (0.442) (0.440) 
CAMELj 
 
 
- - 0.575** 0.569** - - 0.533** 0.479* 
- - (0.255) (0.256) - - (0.252) (0.251) 
PRICEjt 
 
 
- - - 0.010 - - - - 
- - - (0.032) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
 
- - - - - - - -1.326*** 
- - - - - - - (0.420) 
Observations                                       932 932 932 932 932 932 932 932 
R
2
 0.039 0.074 0.099 0.099 0.062 0.106 0.125 0.134 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.0360 0.0681 0.0904 0.0895 0.0587 0.100 0.116 0.125 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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36Table (E.4) Simple logit demand models for all observations.  
Dependent variable: 
 
  (  )    (  ) 
 
(E17) 
 
(E18) 
 
(E19) 
 
(E20) 
 
(E21) 
 
(E22) 
 
(E23) 
 
(E24) 
CONSTANT 
 
 
 
-4.266*** -4.452*** -4.397*** -4.339*** -3.618*** -3.876*** -3.905*** -4.710*** 
(0.168) (0.170) (0.172) (0.205) (0.197) (0.198) (0.200) (0.334) 
YEAR 
 
 
-0.043 -0.035 -0.037 -0.037 -0.045 -0.036 -0.039 -0.041 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
POLICY 
(Dummy=1 for 2010-
2011) 
 
-0.349* -0.310* -0.410** -0.505* -0.348* -0.310* -0.401** 0.635 
(0.184) (0.181) (0.190) (0.263) (0.183) (0.180) (0.189) (0.394) 
PRICEjt 
(network own price) 
 
0.012 0.010 0.012 0.003 - - - - 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
(network own price 
relative to arithmetic 
mean) 
 
- - - - -0.566*** -0.505*** -0.411*** 0.398 
- - - - (0.142) (0.140) (0.141) (0.304) 
Network 
characteristics: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is cross-owned by 
Etisalat) 
 
- -1.011*** 0.344 0.328 - -1.018*** 0.235 0.408 
- (0.200) (0.346) (0.348) - (0.198) (0.346) (0.350) 
ALLIANCEj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
is alliance  to Etisalat) 
 
- 0.291** 0.101 0.103 - 0.261* 0.122 0.086 
- (0.145) (0.205) (0.205) - (0.145) (0.204) (0.204) 
CAMELj 
(Dummy=1 if network 
allows Etisalat 
prepaid) 
 
- 0.521*** 0.278** 0.277** - 0.508*** 0.278** 0.275** 
- (0.088) (0.126) (0.126) - (0.087) (0.126) (0.126) 
Interaction with 
POLICY: 
 
        
CROSSOWNEDjt 
 
 
- - -1.984*** -1.961*** - - -1.840*** -1.987*** 
- - (0.422) (0.424) - - (0.423) (0.425) 
ALLIANCEj 
 
 
- - 0.359 0.361 - - 0.269 0.271 
- - (0.288) (0.288) - - (0.289) (0.288) 
CAMELj 
 
 
- - 0.422** 0.424** - - 0.407** 0.402** 
- - (0.175) (0.175) - - (0.174) (0.174) 
PRICEjt 
 
 
- - - 0.015 - - - - 
- - - (0.028) - - - - 
RPRICEjrt 
 
- - - - - - - -1.029*** 
- - - - - - - (0.343) 
Observations                                       1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 1,927 
R
2
 0.015 0.050 0.064 0.064 0.023 0.056 0.068 0.072 
R
2
 Adjusted 0.0137 0.0468 0.0598 0.0595 0.0213 0.0529 0.0636 0.0675 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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37Table (E.5) Marginal effects on visited networks’ prices post Etisalat uniform retail policy. 
Observations  
Null 
Hypothesis 
Relevant model F-statistics P-value 
Observations in High 
Visited Markets  
(Table E.2) 
  ̂     ̂    
Given price (E4) 1.35 0.245 
Relative price (E8) 0.71 0.400 
Observations in Low 
Visited Markets  
(Table E.3) 
  ̂     ̂    
Given price (E12) 2.04 0.154 
Relative price (E16) 40.08 0.000*** 
All observations  
(Table E.4) 
  ̂     ̂    
Given price (E20) 0.98 0.321 
Relative price (E24) 15.79 0.000*** 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We discuss models (E4) and (E8) for the highly visited markets (Table E.2), models (E12) 
and (E16) for the low visited markets (Table E.3), and models (E20) and (E24) for all 
observations (Table E.4). The marginal effects post-the-policy are discussed based on Table 
(E.5). Conclusions regarding which model and price suits to model demand or steering are 
drawn in light of Table (E.0).    
  
For visited networks in the highly visited markets, the given price is found negative and 
significant only before the policy (model E4); while the relative price is found insignificant 
before or after the policy (model E8). Therefore, we can reject H1 but fail to reject H2 with 
the given price; however with the relative price, we fail to reject both H1 and H2.  
 
We conclude that the model for highly visited markets with the given price, model (E4), 
should be used to model demand, as roamers care about the wholesale price only during the 
time when it was reflected in the retail price (i.e. before the policy when retail prices were 
discriminatory). However, no model for highly visited markets suits to model steering, as the 
market share does not respond to changes in wholesale price after the policy. Moreover, the 
relative price does not suit the demand model as it is insignificant before or after the policy, 
which can be due to the fact that relative price does not reflect the level of prices to which 
roamers are sensitive.  
 
For visited networks in the low visited markets, the given price is found insignificant before or 
after the policy (model E12); while the relative price is found negative and significant only 
after the policy (E16). Therefore, we fail to reject H1 and H2 with the given price; however 
with the relative price, we fail to reject H1 but we can reject H2.  
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We conclude that the model for low visited markets with the relative price, model (E16), 
should be used to model steering. This is so because market share is responsive to changes 
in wholesale price, suggesting that Etisalat has effective steering after its uniform retail policy 
that makes undercutting by a visited network attractive to raise own market share. However, 
no model for low visited markets suits to model demand, as the market share does not 
respond to changes in wholesale price before the policy. Moreover, the given price does not 
suit the steering model as it is insignificant before or after the policy, because probably 
roamers are insensitive to price in the low visited markets. In addition, the same intuitions for 
the low visited markets are true for all observations (models E20 and E24).  
 
In sum, we think the given price suits the demand model as it represents roamers’ response 
to price (i.e. demand-side substitution), while relative price suits the steering model as it 
represents Etisalat’s response to price (i.e. supply-side substitution). 
 
A part from the hypotheses, the coefficient of the given price in the low visited markets is 
found positive and significant (model E9). This is caused by not controlling for visited 
network’s characteristics. In fact, CAMEL dummy variable’s coefficient is only significant 
after the policy. However, the significance and size of the CAMEL dummy variable’s 
coefficient indicate that low visited markets do not significantly host prepaid roamers as 
compared to the highly visited markets. 
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Appendix (F). Mean Elasticities In EEA Countries 
 
38Table (F) Estimated mean own price elasticity of demand for EEA visited networks by market. 
Market 
Mean elasticity 
(2008-2011) 
AUSTRIA -1.428 
BELGIUM -1.659 
CYPRUS -0.511 
CZECH REPUBLIC -2.018 
DENMARK -1.174 
FINLAND -0.931 
FRANCE -1.640 
GERMANY -1.244 
GREECE -1.127 
IRELAND -1.140 
ITALY -1.490 
NETHERLANDS -1.176 
NORWAY -0.718 
PORTUGAL -1.548 
ROMANIA -1.689 
SPAIN -1.458 
SWEDEN -1.020 
UK -1.178 
All EEA -1.295 
Source: Estimated elasticity based on Eq. (6.2) using the price coefficient of model (6f). 
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Appendix (G). List Of Visited Networks     
 
39Table (G) List of all foreign networks visited by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011. 
SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
1 AFGAW AFGHAN WIRELESS AFGHANISTAN 51 BIHER HT ERONET BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 
2 AFGEA ETISALAT-AFGHN AFGHANISTAN 52 BIHMS MOBILNA - BIH BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 
3 AFGAR MTN AFGHANISTAN 53 BWAGA MASCOM-BOTSWANA BOTSWANA 
4 AFGTD TDC(ROSHAN) AFG AFGHANISTAN 54 BWAVC VISTA CELLULAR BOTSWANA 
5 ALBAM AMC, ALBANIA ALBANIA 55 BRABT 14 BRASIL TELCO BRAZIL 
6 ALBEM EAGLE MOBILE ALBANIA 56 BRACS TIM - BRACS BRAZIL 
7 ALBVF VODAFONE ALBANI ALBANIA 57 BRARN TIM - BRARN BRAZIL 
8 DZAA1 ATM MOBILIS ALG ALGERIA 58 BRASP TIM - BRASP BRAZIL 
9 DZAOT DJEZZY ALGERIA 59 BRATM TNL PCS BRAZIL BRAZIL 
10 DZAWT WATANIYA - DZA ALGERIA 60 BRATC VIVO-MG BRAZIL 
11 ANDMA MOBILAND GSM ANDORRA 61 BRNBR B.MOBILE COMM. BRUNEI 
12 AGOUT UNITEL ANGOLA 62 BRNDS DST COMMUNICATI BRUNEI 
13 AIACW C&W ANGUILLA ANGUILLA 63 BGRVA BTC BULGARIA 
14 ATGCW C&W ANTIGUA ANTIGUA & BARBUDA 64 BGRCM GLOBUL BULGARIA 
15 ARGTP TELE. ARGENTINA ARGENTINA 65 BGR01 MOBILTEL,BULGRI BULGARIA 
16 ARM01 ARMENTEL GSM900 ARMENIA 66 BFACT CELTEL - B.FASO BURKINA FASO 
17 ARM05 K-TEL VIVACELL ARMENIA 67 BFATL TELECEL - BFASO BURKINA FASO 
18 ARMOR ORANGE ARMENIA ARMENIA 68 BFAON TELMOB BURKINA FASO 
19 AUSHU HUTCHISON 3G AU AUSTRALIA 69 BDIET ECONET WIRELESS BURUNDI 
20 AUSOP OPTUS,AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA 70 KHMCC CADCOMMS CAMBODIA 
21 AUSTA TELSTRA, AUS AUSTRALIA 71 KHMGM CAMGSM CAMBODIA 
22 AUSVF VODAFONE-AUS AUSTRALIA 72 KHMSM CASACOM CAMBODIA 
23 AUTHU H3G AUSTRIA 73 KHML1 LATEZ CO, LTD CAMBODIA 
24 AUTPT MOBILKOM, AUT AUSTRIA 74 KHMSH SHINAWTRA CO. CAMBODIA 
25 AUTCA ORANGE AUSTRIA AUSTRIA 75 CMRMT MTN - CAMEROON CAMEROON 
26 AUTMM T-MOBIL AUSTRIA AUSTRIA 76 CMR02 ORANGE CAMEROUN CAMEROON 
27 AZEAC AZERCEL - AZB AZERBAIJAN 77 CANBM BELL MOBILITY CANADA 
28 AZEAF AZERFON  LLC AZERBAIJAN 78 CANRW ROGERS - CANADA CANADA 
29 AZEBC BAKCELL LTD AZERBAIJAN 79 CANTS TELUS CANADA 
30 BHRBT BATELCO,BAHRAIN BAHRAIN 80 CYMCW C&W CAYMAN CAYMAN 
31 BHRST STC BAHRAIN BAHRAIN 81 CAFAT MOOV-RCA CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC 
32 BHRMV ZAIN-BAHRAIN BAHRAIN 82 TCDCT CELTEL - TCHAD CHAD 
33 BGDGP GRAMEEN PHONE BANGLADESH 83 TCDML MILICOM (TIGO) CHAD 
34 BGDBL SHEBA TELECOM BANGLADESH 84 CHLMV ENTEL PCS TELEC CHILE 
35 BGDTT TELETALK BNGDSH BANGLADESH 85 CHNCT CHINA TELECOM CHINA 
36 BGDAK TM INTERNATIONL BANGLADESH 86 CHNCU CHINA UNICOM CHINA 
37 BGDWT WARID(BANGLADSH BANGLADESH 87 COLCM COM.COMCEL S.A COLOMBIA 
38 BRBCW C&W BARBADOS BARBADOS 88 COMHR COMORES TELECOM COMOROS ISLANDS 
39 BLRMD FE 'VELCOM' BELARUS 89 CODCT CELTEL-DRC CONG CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) 
40 BLR02 MTS - BELARUS BELARUS 90 CODSA OASIS SPRL CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) 
41 BELTB BELGACOM - BEL BELGIUM 91 CODVC VODACOM - CONGO CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) 
42 BELKO KPN(BASE) BELGIUM 92 COGCT CELTEL - CONGO CONGO (PEOPLES REPUBLIC) 
43 BELMO MOBISTAR GSM BELGIUM 93 COGLB LIBERTIS - COG CONGO (PEOPLES REPUBLIC) 
44 BENSP AREEBA - BENIN BENIN 94 COGWC WARID CONGO S.A CONGO (PEOPLES REPUBLIC) 
45 BEN02 MOOV-BENIN BENIN 95 HRVCN T-MOBILE CROTIA CROATIA 
46 BMUNI M3 WITELESS LTD BERMUDA 96 HRVVI VIP NET GSM CROATIA 
47 BTNBM B-MOBILE(BTNBM) BHUTAN 97 CUB01 C_COM (CUBACEL) CUBA 
48 BOLME MOVIL DE ENTEL BOLIVIA 98 CYPCT CYTA, CYPRUS CYPRUS 
49 BOLNT NUEVATEL BOLIVIA 99 CYPSC MTN CYPRUS CYPRUS 
50 BIHPT GSMBIH - BOSNIA BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 100 CZECM OSKAR CZECH REPUBLIC 
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Table (G) List of all foreign networks visited by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011. 
SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
101 CZERM T-MOBILE CZECH CZECH REPUBLIC 151 GRCSH TIM - GREECE GREECE 
102 CZEET TELEFONICA O2 CZECH REPUBLIC 152 GRCPF VODAFONE PANAFO GREECE 
103 DNKHU HI3G ACCESS-DNK DENMARK 153 GRDCW C&W GRENADA GRENADA 
104 DNKDM SONOFON,DENMARK DENMARK 154 GUMHT GUAM WIELESS GUAM 
105 DNKTD TDC MOBIL A/S DENMARK 155 GTMSC SERCOM (CLARO) GUATEMALA 
106 DNKIA TELIA-DENMARK DENMARK 156 GBRGT GUERNSEY, UK GUERNSEY 
107 DJIDJ DJIBOUTI-TELECO DJIBOUTI 157 GIN07 CELLCOM GUINEA GUINEA 
108 DMACW C&W DOMINICA DOMINICA 158 GIN03 INTERCEL GUINEE GUINEA 
109 DOM01 ORANGE DOMINICA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 159 GINGS ORANGE GUINEE GUINEA 
110 EGYEM ETISALAT MISR EGYPT 160 GUYUM CEL*STAR GUYANA GUYANA 
111 EGYAR MOBINIL, EGYPT EGYPT 161 HKGPP CHINA MBLE PTCL HONGKONG 
112 EGYMS VODAFONE EGYPT EGYPT 162 HKGNW CSL LTD HONGKONG 
113 SLVTP STE TELECOM SLV EL SALVADOR 163 HKGTC CSL, HONG KONG HONGKONG 
114 SLVTM TELEMOVIL EL SL EL SALVADOR 164 HKGMC HKT(PCCW MBL) HONGKONG 
115 GNQ01 ORANGE GQ EQUATORIAL GUINEA 165 HKGM3 HKT(PCCW MBLE) HONGKONG 
116 ESTEM AS EMT(EMT GSM) ESTONIA 166 HKGH3 HUTCHISON - HKG HONGKONG 
117 ESTRE ELISA MOBIILSID ESTONIA 167 HKGHT HUTCHISON, HKG HONGKONG 
118 ESTRB TELE2 - ESTONIA ESTONIA 168 HKGSM SMARTONE-VODAFN HONGKONG 
119 ETH01 ETHIOPIAN TELE ETHIOPIA 169 HUNH2 MAGYAR TELEKOM HUNGARY 
120 FROFT FAROESE TELE FAROE ISLANDS 170 HUNH1 PANNON GSM HUNGARY 
121 FJIDP DIGICEL(FIJI) FIJI 171 HUNVR VODAFONE-HUN HUNGARY 
122 FJIVF VF FIJI LIMITED FIJI 172 ISLPS SIMINN -ICELAND ICELAND 
123 FIN2G DNA FINLAND FINLAND 173 ISLTL VODAFONE ICELAND 
124 FINRL ELISA CORPORTN. FINLAND 174 INDJH BHARTI, ANDHRA INDIA, Andhra Pradesh 
125 FINTF SONERA FINLAND FINLAND 175 IND23 DISHNET-AIRCELL INDIA, Andhra Pradesh 
126 FINAM ALANDS MOBITEL FINLAND, ALANDS 176 INDAH ETISALAT DB INDIA, Andhra Pradesh 
127 FRAF3 BOUYGUES GSM FRANCE 177 IND07 IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Andhra Pradesh 
128 FRAF1 FRANCE TELECOM FRANCE 178 INDT0 TATA TELESERVCE INDIA, Andhra Pradesh 
129 FRAF2 SFR - CEGETEL FRANCE 179 IND04 DISHNET-AIRCELL INDIA, Bihar 
130 FRAF4 BOUYGUES TELECM FRENCH WEST INDIES 180 INDBR ETISALAT DB INDIA, Bihar 
131 GUF01 OUTREMER TELECO FRENCH WEST INDIES 181 INDIB IDEAR CELLULAR INDIA, Bihar 
132 GABCT CELTEL - GABON GABON 182 INDTB TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Bihar 
133 GAB01 LIBERTIS-GABON GABON 183 INDRC AIRCEL CELLULAR INDIA, Chennai 
134 GABTL MOOV-GABON GABON 184 INDSC SKYCELL COMM INDIA, Chennai 
135 GMBAC AFRICELL-GAMBIA GAMBIA 185 IND19 AIRCELL LTD INDIA, Delhi 
136 GMBCM COMIUM GAMBIA GAMBIA 186 INDAT AIRTEL, INDIA INDIA, Delhi 
137 GMB01 GAMCEL - GAMBIA GAMBIA 187 INDE1 ESSAR MOBILE INDIA, Delhi 
138 GEOGC GEOCEL,GEORGIA GEORGIA 188 INDND ETISALAT DB INDIA, Delhi 
139 GEOMA MAGTICOM,GEO GEORGIA 189 INDID IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Delhi 
140 GEOMT MOBITEL GEORGIA GEORGIA 190 INDDL MTNL - DELHI INDIA, Delhi 
141 DEUE1 E-PLUS, GERMANY GERMANY 191 INDA3 B.A.GUJARAT INDIA, Gujarat 
142 DEUE2 O2 (GERMANY) GM GERMANY 192 INDGU EISALAT DB INDIA, Gujarat 
143 DEUD1 T-MOBILE,GERMAN GERMANY 193 INDF1 ESSAR GUJARAT INDIA, Gujarat 
144 DEUD2 VODAFONE GERMAN GERMANY 194 INDBI IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Gujarat 
145 GHAMT MILLICOM GHANA 195 INDTG TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Gujarat 
146 GHASC MTN (SCANCOM) GHANA 196 INDA5 B.A.HARYANA INDIA, Haryana 
147 GHAGT ONETOUCH - GHA GHANA 197 INDHY ETISALAT DB INDIA, Haryana 
148 GHAZN ZAIN COM.GHANA GHANA 198 INDEH IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Haryana 
149 GIBGT GIBTEL, GIB GIBRALTAR 199 INDTH TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Haryana 
150 GRCCO COSMOTE GSM GREECE 200 INDBL AIRTEL,HIMACHAL INDIA, Himachal Pradesh 
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Table (G) List of all foreign networks visited by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011. 
SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
201 IND02 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, Himachal Pradesh 251 INDTC ETISALAT DB INDIA, Tamilnadu 
202 INDIH IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Himachal Pradesh 252 INDIT IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Tamilnadu 
203 IND22 AIRCELL LIMITED INDIA, Karnataka 253 INDT2 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Tamilnadu 
204 INDJB BHARTI,KARNATAK INDIA, Karnataka 254 IND17 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, Uttar Pradesh East 
205 INDKA ETISALAT DB INDIA, Karnataka 255 INDPE ETISALAT DB INDIA, Uttar Pradesh East 
206 INDSK SPICE TELECOM-K INDIA, Karnataka 256 INDIU IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Uttar Pradesh East 
207 INDT1 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Karnataka 257 INDT7 TATA TELESRVICE INDIA, Uttar Pradesh East 
208 INDA7 BHARTI KERALA INDIA, Kerala 258 INDA6 B.A.UP INDIA, Uttar Pradesh West 
209 IND20 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, Kerala 259 IND18 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, Uttar Pradesh West 
210 INDBK ESSAR CELLULAR INDIA, Kerala 260 INDPW ETISALAT DB INDIA, Uttar Pradesh West 
211 INDKE ETISALAT DB INDIA, Kerala 261 INDEU IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Uttar Pradesh West 
212 INDEK IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Kerala 262 INDT8 TATA TELESERVCE INDIA, Uttar Pradesh West 
213 INDT3 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Kerala 263 INDWB BSNL - INDIA INDIA, West Bengal 
214 INDMT BHARTI MOBITEL INDIA, Kolkata 264 IND03 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, West Bengal 
215 INDCC EAST LIMITED INDIA, Kolkata 265 INDIW IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, West Bengal 
216 INDIK IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Kolkata 266 INDT9 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, West Bengal 
217 INDTK TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Kolkata 267 IDNLT AXIS(LIPPOTEL) INDONESIA 
218 INDA8 B.A.MP INDIA, Madhya Pradesh 268 IDNEX EXCELCOMINDO INDONESIA 
219 INDMD ETISALAT DB INDIA, Madhya Pradesh 269 IDN89 HUTCHISON CP INDONESIA 
220 INDMP IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Madhya Pradesh 270 IDNSL SATELINDO INDONESIA 
221 INDRM RELIANCE INDIA INDIA, Madhya Pradesh 271 IDNTS TELKOMS, IDA INDONESIA 
222 INDT5 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Madhya Pradesh 272 IRNMI MTN IRANCELL IRAN 
223 IND24 AIRCELL LTD INDIA, Maharashtra 273 IRNRI TALIYA IRAN IRAN 
224 INDA2 B.A.MAHARASHTA INDIA, Maharashtra 274 IRN11 TCI-GSM 900 IRAN 
225 INDBM ESSAR CELLULAR INDIA, Maharashtra 275 IRNKI TKC-KIFZO, IRAN IRAN, KISH ISLAND 
226 INDMA ETISALAT DB INDIA, Maharashtra 276 IRQAC ASIA CELL-IRAQ IRAQ 
227 INDBO IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Maharashtra 277 IRQOR IRAQNA (ZAIN) IRAQ 
228 INDT6 TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Maharashtra 278 IRQKK KOREK TELECOM IRAQ 
229 IND21 AIRCELL LTD INDIA, Mumbai 279 IRQAT ZAIN-IRAQ IRAQ 
230 INDA1 B.A.MUMBAI INDIA, Mumbai 280 IRLH3 HUTCHISON 3G IRELAND 
231 INDB1 BPL MOBILE-MUM INDIA, Mumbai 281 IRLME METEOR, IRELAND IRELAND 
232 INDHM ESSAR LIMITED INDIA, Mumbai 282 IRLDF O2 - IRELAND IRELAND 
233 INDMU ETISALAT DB INDIA, Mumbai 283 IRLEC VODAFONE-IRELND IRELAND 
234 INDIM IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Mumbai 284 GBRMT MANX TELECOM,UK ISLE OF MAN 
235 INDMB MTNL - MUMBAI INDIA, Mumbai 285 ITAH3 H3G S.P.A ITALY ITALY 
236 INDTM TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Mumbai 286 ITASI TIM - ITALIA ITALY 
237 IND05 DISHNET AIRCELL INDIA, Orissa 287 ITAOM VODAFON-OMNITEL ITALY 
238 INDIO IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Orissa 288 ITAWI WIND - ITALY ITALY 
239 INDTO TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Orissa 289 CIVTL LOTENY TELECOM IVORY COST 
240 INDPN ETISALAT DB INDIA, Punjab 290 CIV02 MOOV(A-CELL) IVORY COST 
241 INDA9 PUNJAB - BHARTI INDIA, Punjab 291 CIV03 ORANGE-IVORY C IVORY COST 
242 INDSP SPICE TELECOM-P INDIA, Punjab 292 JAMCW CABLE&WIRELESS JAMAICA 
243 INDTP TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Punjab 293 JAMDC DIGICEL-JAMAICA JAMAICA 
244 INDRS ETISALAT DB INDIA, Rajasthan 294 JPNDO NTT DOCOMO-JPN JAPAN 
245 INDH1 HEXACOM INDIA INDIA, Rajasthan 295 JPNJP SOFTBANK MOBLE JAPAN 
246 INDIR IDEA CELLULAR INDIA, Rajasthan 296 GBRAJ AIRTEL JERSEY 
247 INDTR TATA TELESERVIC INDIA, Rajasthan 297 GBRJT JERSY TELECOM JERSEY 
248 INDAC AIRCELL LTD. INDIA, Tamilnadu 298 JORMC ORANGE JORDAN 
249 INDA4 B.A.TAMIL NADU INDIA, Tamilnadu 299 JORUM UMNIAH JORDAN JORDAN 
250 INDBT ESSAR CELLULAR INDIA, Tamilnadu 300 JORXT XPRESS - JORDAN JORDAN 
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Table (G) List of all foreign networks visited by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011. 
SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
301 JORFL ZAIN,JORDAN JORDAN 351 MLTGO GO MOBILE MALTA 
302 ARMKT KARABAKH - ARM KARABAKH (DISPUTED REGION) 352 MLTMM MELITA MOBILE MALTA 
303 KAZKZ K.CELL KAZAKHSTAN 353 MLTTL VDF MALTA LTD MALTA 
304 KAZKT KAR-TEL LLP(KM) KAZAKHSTAN 354 MRTMT MATTEL MAURITANIA 
305 KAZ77 MOBILE TELECOM KAZAKHSTAN 355 MRTMM MAURITEL MOBILE MAURITANIA 
306 KENEC ESSAR TELECOM KENYA 356 MUSCP CELLPLUS,MTS MAURITIUS 
307 KENSA SAFARICOM KENYA 357 MUSEM EMTEL LIMITED MAURITIUS 
308 KENTK TELKOM KENYA KENYA 358 MEXTL RADIOMOVL(TELCL MEXICO 
309 KENKC ZAIN-KENYA KENYA 359 MEXMS TELEFONICA MVLS MEXICO 
310 KWTKT KUWAIT_KTC KUWAIT 360 MDAMC MOLDCELL MOLDOVA 
311 KWTNM WATANIYA TELE KUWAIT 361 MDAVX VOXTEL MOLDOVA 
312 KWTMT ZAIN,KUWAIT KUWAIT 362 MCOM1 MONACO TELECOM MONACO 
313 KGZ01 BITEL,KYRGYZSTN KYRGYZSTAN 363 MNGMC MOBICOM-MONGOLI MONGOLIA 
314 KGZNT NURTELECOM LLC KYRGYZSTAN 364 MNEMT MTEL MONTENEGRO 
315 LAOTL TANGO LAO 365 YUGPM PRO MONTE GSM MONTENEGRO 
316 LVABT BITE LATVIA LATVIA 366 YUGTM T-MOBILE MONTENEGRO 
317 LVALM LATVIA MOBILE LATVIA 367 MSRCW MONTSERRAT MONTSERRAT 
318 LVABC TELE2 - LATVIA LATVIA 368 MARMT MEDI TELECOM SA MOROCCO 
319 LBNFL MIC 1 (ALFA) LEBANON 369 MARM1 MOROCO TELECOM MOROCCO 
320 LBNLC MTC - LEBANON LEBANON 370 MARM3 WANA CORPORATE MOROCCO 
321 LBR07 CELLCOM TELCO. LIBERIA 371 MOZ01 MCEL (TDM) MOZAMBIQUE 
322 LBRCM COMIUM LIBERIA LIBERIA 372 MOZVC VODACOM - MOZ MOZAMBIQUE 
323 LBY01 ELMADAR ALJADID LIBYA 373 NAM03 CELL ONE NAMIBIA 
324 LBYLM LIBYANA MOBPHON LIBYA 374 NAM01 NAMIBIA TELECOM NAMIBIA 
325 LIEMK MOBILKOM GSM LIECHTENSTEIN 375 NPLM2 SPICE NEPAL NEPAL 
326 LIEVE ORANGE-LIEVE LIECHTENSTEIN 376 NLDPT KPN TELECOM NETHERLANDS 
327 LIETG TELE 2 AKTIENGE LIECHTENSTEIN 377 NLDDT T-MBLE(ORANGE) NETHERLANDS 
328 LTUOM OMNITEL, LIT LITHUANIA 378 NLDPN T-MOBILE - NLD NETHERLANDS 
329 LTU03 TELE2-LITHUANIA LITHUANIA 379 NLDLT VODAFONE-NLD NETHERLANDS 
330 LTUMT UAB BITE LITHUANIA 380 NZLNH NZ-COMMUNICATN NEW ZEALAND 
331 LUXPT P&T, LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 381 NZLTM TELECOM MOBILE NEW ZEALAND 
332 LUXTG TANGO-LUXEMBURG LUXEMBOURG 382 NZLBS VODAFON N.ZELND NEW ZEALAND 
333 LUXVM VOX.MOBILE- LUX LUXEMBOURG 383 NICEN ENITEL-GSM1900 NICARAGUA 
334 MACCT CTM, MACAU MACAU 384 NERCT CELTEL - NIGER NIGER 
335 MACHT HUTCHISON-MACAU MACAU 385 NERTL MOOV-NIGER NIGER 
336 MKDCC COSMOFON - MKD MACEDONIA 386 NGAEM ETISALT NIGERIA NIGERIA 
337 MKDMM T-MBLE MACEDNIA MACEDONIA 387 NGAGM GLO MOBILE -NGA NIGERIA 
338 MKDNO VIP OPERATOR MACEDONIA 388 NGAMN MTN NIGERIA NIGERIA 
339 MDGCO CELTEL-MADACOM MADAGASCAR 389 NGAET ZAIN-NIGERIA NIGERIA 
340 MDGAN ORANGE - MDGAN MADAGASCAR 390 NORNC NETCOM, NORWAY NORWAY 
341 MDGTM TELMA MOBILE MADAGASCAR 391 NORNN NETWORK NORWAY NORWAY 
342 MWICT CELTEL - MALAWI MALAWI 392 NORTM TELENOR, NORWAY NORWAY 
343 MWICP TELEKOM MALAWI MALAWI 393 OMNNT NAWRAS - OMAN OMAN 
344 MYSCC CELCOM, MYA MALAYSIA 394 OMNGT OMAN MOBILE OMAN 
345 MYSMT DIGI TELECOM MALAYSIA 395 PAKMK MOBILINK, PAK PAKISTAN 
346 MYSBC MAXIS, MALAYSIA MALAYSIA 396 PAKTP TELENOR - PAK PAKISTAN 
347 MDV01 DHIRAAGU MALDIVES 397 PAKUF UFONE - PAK PAKISTAN 
348 MDVWM WATANIYA-MDVWM MALDIVES 398 PAKWA WARIDTEL - PAK PAKISTAN 
349 MLI01 MALITEL GSM-900 MALI 399 PAKPL ZONG(PAKTEL) PAKISTAN 
350 MLI02 ORANGE MALI SA MALI 400 PSEJE JAWWAL(PALCELL) PALESTINE 
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Table (G) List of all foreign networks visited by Etisalat roamers during the years 2008-2011. 
SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
401 PSEWM WATANIYA MOBILE PALESTINE 451 SLEAC AFRICELL-LINTEL SIERRA LEONE 
402 PANCW CW PANAMA PANAMA 452 SLECT CELTEL - S.L SIERRA LEONE 
403 PANDC DIGICEL PANAMA PANAMA 453 SLECM COMIUM(SL)LMTD. SIERRA LEONE 
404 PRYVX HOLA-PARAGUAY PARAGUAY 454 SGPM1 MOBILEONE, SPE SINGAPORE 
405 PRYTC TELECEL PARAGUY PARAGUAY 455 SGPST SINGTEL (900) SINGAPORE 
406 PERTM CLARO PERU PERU 456 SGPSH STARHUB PTE LT SINGAPORE 
407 PHLDG DIGITAL - PHLDG PHILIPPINES 457 SVKGT ORANGE SLOVAK SLOVAKIA 
408 PHLGT GLOBE TELECOM PHILIPPINES 458 SVKET T-MOBILE SVK SLOVAKIA 
409 PHLSR SMART COMM INC PHILIPPINES 459 SVKO2 TELEFONICA O2 SLOVAKIA 
410 POL02 ERA GSM, POLAND POLAND 460 SVNMT MOBITEL,SLOVEN SLOVENIA 
411 POLKM POLKOMTEL, POL POLAND 461 SVNSM SI.MOBIL SLOVENIA 
412 POL03 PTK-CENTERTEL POLAND 462 SVNVG TUSMOBIL SLOVENIA 
413 PRTOP OPTIMUS PORTUGAL 463 SOMNL NATIONLINK TEL. SOMALIA 
414 PRTTM TMN, PORTUGAL PORTUGAL 464 ZAFCC CELL C (PTY)LTD SOUTH AFRICA 
415 PRTTL VODAFONE - PRT PORTUGAL 465 ZAFMN MTN - S.AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA 
416 PRICL CLARO P RICO PUERTO RICO 466 ZAFVC VODACOM - S.A SOUTH AFRICA 
417 QATQT QTEL, QATAR QATAR 467 KORKT KT FREETEL SOUTH KOREA 
418 QATB1 VODAFONE QATAR QATAR 468 KORKF KT FREETEL CO. SOUTH KOREA 
419 REU02 ORANGE REUNION REUNION 469 KORSK SK TELE-S.KOREA SOUTH KOREA 
420 REUOT OUTREMER TELCOM REUNION 470 ESPRT ORANGE ES SPAIN 
421 FRARE SFR REUNIONAISE REUNION 471 ESPTE TELEFONICA, SPN SPAIN 
422 ROMMR ORANGE-ROMANIA ROMANIA 472 ESPAT VODAFONE ESPANA SPAIN 
423 ROMCS S.C. COSMOTE ROMANIA 473 LKAAT AIRTEL LANKA SRI LANKA 
424 ROMMF VODAFNE ROMANIA ROMANIA 474 LKADG DIALOG TEL PLC SRI LANKA 
425 RUSKH BAYKALWESTCOM RUSSIA 475 LKAHT HUTCHISON SRI LANKA 
426 RUS17 ERMAK RMS RUSSIA 476 LKA71 MOBITEL-SRILANK SRI LANKA 
427 RUSEC LLC EKATERNBURG RUSSIA 477 LKACT TIGO SRI LANKA 
428 RUSNW MEGAFON-RUSSIA RUSSIA 478 KNACW ST. KITTS ST. KITTS & NEVIS 
429 RUS01 MTS, RUSSIA RUSSIA 479 VCTCW ST.VINCENT ST. VINCENT 
430 RUS03 NCC - RUSSIA RUSSIA 480 LCACW S. LUCIA ST.LUCIA 
431 RUSNO NOVGOROD TELCOM RUSSIA 481 SDNBT AREEBA SUDAN SUDAN 
432 RUS16 NTC - RUSSIA RUSSIA 482 SDNVC VIVACELL SUDAN 
433 RUSSC SCS RUSSIA 483 SUDMO ZAIN SD - SUDAN SUDAN 
434 RUS14 TELESET LTD. RUSSIA 484 SWZMN MTN - SWAZILAND SWAZILAND 
435 RUSUT URALTEL RUSSIA 485 SWEHU HI3G ACCESS-SWE SWEDEN 
436 RUSBD VIMPELCOM RUSSIA 486 SWEIQ TELE2, SWEDEN SWEDEN 
437 RUS07 ZAO SMARTS RUSSIA 487 SWEEP TELENOR SVERIGE SWEDEN 
438 RWAMN MTN RWANDACELL RWANDA 488 SWETR TELIASONERA-SWE SWEDEN 
439 RWATG TIGO RWANDA RWANDA 489 CHEOR ORANGE COMM SA SWITZERLAND 
440 SMOSM SAN MARINO TELE SAN MARINO 490 CHEDX SUNRISE COMM.AG SWITZERLAND 
441 SAUET ETIHAD ETISALAT SAUDI ARABIA 491 CHEC1 SWISSCOM, SWZ SWITZERLAND 
442 SAUAJ SAUDI TELECOM SAUDI ARABIA 492 SYRSP AREEBA SYRIA SYRIA 
443 SAUZN ZAIN KSA SAUDI ARABIA 493 SYR01 SYRIATEL- SYRIA SYRIA 
444 SENSG SENTEL GSM SENEGAL 494 TWNLD CHANGHWA-TAIWAN TAIWAN 
445 SENAZ SONATEL SENEGAL 495 TWNFE FAR EAST,TAIWAN TAIWAN 
446 YUGTS TELEKOM-SERBIA SERBIA 496 TWNKG KG TELECOM LTD TAIWAN 
447 YUGMT TELENOR D.O.O SERBIA 497 TWNPC TAIWAN MBLE CO. TAIWAN 
448 SRBNO VIP MOBLE D.O.O SERBIA 498 TWNTG VIBO TELCOM INC TAIWAN 
449 SYCAT AIRTEL TELECOM SEYCHELLES 499 TJKBM BABILON-MOBIL TAJIKISTAN 
450 SYCCW CABLE WIRELESS SEYCHELLES 500 TJK01 INDIGO NORTH-TJ TAJIKISTAN 
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SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET SERIAL TAP OPERATOR MARKET 
501 TJKIT INDIGO SOUTH-TJ TAJIKISTAN 551 ZWEET ECONET-ZIMBABWE ZIMBABWE 
502 TJK91 TACOM TAJIKISTAN 552 ZWEN1 NET ONE - ZIMB ZIMBABWE 
503 TZACT CELTEL - TZA TANZANIA 
    504 TZAMB MOBITEL-TZA TANZANIA 
    505 TZAVC VODACOM LTD TANZANIA 
    506 TZAZN ZANTEL TANZANIA 
    507 THAAS AIS ,THAILAND THAILAND 
    508 THAWP TOTAL ACCESS THAILAND 
    509 THACO TRUE MOVE CO. THAILAND 
    510 TGOTL TELECEL - TOGO TOGO 
    511 TTO12 TSTT-TRINIDAD TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
    512 TUNOR ORANGE TUNISIA TUNISIA 
    513 TUNTA TUNISIANA TUNISIA 
    514 TUNTT TUNISIE TELECOM TUNISIA 
    515 TURIS AVEA ILETISIM H TURKEY 
    516 TURTC TURKCELL-TURKEY TURKEY 
    517 TURTS VODAFONE TELEKO TURKEY 
    518 TKMBC BCTI TURKMENIST TURKMENISTAN 
    519 TCACW TURKS & CAICOS TURKS & CAICOS 
    520 UGACE CELTEL - UGANDA UGANDA 
    521 UGAMN MTN-UGANDA UGANDA 
    522 UGAOR ORANGE UGANDA UGANDA 
    523 UGATL UTL - UGANDA UGANDA 
    524 UGAWT WARID TELECOM UGANDA 
    525 GBRHU HUTCHISON 3G-UK UK 
    526 GBRCN O2 (CELLNET),UK UK 
    527 GBROR ORANGE, UK UK 
    528 GBRME T-MOBILE - U.K UK 
    529 GBRVF VODAFONE, U.K. UK 
    530 UKRAS ASTELIT UKRAINE 
    531 UKRGT GOLDEN TELECOM UKRAINE 
    532 UKRKS KYIVSTAR - GSM UKRAINE 
    533 UKRUM MOBILECOMM, UKR UKRAINE 
    534 UKRUT UKRTELECOM UKRAINE 
    535 UKRRS URS UKRAINE 
    536 URYAN ANTEL URUGUAY 
    537 USACG CINGULAR GENES USA 
    538 USANC NEXTEL COMM USA 
    539 USAW6 T-MOBILE USA USA 
    540 UZBDU BELEENE UZ UZBEKISTAN 
    541 UZB05 UCELL-COSCOM JV UZBEKISTAN 
    542 UZB07 UZDUNROBITA-UZB UZBEKISTAN 
    543 VEND2 DIGITEL VENEZUELA 
    544 VNMVI VIETNAM TELECOM VIETNAM 
    545 VNMVT VIETTEL TELECM VIETNAM 
    546 YEMYY HITS-UNITEL YEMEN 
    547 YEMSA SABAFON YEMEN YEMEN 
    548 YEMSP SPACETEL (MTN) YEMEN 
    549 ZMBCE CELTEL - ZAMBIA ZAMBIA 
    550 ZMB02 MTN (TELECEL) ZAMBIA 
     
 
